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Accountability ensures the proper use and distribution of digital data, including keys
and programs. Without it, the digital world would become lack of order and in turn it
will hinder the development and deployment of information technology itself. In this
dissertation, we considered accountability for three different entities:
1. We systematically studied proactive deterring mechanisms for user accountability.
Specifically, we study how to enforce the user to follow the key management
policy in the single user setting of traditional public key infrastructure (PKI), and
the multi-user setting of digital rights management. The crux of the deterring
mechanisms is that a piece of user secret information is embedded into the public
key/parameter. If the key owner makes a working device, e.g., a decryption device,
and leaks it, then any recipient of the device can recover the secret information.
This de-incentivizes illegal re-distribution and significantly advances the existing
mindsets of detect-and-punish paradigm, which becomes ineffective when facing a
private illegal redistribution.
2. We initiated the study of cliptography: preserving security of cryptographic
primitives when all algorithms may be subverted by the adversary. This is
regarding implementation provider accountability. Cliptography is possible since
the adversary also tries to avoid the detection of misbehavior. As a first step, we
focused on dealing with key/public parameter generation algorithm, and provide
the first secure one way functions, signature, and PRG in the aforementioned
complete subversion model.
3. We revisited the current techniques for enforcing service provider accountability
which aims at providing undeniable proofs when a malicious behavior is detected.
Given that a fingerprinting scheme is usually used for copyrighting large files like
a movie, we suggest to study and construct the first asymmetric fingerprinting
scheme with an optimal communication rate.
We for the first time show a generic transformation that converts any identity based
encryption (IBE) to be accountable, and the ciphertext size only doubles that
of the underlying IBE. Furthermore, our generic constructions can be extended
without losing efficiency, to provide several properties like allowing identity re-use
that are not known whether achievable before.
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With the fast growing of information technology, digital data is produced and
transferred in an unprecedented scale and speed. This revolutionizes many aspects of
human creativity, but also, arouses serious concerns about data security, personal privacy,
communication authenticity and many others. Accountability, among those properties,
is one of the most important features that ensures the proper use and distribution of
digital data, keys and programs.
Cryptography provides protection mechanisms for the information that people
prefer to hide which may otherwise easily leaked in the Internet, e.g., private personal
information, or even their identities. However it is a double-edged sword in this digital
world. These powerful tools also provide convenient, even new ways for dishonest parties
to misbehave and even to participate in illegal acts.
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Accountability is indispensable, unfortunately, it does not come along automatically.
Sometimes, people even have incentives to deviate from the commonly acknowledged
principles that they are supposed to follow. For example, distributing pirate copies of
digital goods will bring financial gains for the illegal distributor with essentially no cost.
Even worse, in many cases, the dishonest parties are “insiders”, they do not have to
break the security of the cryptographic primitives Thus, we have to design new technical
mechanisms to enforce them.
Since accountability aims at ensuring people to produce/use data, key or program
according to certain policies, depending on the form of the enforcement, we may have
three types of mechanisms: (i.) detect-then-punish, (ii.) proactively deter; and (iii.)
even sometimes, prevent the malicious behavior at the beginning.
1.2 Contributions of This Dissertation
In this thesis, we will discuss the cryptographic tools developed by us for enforcing
accountability in three different kinds of entities in different application scenarios,
regarding all the three enforcing mechanisms mentioned above. We elaborate below.
User accountability. Encryption schemes are one of the most widely used crypto-
graphic primitives. However, the security relies on the fact that the secret key is private.
This requires a carefully designed key management policy. It follows that an equally
important question is how to enforce the policy to be obeyed. A common requirement in
a key management policy, (e.g., for a company public key infrastructure, or in a digital
right management system), is that the key owner should not distribute the secret key to
any third party. However, there is no built-in incentives for the key owners to follow;
even worse, there may be motivation for them to leak (or “sell”) a decryption device
2
(called a pirate box). In this case, we consider the key owners to be the adversary (while
in classic security notions in cryptography, the secret key is not known to the adversary).
It follows that it is very difficult to prevent the adversaries from misbehaving, (unless
we introduce some extra hardware assumption which we don’t use in this dissertation).
Existing mindsets focus on designing techniques to detect the illegal re-distribution
and then some actions maybe taken by the authority (e.g., the manager or the service
provider) as punishment. One well-known cryptographic primitive aiming at enabling
the detection of illegal content re-distribution is traitor tracing scheme (TTS) [36].
However, in order to make this detect-then-punish mechanism work, the authority
has to have access to the pirate box. A foxy adversary can make a decryption device,
(e.g., a program), and simply uploads it to, say, a private hacker forum, the access of
which is granted to the members exclusively. The authority can not have access to
this private form, even may not be aware of the existence of it. Since the members of
the forum can download and use the program, they have no incentive to report to the
authority about such a pirate box. This demonstrates the ineffectiveness of traditional
tools such as a TTS, when dealing with private re-distribution.
We initiate the systematic study of proactive deterring mechanisms for enforcing key
management policy. In particular, we introduced two new frameworks of leakage-deterring
public key cryptography (LD-PKC), and traitor deterring schemes (TDS).
• LD-PKC: We first consider the accountability problem in the traditional public
key infrastructure (PKI) of enforcing a key management policy that every key
owner should keep the key to himself. To achieve this, we augment the PKI with a
new property of leakage-deterrence. During the public key certification procedure,
a piece of secret information s from the key owner will be securely embedded
into her public key (or the certificate.) The system is also coupled with another
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recovering procedure that given access to any partially working cryptographic
functionality (e.g.,decryption) of the key owner, anyone can retrieve s. Having the
new feature, when a key owner plans to leak her key or a device (say, decryption)
in any form (even privately to a third party), she will bear with the potential
cost/punishment that her secret s will be revealed. In this way, the key owner is
deterred. Adding leakage deterrence turns out to be highly non-trivial. We did a
systematic study for all the major asymmetric cryptographic primitives including
public key encryption, signature schemes and identification schemes.
• TDS: Similarly, a TDS augments the classical TTS in the multi-recipient encryption
system, with the new embedding and recovering mechanism we introduce. In
a multi-recipient encryption system, there are a set of users, and each of them
have a key that enables the decryption of ciphertext generated with the system
encryption key. A TDS suggests that during the system initialization, a piece of
secret information for each user is embedded into the public parameter. If a subset
of the users collude to provide a decryption device, one may recover the secret
of one of the colluders. While, in a TTS, only an identity of the colluders can
be retrieved (even this requires a special property called public traceability). We
gave two constructions for TDS with black-box recovery, and apply it to resolve a
major open problem in digital signet with self-enforcement [51]. Along the way we
introduce new cryptographic primitives of fuzzy locker and comparison predicate
encryption with exponentially large domain, which are of their own interests.
• Bitcoin as a trusted collateral: Having the new mechanisms at hand, we identify
an extremely suitable information which can be used as each user’s collateral
embedded in the public repository — Bitcoin. Bitcoin has a public ledger that
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records every transaction ever happened. But only with a secret key corresponding
to an account, any outgoing transaction (from that account) can be generated.
Every user will be associated with one bitcoin account which is required to be
frozen until the user cancels the service. The secret key of each account will
be embedded into the public parameter. Our recovering mechanism enables the
recipient of the pirate box to retrieve a secret key and then transfer the money
out. The authority will also notice the transaction and further stop the service.
Implementation provider accountability. Consider conventional use of programs,
including cryptographic primitives, a regular user simply runs the software or hardware
obtained from some providers.
Kleptography, originally introduced by Young and Yung [130], studies how to
steal information securely and subliminally from cryptosystems. The basic framework
considers the (in)security of malicious implementations of a standard cryptographic
primitive by embedding a “backdoor” into the system. Remarkably, crippling subliminal
theft is possible even if the subverted cryptosystem produces output indistinguishable
from a secure “reference implementation.” After a long hiatus, interest in such issues
was rekindled by the dramatic revelations of Edward Snowden, demonstrating that such
deliberate attacks have been deployed and presumably used for massive surveillance.
Notably, Bellare, Paterson, and Rogaway [11] initiated a formal study of attacks on
symmetric key encryption algorithms.
Motivated by the original examples of subverting key generation algorithms in
the kleptography papers from Young and Yung [130, 131], we initiate the study of
cryptography in the setting where all algorithms are subject to kleptographic attacks—
we call this cliptography. As a first step, we formally study the fundamental primitives
of one-way function and trapdoor one-way function in this “complete subversion” model.
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We describe a general, rigorous immunization strategy to clip the power of kleptographic
subversions; concretely, we propose a general framework for sanitizing (trapdoor) one-way
function index generation algorithms by hashing the function index, and prove that such
a procedure indeed destroys the connection between a subverted function generation
procedure and any possible backdoor. Along the way, we propose a split program model
for practical deployment.
We then examine two standard applications of (trapdoor) one way functions in this
complete subversion model. First, we consider construction of “higher level” primitives via
black-box reductions. In particular, we show how to use our trapdoor one-way function
to defend against key generation sabotage, and showcase a digital signature scheme
that preserves existential unforgeability when all algorithms (including key generation,
which was not considered to be under attack before) are subject to kleptographic attacks.
Additionally, we demonstrate that the classic Blum–Micali pseudorandom generator
(PRG), using our “unforgeable” one-way function, yields a backdoor-free PRG. Second,
we generalize our immunizing technique to one way functions, and propose a new public
immunization strategy to randomize the public parameters of a (backdoored) PRG.
This notably contrasts with previous results of Dodis, Ganesh, Golovnev, Juels, and
Ristenpart [47], which require an honestly generated random key.
Thus, we develop fundamental cryptographic primitives with meaningful security
guarantees in a quite adversarial setting, where one cannot rely on private randomness
and all associated algorithms, including key and index generation, are under attack.
Putting into the context of accountability, clipotography aims at enforcing honest
implementation. In particular, in the case that the adversary ("big brother") wants also
avoid the detection of misbehavior and thus her power is restricted to some extend. We
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will essentially explore this opportunity to amplify the restriction so that the security
can be preserved.
Service provider accountability. In most of the systems, there is service provider
(SP) who sets up the system, thus the user secret key or the secret information is known
to the SP. One nature question is do we have to trust the SP completely when considering
the user accountability problem. In practice, one may think the service provider cares
about its reputation and will well behave. However, there are potential system breaches
and even insider attacks. More importantly, when a malicious user behavior is detected,
if a third party (e.g., a judge) has to be involved, the user can simply emphasize the
possible misbehavior of the SP. Thus excluding the capability of the SP to frame users
can guarantee that one can form an undeniable proof when misbehaviors are detected.
This will improve the applicability of the concept of detect-then-punish.
We considered two different scenarios for restricting SP. Although the concepts for SP
accountability exists in both settings, there are different kinds of restrictions that hinder
their wide use in practice. In this thesis, we significantly improve the state-of-the-art,
and push them closer to be applicable in practice.
• Rate optimal asymmetric fingerprinting: The first setting is digital rights manage-
ment (DRM) , e.g., a pay-TV service. Similar to the classical notion of TTS, a
fingerprinting scheme enables the identification of a pirate box/data. However,
the whole system is initialized by the SP, and all the user secret codewords are
generated (thus known to) the SP. The concept of asymmetric fingerprinting sug-
gests that via a secure two party protocol, the SP only learns half of the codeword
of each user, and some references (e.g., commitments) of the other half of the
codeword. The half code known to the SP can still be used to trace, and the SP
can file a accusation. But now the SP has no knowledge of the other half code,
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thus a judge can make a final decision to check whether the other half codeword
also implicates the user.
However, security comes with a price of less efficiency. In particular, we examine
the communication efficiency, which is one of the most critical considerations when
transmitting big data, e.g., high resolution movies in the DRM setting. We suggests
to systematically study the communication rate of an asymmetric fingerprinting
protocol, i.e., the data needed over the actual communication should approach
one very fast when the size of the data grows. We constructed the first such rate
optimal asymmetric fingerprinting scheme, and along the way we formally analyze
several overlooked security concerns.
• Accountable Identity Based Encryption: Identity based encryption (IBE) provides a
compelling solution to replace PKI, and the flexibility of using any identity as a
public key leads to many breakthroughs in cryptography. However an inherent
weakness of the IBE system is the decryption key has to be generated by a trusted
party, say a service provider. Accountable authority IBE (A-IBE) aims at easing
this conflict between the privacy and the functionality, in a way that during key
generation, the user randomly selects one key from an exponentially many keys
generated by the authority. If the authority leaks a decryption device of the
user, the key selected by the user and this extra key would be different, and they
together forms an evidence that the authority misbehaves.
Although A-IBE significantly improve the accountability of the authority, however,
it is still not practical for a couple of reasons. (i.) existing constructions are either
inefficient, or rely on special structure and not compatible with the standardized
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designs, e.g., [26]. (ii.) when a user accidentally lost his secret key, the identity
has to be abandoned and a new identity should be used for issuing a new key.
We proposed a generic way of compiling an IBE into an A-IBE, such that one
can upgrade the efficient deployments like the Boneh-Franklin IBE [19]. More
importantly, this generic transformation only doubles the ciphertext size (3 more
group elements if using [19]). Furthermore, we improve the generic construction
with public traceability and allow identity re-use, which drastically advance the
usability of A-IBE schemes.
1.3 Organizations
We arrange the presentation as the order of proactive deterring mechanisms for user
accountability; implementor accountability; and service provider accountability. In more
detail, we will present leakage-resilient public key cryptography in chapter 2; and we
then extend the notion to the multi-recipient encryption scenarios and present traitor
deterring schemes in chapter 3. Then we shift gears to introduce and explain our initial
works of cliptography in chapter 4. Furthermore, to improve the applicability of current
solutions for SP accountability, we present the rate optimal asymmetric fingerprinting
problem in chapter 5, and discuss our improvement of efficient generic transformation of
A-IBE in chapter 6. And finally, we conclude and explain future works in chapter 7.
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Chapter 2
Leakage Deterring Public Key Cryptography
2.1 Introduction
Consider any organization that maintains a PKI supporting various cryptographic
functions including public-key encryption, signatures and identification. How is it
possible to prevent individuals from sharing their cryptographic functions? Certified
PKI members, out of convenience or even malice, can delegate their private keys to
each other (or even to outsiders), thus violating accountability and organizational policy.
Even worse, delegation can be partial: for instance, a public-key encryption user can
share (or, in fact, even sell) an implementation that only decrypts messages of a certain
form (e.g., only e-mails from a specific source). Seemingly, very little can be done to
prevent this as the adversary in this case is the owner of the cryptographic key and
hence she may freely choose to share it with others either directly or by incorporating
its functionality within a larger system that is shared.
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The above scenario puts forth the central problem of our work: how is it possible to
prevent the sharing of cryptographic functions? The main challenge here is that the
owner of the key is adversarial: she wishes to share a program or hardware device that
(potentially only partly) implements her main cryptographic functionality. Given that
she possesses the key (either in software or hardware), it is impossible for her to be
prevented from delegating it. However, as we highlight, there can be ways for her to be
deterred from doing so. A straightforward deterrence mechanism would be to identify
and penalize the sharing behavior. However, the enforcement of a penalty mechanism
is contingent to detecting the act of sharing — something that limits the effectiveness
of penalties: a cautious adversary can keep itself “below the radar” and thus remain
penalty-free. To address this we put forth and explore a more proactive approach.
A cryptographic scheme will be called leakage-deterring if the release of any imple-
mentation of the cryptographic function (e.g, decryption, signing), leads to the recovery
of some private information (that the owner prefers to keep hidden) by anyone that
possesses the implementation. Leakage deterrence is thus achieved in the sense that
sharing the cryptographic function in any form incurs the penalty of revealing the private
information (while non-sharing maintains its privacy).
Note that a leakage-deterring primitive should retain its original functionality (e.g.,
encryption, signing, identification) but it also offers two additional operations: first, it is
possible to embed private data into the public-key of the primitive in a way that they are
(at least) semantically secure – we call this property privacy. The embedding operation is
facilitated through an interaction with an authority that vouches for the integrity of the
private data and is akin to a PKI certification of the owner’s public-key. In this fashion,
the primitive’s public-key becomes “enhanced” and is a carrier of private information
itself (i.e., a ciphertext) — otherwise the intended functionality of the primitive should
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remain unchanged. The second operation that is offered by a leakage-deterring primitive
comes into play when the owner of the secret key produces an implementation of the
main operation in the form of a “box” and shares it with other entities (in software or
hardware). Given such a box, any entity that receives it can utilize a public recovering
algorithm that will interact with the box and produce the private data that are embedded
into the owner’s enhanced public-key – we call this property recoverability.
In a nutshell, designing a leakage-deterring scheme requires the transformation of
the public-key of the primitive into a (one-time) ciphertext that can be decrypted by
any working implementation of the cryptographic functionality. The main challenge
comes precisely from this latter requirement: any working implementation of the crypto-
graphic functionality should be usable as a decryption key that unlocks the private data
embedded into the public-key, even if the adversarial implementor takes into account
the recoverability algorithm and the enhanced public-key that carries the private data
when implementing the functionality.
To appreciate the complexity of the problem, consider a naive attempt to produce a
leakage-deterring public-key encryption (PKE): the authority certifies as the enhanced
public key the pair (pk, ψ) where ψ = Enc(pk, s) and s is the private data related to
the owner. Recoverability can be attempted by feeding ψ into a decryption box. It is
apparent that this construction can be defeated by an adversarial implementation of
decryption that given input c, it decrypts it only in the case c 6= ψ (or even Dec(c) 6= s).
The constructions we seek should facilitate recoverability even if the adversary releases
implementations that work for arbitrary input distributions of her choice.
The applications of leakage-deterring cryptographic primitives are in any context
where the intentional leakage of a cryptographic functionality should be deterred or
restricted in some fashion or in a context where the leakage of an implementation should
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enable the computation of a value that is otherwise hidden. In the most simple scenario,
the enhanced public-key contains some piece of information that the owner prefers to keep
secret (e.g., her credit-card number or similar piece of private information as suggested
by Dwork, Lotspiech and Naor [51] that introduced the concept of self-enforcement –
in a related but different context – see below). It follows that the system setup “self-
enforces” the owner to keep the cryptographic functionality to herself. Depending on the
deployment environment, different types of secret-information can be used. We describe
more application scenarios of leakage deterring cryptographic primitives in section 2.7.
Our contributions. We introduce, formalize and implement leakage-deterring cryp-
tographic primitives for public-key encryption, digital signatures, and identification
schemes. The main technical contributions we provide are three different techniques
for constructing leakage-deterring cryptographic primitives. Our techniques enable the
secure embedding of private information into the public key of the primitive in a way
that is recoverable given any (even partially) working implementation. Our first method,
applies to encryption that is partially homomorphic; given a box that works only for some
adversarially chosen distributions we show how to exploit the homomorphic property to
appropriately manipulate a target ciphertext and make it decryptable by the adversarial
decryption box. Our second method, which can rely on any encryption scheme, hides the
key that unlocks the private information into an exponentially large key space that is
encoded in the public-keys. By using appropriate redundancy in the public key space we
enable the tracing of the vector of keys that identify the private information, out of any
(even partially working) implementation. Achieving recoverability while maintaining
small ciphertext size in this setting requires an involved recoverability algorithm which is
one of the highlights of our contributions. Finally, our third method applies to signature
and identification schemes. It uses the fact that working implementations of suitably
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chosen such primitives can be used to build “knowledge extractors.” These are algorithms
that reveal information about the secret-key of the underlying primitives which we use
to hide the private information. We note that the idea of using extractors for preventing
the transfer of identification tokens has been used before [28, 30, 78, 98] in the sense
that sharing a token implies sharing the key. Going beyond this we show here that
secret key can be of sufficient entropy so that it simultaneously hides the embedded
owner information while still maintaining the security of the underlying scheme. In
fact we show that no additional intractability assumptions are necessary for achieving
leakage-deterring signature and identification schemes.
Our first construction for PKE requires a standard homomorphic property and
achieves constant size ciphertexts while offering recoverability for any (non-trivial)
adversarial distribution. The second construction is generic and the size of ciphertexts
is a parameter that increases as the min-entropy of the allowed adversarial distributions
becomes smaller. We analyze our constructions in the IND-CPA setting and then
present a generic transformation to obtain IND-CCA2 security1. It is evident that there
is a trade-off between privacy and recoverability. For encryption schemes, we aim at
maximizing the recoverability while privacy can only be achieved if no decryption query is
allowed. For the case of signatures, we present a construction that maintains the privacy
1It may come as a surprise that recoverability and IND-CCA2 can actually coexist. Attaining
IND-CCA2 intuitively means that a decryption oracle basically leaks no useful information about
manipulated ciphertexts. Thus, the recovering algorithm can seemingly do nothing useful with access
to a decryption implementation beyond decrypting valid ciphertexts, which if related to the enhanced
public-key can be rejected. Still, the paradox can be resolved, if one observes that the decryption oracle
should be useless only with respect to breaking the security of regular ciphertexts and not the security
of the data that are somehow embedded into the enhanced public-key.
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of the embedded information even if the adversary has access to the signing functionality
(which is most desirable since digital signatures are typically publicly available). We still
manage to enable recoverability by exploiting the random oracle model and non-black-
box access to the implementation. Security properties of our identification schemes are
shown in the standard model. To attain privacy in the standard model we utilize strong
extractors for random variables with high conditional unpredictability.
Related work. The most relevant work to ours is [51] that introduced self-enforcement
as a way of avoiding illegal content redistribution in a multi-user setting. Self-enforcement
was argued there by ensuring (under nonfalsifiable assumptions) that an owner has only
two options when implementing a decoder: either using her private key (that includes
private personal information), or encoding a derived key that is of size proportional to
the data to be decrypted. In our terminology, this means that the schemes of [51] exhibit
a leakage-deterrence/program-length tradeoff and hence are not leakage-deterring per
se. Furthermore, recoverability in [51] is only “white-box” as opposed to the black-box
type that our constructions achieve. In another related line of work [28,30,78,98] it was
discussed how to deter a user from transferring her credentials (or the secret key directly)
to others in the context of identification systems. The techniques from these works – by
nature – were restricted to only identification schemes and digital signatures. In contrast,
our work encompasses all major public key cryptographic primitives (including PKE).
The primitive of circular encryption [28] might look promising at first sight to achieve
leakage-deterring PKE, however, no recovery mechanism which works for all partial
implementations is provided by this primitive. To resolve the main difficulty we explained
in a previous paragraph, new techniques other than circular encryption are needed.
Furthermore, for the case of identification and signature schemes, our method shows that
leakage-deterrence can be achieved without any assumptions beyond the one employed
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by the underlying primitive. Other forms of leakage deterring techniques were considered
in various settings, e.g., limited delegation [62], data collection [64], e-payments [120] or
designated verifier signatures in [95, 122] in the form of non-delegatability (which is a
weaker notion than our leakage-deterring concept).
Another related notion, introduced in [101], dealt with the problem copyrighting a
public-key decryption function: a single public-key decryption functionality should be
implemented in many distinct ways so that if an implementation is derived from some of
them, then it is possible to discover the index of at least one of the implementations that
was used. This notion was further investigated in [87] and was related to a TTS [37]. In
the context of PKE, the objective of copyrighting a function or of a TTS is orthogonal
to ours. While in both cases we deal with adversarial implementations of cryptographic
functionalities (hence the similarities in terminology), the adversarial goal is different:
in the case of traitor tracing, the adversary has many different implementations of the
same functionality and tries to produce a new one that is hard to trace back to the
ones she is given. In an attack against a leakage-deterring scheme on the other hand,
the adversary possesses an implementation of a cryptographic functionality and tries to
modify it in a way that it cannot be used to extract some information that is hidden in
the primitive’s public-key. Combining the two functionalities in one is an interesting
question and we will study it in next chapter (a step towards this general direction but
in a much weaker model than ours was suggested in [89] but the leakage-deterring aspect
(in our terminology) was found to be insecure in [88]).
Accountable authority identity based encryption (AIBE) [67,68,86,93,118] considers
the problem of judging whether an implementation of decryption belongs to the owner
or the PKG (in the context of IBE). In this setting, both the owner and the PKG may
be the potential adversary who try to implicate the other. Hence, some property similar
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to our recoverability is needed. In any case, the single bit decisional output required
by AIBE is much weaker than our recoverability requirement in leakage-deterring PKE
(even in the IBE setting) where by interacting with a decryption box, one should recover
the whole private data embedded in the enhanced public-key.
Finally we should point out that the notion of leakage deterrence is different from the
notion of leakage-resilience (see e.g., [52, 77]). Our notion aims at constructing schemes
with the property that intensional leakage of the cryptographic functionality implies the
revelation of some private owner information (hence they are “leakage-deterring”), while
the leakage-resilience notion aims at ensuring that the unintentional leakage (as in the
case of side channel attacks) provides no useful information to an adversary.
2.2 Preliminaries
First, we recall some known primitives and results which we utilize in our construc-
tions or security analysis.
Proof of Knowledge: [6] A proof of knowledge (PoK) protocol is one that a prover convinces
the verifier he knows a witness to a publicly known ppt predicate. This is a protocol
between two parties P, V where P proves a statement x ∈ L for a language L’s instance
x with its witness w from a witness set denoted by W (x). Suppose OV [P (x,w)↔ V (x)]
denotes the output of the verifier V after interacting in the protocol with the prover P ,
a proof of knowledge protocol satisfies the following two properties:
• Completeness: Honest prover always convinces the verifier: if w ∈ W (x), then
Pr[OV [(P (x,w)↔ V (x)] = 1] = 1.
• Soundness: There exist an expected ppt “knowledge extractor” E which interacts
with a malicious prover P ∗, and outputs a witness with overwhelming probability
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as long as the success probability that P ∗ convinces V is non-negligible. Formally,
for all x,w∗, whenever Pr[OV [(P ∗(x,w∗)↔ V (x)] = 1] is non-negligible it holds
that Pr[EP
∗
(x) ∈W (x)] happens with overwhelming probability.
Σ-Protocol: [43] One frequently used type of PoK protocols is the class of Σ-protocols,
which have a three move structure (a, e, z), starting with the prover sending a ‘commit’
message a, then the verifier sending a ‘challenge’ message e, and finally the prover
answering with a ‘response’ message z. Using the Fiat-Shamir transformation [53], one
can construct a signature scheme based on such protocol in the random oracle model [12].
Security of such signature schemes is comprehensively studied in [114], and it mainly
relies on the existence of a knowledge extractor algorithm (which is implied by the
soundness of the protocol).
General Forking Lemma: [9] The general forking lemma states that that if an adversary,
on inputs drawn from some distribution, produces an output, then the adversary will
produce another correlated output with different inputs from same distribution and same
random tape. Rigorously, let A be a probabilistic algorithm, with inputs (x, r1, . . . , rq; ρ)
that outputs a pair (J, σ), where ρ refers to the random tape of A (that is, the random
coins A will make). Suppose further that x is sampled from some distribution X, and
R is a super-polynomially large set and ri is sampled uniformly from R. Let acc be the
probability that J ≥ 1. We can then define a “forking algorithm" as follows,
• on input x: pick a random tape ρ for A.
• r1, . . . , rq r← R.
• (J, σ)← A(x, r1, . . . , rq; ρ)
• If J = 0, return (0, , ).
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• r′J , . . . , r′q r← R
• (J ′, σ′)← A(x, r1, . . . , rJ−1, r′J , . . . , r′q; ρ)
• If J ′ = J and rJ 6= r′J then return (1, σ, σ′), otherwise, return (0, , ).
Let frk be the probability that A outputs (b, σ, σ′), and b = 1, then frk ≥ acc(accq − 1|R|).
Strong one-time signature [96] A signature scheme Sig = (KeyGen,Sign,Verify) is a strong
one-time signature scheme if the success probability of any PPT adversary A in the
following game is negligible:
• The challenger sends A a verification key vk.
• A asks one signing query on some message m chosen by her and the challenger
returns a valid signature σ.
• A outputs a new signature (m∗, σ∗).
We say the adversary succeeds if: Verify(vk, (m∗, σ∗)) = 1 ∧ (m∗, σ∗) 6= (m,σ).
2.3 Definitions and Security Modeling
2.3.1 Definitions of leakage-deterring cryptographic primitives
A leakage-deterring cryptographic primitive includes two additional algorithms on
top of the regular algorithms the primitive should normally possess: EnKey(·), which
embeds some (private) owner related information s into the public key, and Rec(·)
which recovers s from the public-key by interacting with any non-trivial implementation
(or “box”) and can be executed by anyone. While the concept of a leakage-deterring
cryptographic primitive can be defined in abstract terms for a wide class of primitives we
find it more instructive to present it for three main cryptographic primitives individually;
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we focus on public-key encryption first; definitions of leakage-deterring signatures and
identification are presented in the following part. With these three examples at hand, it is
relatively straightforward to derive leakage-deterring definitions for other cryptographic
primitives following the same general structure (see also remarks below).
Leakage-deterring Public Key Encryption:
• KeyGen(1λ): On input security parameter λ, this algorithm returns a key pair
(pk, sk).
• EnKey(O,A): This is a protocol between two parties O (owner) and A (authority),
with inputs (pk, sk, s) and (pk, s) respectively that has the objective to embed
the private owner’s data s into his public-key; the protocol terminates with O
obtaining an enhanced key pair (epk, esk) and A obtaining simply epk.
• Enc(epk,m): On input a message m, the user’s enhanced public key epk, this
algorithm returns a ciphertext c.
• Dec(esk, c): On input a ciphertext c and enhanced secret key esk, this algorithm
returns m or fail ⊥.
• RecB,D(epk, δ):2 Using access to a decryption box B and a plaintext distribution
D (which is supposedly the one that B is suited for and is correct with probability
δ), as well as input the enhanced public key epk for a certain user, this algorithm
outputs s or fail ⊥.
2Having access to D is necessary; to see that, consider the following simple example: the box processes
the input only if the message encrypted is of the form sc||m for some secret string sc; otherwise it
outputs ⊥. It follows that without knowledge of D, the box is useless. This counterexample applies to
the other leakage-deterring primitives.
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The definitions for other public-key primitives are similar and we present them below.
They share the same basic structure in terms of the syntax of the recovering algorithm
but there is some variability across primitives with respect to when this algorithm is
supposed to operate. We tackle this question in the following section.
Leakage-deterring Signature Scheme: The definition of a leakage-deterring signature
scheme is defined in a similar vein to the definition of leakage-deterring PKE. Specifically,
algorithms KeyGen,EnKey are identical. The rest are defined as follows.
• Sign(esk,m): On input a message m, the user’s enhanced secret key esk this
algorithm returns a signature σ.
• Verify(epk,m, σ): On input message-signature pair (m,σ), and enhanced public
key epk, this algorithm returns 1 if valid, or 0 otherwise.
• RecD(epk,B, δ): Given a signing box B and a message distribution D, and on
input an enhanced public key epk, for a certain user, this algorithm outputs the
private string s belongs to this user or fail ⊥.
Leakage-deterring Identification Scheme: The case of leakage-deterring identification
schemes is similar to digital signatures with the differentiation that the Sign and Verify
algorithms are substituted by a protocol between two parties, the prover P and the
verifier V . Normally, the owner is assumed to be the prover but the owner, having access
to the secret-key, can issue implementations of the prover algorithm in the identification
protocol. Specifically we have the following. First KeyGen and EnKey are the same as in
the previous case of leakage-deterring signature schemes, for the other two,
• Identify(P, V ): this is a protocol between the prover P with inputs epk, esk and the
verifier V on input epk that terminates with the verifier outputting 1 (accepting) or
0 (rejecting the identification). We denote the transcripts as P (epk, esk)↔ V (epk).
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• Rec(epk,B, δ): Given an implementation B of the prover P algorithm in the
identification protocol, and input the enhanced public key epk, this algorithm
outputs s or fails ⊥.
Remark 1. One can think of EnKey as an extension of a public-key certification operation
by an authority. The owner may still utilize (pk, sk) for the primitive’s operation (as in
a PKI one may still use an uncertified key) but epk is the key designated for public use.
Furthermore, we note that in the Rec algorithm, one may distinguish several ways
that the algorithm may have access to the main functionality box (which is assumed to
be resettable, i.e., it does not maintain state from one query to the next). Specifically,
beyond black-box access we will also consider a certain type of non-black-box access.
2.3.2 Correctness and security modelling
In this section we introduce the main security requirements for leakage-deterring
cryptographic primitives. In general any leakage-deterring primitive should offer privacy
for the owner (as long as no implementation of the primitive is leaked) and recoverability,
i.e., that the recovering algorithm will be able to produce the private data of the owner
when it has access to a non-trivial implementation of the cryptographic primitive. Finally,
it is important that the introduction of the additional functionality does not disturb the
standard cryptographic properties of the primitive. We examine these properties below.
Definition 1. Privacy (of Owner’s Data): For an honest owner who does not leak
any non-trivial box, the privacy of its data bound in the enhanced public key should be
protected. To define the property formally we introduce the following game between a
challenger C and an adversary A.
• The challenger runs KeyGen(·) and sends to the adversary A the public key pk.
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• The adversary A chooses two private strings s0, s1 and sends them to the challenger.
• C chooses b and simulates EnKey(·) on sb and pk, sk; it sends epk to the adversary.
• A returns his guess b′ about b.
If there is no ppt adversary A can correctly guess b with non-negligible advantage,
i.e., for all PPT A, |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 | ≤  where  is a negligible function, we say the leakage-
deterring cryptographic scheme achieves privacy (in the sense of indistinguishability).
Furthermore, in the above game, we may allow A to observe the cryptographic
functionality on a certain input distribution. If the above definition holds even if the
adversary has access to an oracle O(esk, ·) (that is dependent on the enhanced secret-key
of the owner, e.g, decryption oracle or signing oracle w.r.t. some plaintext distribution
D) we will say that the scheme achieves privacy with respect to the secret-key oracle
O(esk, ·). Note that with respect to privacy we consider both owner and authority
honest. It is possible to extend the model to the case of a dishonest authority but this
goes beyond the scope of our current exposition (and intended use cases).
Definition 2. Recoverability (of Owner’s Data): If a dishonest owner releases a func-
tional box B, anyone having access to B should be able to recover the owner’s private
data from the enhanced public key epk. Formally, consider the following game between a
challenger and an adversary A:
• The adversary A on input 1λ generates a key pair (sk, pk) and submits it together
with the owner private data s to the challenger.
• The challenger acting as the authority runs EnKey with the adversary (playing the
role of the owner) to produce the enhanced key pair (epk, esk).
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• A outputs an implementation B and a distribution D.
• The challenger outputs the value s′ = RecB,D(epk, δ).
For a given δ, we will say that the leakage-deterring cryptographic primitive satisfies
black-box recoverability with respect to the class of input distributions D , if for any ppt
adversary A the following event in the game above happens with negligible probability.
(B is δ-correct w.r.t. D) ∧ (D ∈ D) ∧ (s′ 6= s)
Definition 3. δ-correctness: The predicate “B is δ-correct w.r.t. D” takes a different
form depending on the cryptographic primitive and is intended to capture the fact that
the box produced by the adversary should have some minimum utility parameterized by δ.
Consider the case of a public-key encryption scheme (KeyGen,Enc,Dec). The predi-
cate for δ-correctness w.r.t. D in this case is as follows:
Pr[B(Enc(epk,m)) = m] ≥ δ, where m← D
where the random variables epk,D, B are defined as in the game.
For a digital signature scheme (KeyGen, Sign,Verify), the notion of δ-correctness of
a box B for a message distribution D is defined as follows:
Pr[Verify(epk,m,B(m)) = 1] ≥ δ, where m← D
For an identification scheme (KeyGen, Identify), we define δ-correctness of an imple-
mentation B as follows:
Pr[OV [B(epk, esk)↔ V (epk)] = 1] ≥ δ,
where OV [B(epk, esk)↔ V (epk)] denotes the output of verifier V after interacting with
box B in an identification protocol.
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It is worth noting that the largest class of distributions D we can hope recoverability
to work for a leakage-deterring PKE is one that includes those distributions whose
predicting probability3 is by a non-negligible amount smaller than δ; otherwise, one can
implement a decryption box by always returning the most probable sample from D.
Also, note that for a signature box to be “non-trivial”, δ should be required to be
non-negligible w.r.t. distributions D with super-logarithmic min-entropy4. In the case
of identification schemes there is no general input passed in the identification box and
hence the choice of distribution D is immaterial.
We will also consider a form of the above definition where a non-black-box technique
is used for recovering the owner’s private data. In this case we can think of the Rec
algorithm as a family of algorithms parameterized by the box algorithm B (as opposed
to being a single algorithm with black-box access to B).
We next compare privacy and recoverability and observe a natural trade-off between
the two properties. Privacy w.r.t. a secret-key oracle O(esk, ·) for a distribution D (i.e.,
when adversarial access to the cryptographic primitive is allowed for input distribution D)
can not be achieved if the leakage-deterring cryptographic primitive satisfies black-box
3p(D) := 2−H∞(D), where H∞(D) = − logmaxx Pr[x ∈ D] is the min-entropy of D.
4This entropy requirement for a non-trivial signing box B is necessary. Consider the following
example. The key owner prepares a list containing a polynomial number of message-signature pairs, and
implements B for a distribution D which has those messages as its support. B works by simply checking
whether a queried message belongs to the list and if yes, it outputs the corresponding signature. Given
that such implementation can be produced from publicly collected signatures, the recoverability of the
owner secret from such implementation would imply that the privacy property collapses. To exclude this
trivial implementation we require that the min-entropy of the message distribution is super-polynomial
(and hence this trivial implementation has a super-polynomial description).
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recoverability w.r.t. D , in case D ∈ D . This easily follows from the fact that the privacy
adversary can simulate the Rec algorithm with the help of the secret key oracle.
Security Properties. We next consider how the individual security properties for
leakage-deterring primitives should be amended. In general, the original security property
(e.g., IND-CPA or unforgeability) should be retained with respect to the enhanced public
and secret-keys even in the presence of a corrupted authority running the EnKey protocol.
• IND-CPA Security (for leakage-deterring PKE with a dishonest authority): Consider
the following game between the adversary A and the challenger C:
• The challenger runs KeyGen(·) to get (pk, sk) and returns pk to the adversary A.
• The adversary A selects s and playing the role of the authority runs EnKey(·) with
the challenger on input pk, s.
• The adversary A chooses two messages m0,m1, and sends them to the challenger.
• C randomly picks a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, and gives A the encryption of mb under epk.
• Finally, A returns a guess b′ about b.
Suppose there is no ppt adversary A can guess b correctly with non-negligible advantage,
i.e, |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 | ≤ , where  is a negligible function. In this case, we say that the
leakage-deterring encryption is IND-CPA-secure (with a dishonest authority).
If we allow the adversary to ask decryption queries at anytime before outputting the
guess (it can be both before and after receiving the challenge ciphertext, with the only
restriction being that the challenge ciphertext cannot be queried), then we refer to this
property as IND-CCA2 security.
We can also consider the security definition with an honest authority, in which case
both the algorithms KeyGen,EnKey are executed by the challenger.
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• IND-CPA Security (for leakage-deterring PKE with an honest authority) Consider the
following game between an adversary A and a challenger C:
• The challenger runs KeyGen(·) to get (pk, sk) and returns pk to A.
• The adversary A selects s and playing the role of the owner runs EnKey(·) with
the challenger (as authority) to get epk.
• The adversary A chooses two messages m0,m1, and sends them to the challenger.
• C randomly picks a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, and gives A the encryption of mb under epk.
• Finally, A returns a guess b′ about b.
Suppose there is no ppt adversaryA can guess b correctly with a non-negligible advantage,
i.e, |Pr[b′ = b] − 12 | ≤ , where  is a negligible function. In this case, we say that
the leakage-deterring encryption is IND-CPA-secure (with honest authority). The only
difference with standard IND-CPA security is that here we have an extra second step.
Below, we will only give unforgeability/impersonation resistance with a dishonest
authority, it is straightforward to derive definitions in the setting of an honest authority
by changing the roles of challenger and adversary play during EnKey protocol.
• Unforgeability (for leakage-deterring digital signatures): Consider the following game
between the adversary and the challenger:
• The challenger runs KeyGen(·) to get pk and returns pk to the adversary A.
• The Adversary A selects s and playing the role of the authority runs EnKey(·)
with the challenger as a user on input pk, s to get epk;
• A is allowed to ask queries to a Sign(esk, ·) oracle.
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• The adversary A outputs a message-signature pair (m∗, σ∗).
The adversary wins the game if m∗ was never queried to the Sign oracle and
Verify(epk,m∗, σ∗) = 1. If for any ppt A the probability of winning the game is
negligible, we say the leakage-deterring signature is unforgeable under adaptively chosen
message attacks.
• Impersonation Resistance (for leakage-deterring identification schemes): Consider the
following game between an adversary A and a challenger C:
• The challenger runs KeyGen(·) to get pk and sends pk to the adversary A.
• The Adversary A selects s and playing the role of the authority, and runs the
EnKey(·) protocol with the challenger on input pk, s to get epk;
• A is allowed to query for Identify(P, V ) protocol transcripts.
• The adversary A engages in an Identify protocol execution with the challenger
playing the role of the prover.
The adversary wins the game if at the end the challenger playing the role of the
verifier accepts the interaction with the adversary. If it holds that for any efficient
adversary A, the probability of winning the above game is negligible, we say that
the leakage-deterring identification protocol is impersonation resistant against passive
attacks. Impersonation resistance against active attacks can be also expressed in a
standard way (following e.g., [10]).
2.4 Leakage-deterring Public Key Encryption
In this section, we present constructions of leakage-deterring PKE schemes. We
start with a construction from any additive homomorphic encryption to demonstrate
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our first technique for implementing recoverability, then, we show a generic construction
of IND-CPA secure leakage-deterring PKE from any IND-CPA secure encryption along
with an improvement that achieves constant size ciphertext, this generic construction
can be easily extended to the identity based setting as well. In section 2.5, we provide a
general way to achieve IND-CCA2 security for all leakage-deterring encryption schemes.
2.4.1 CPA-secure leakage-deterring PKE from homomorphic encryption
Recall the trivial solution presented in the introduction (encrypting the owner’s
private data with its public-key). It does not work because an adversarial decryption box
is able to test whether the queries fed by the recovering algorithm match the ciphertext
stored in epk. A seeming fix is to query via rerandomizing the ciphertext contained
in the enhanced public key. However, given that the private data are known to the
attacker, the adversarial box can check for them and still rejects. So in some sense to
go around the problem one has to re-randomize the plaintext as well! (so that after
re-randomization, the plaintexts should be distributed according to D but still somehow
be useful for decrypting the private data). We provide a solution along these lines.
Informally, an encryption algorithm E(·) has a homomorphic property if E(m1 +
m2) = E(m1) ·E(m2) for some operations (+, ·) over plaintexts and ciphertexts respec-
tively. For instance, we can submit a ciphertext c∗ ·E(r) to the decryption box B, and
retrieve the message in c∗ from the answer by subtracting r. This method would be
effective for our purpose only if B satisfies correctness w.r.t. to random distributions
over the whole message space. However we would like a solution that works even for
adversarially chosen distributions that are unknown at the time of the generation of epk.
The recovering technique we introduce below achieves this goal.
29
First assume that we have an underlying encryption E : (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) that is
an IND-CPA secure PKE with a homomorphic property. Specifically, we assume that
for any message m and any a, b from the message space, Enc(m)a · Enc(b) is identically
distributed to Enc(am+ b). We call the following construction Scheme-I.
• KeyGen(1λ): Run the KeyGen algorithm of E, return (pk, sk).
• EnKey(O,A): This is a protocol between O and A with input (pk, sk, s) and (pk, s)
respectively. A randomly chooses n = |s| messages ωi, i = 1, . . . , n according
to the uniform distribution over {0, 1}. Then A calculates s′i = ωi ⊕ si, {ci =
E(pk, ωi)}, s′ = s′1 . . . s′n. The protocol terminates with O obtaining the enhanced
key pair (epk, esk) where epk = (pk, {ci}, s′), and esk = sk, while A gets only the
enhanced public key epk.
• Enc(epk,m): This algorithm runs the encryption algorithm Enc, returning c =
Enc(pk,m).
• Dec(esk, c): This algorithm runs the decryption algorithm Dec, returning m =
Dec(sk, c).
• RecB,D(epk, δ): With access to a decryption box B and a distribution D, that
B supposedly works on with δ-correctness, the objective of this algorithm is to
transform the ciphertexts c1, . . . , cn found in the epk to ciphertexts that look
inconspicuous from the point of view of the box B. For each ciphertext ci the
algorithm will operate as follows. First it will calculate a sufficiently long sequence
of pairs (x, y) (the exact length N of the sequence depends on the parameters
of B and D and will be determined in our security analysis). For each pair, the
algorithm first independently samples two plaintexts m0,m1 according to D. Then
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it calculates x, y by solving the following linear system:
0 · x+ y = m0
1 · x+ y = m1
Let (xl, yl)l=1,...,N be the pairs produced by running the above procedure N
times and m0,l,m1,l be the pair of plaintexts used as constant terms of the linear
system for the l-th sample. Having calculated those, the algorithm computes
c′i,l = c
xl
i · E(pk, yl) for l = 1, . . . , N , and feeds B with those ciphertexts (whose
corresponding plaintexts follow D). Let a1, . . . , aN , be the answers of the box B
where al = ⊥ if B does not provide an answer for the l-th ciphertext. Now consider
the modified answer sequence to be a string over {0, 1,⊥} defined as follows:
a∗l =

(al − yl)/xl al ∈ {m0,l,m1,l)} ∧ xl 6= 0
⊥ otherwise
Note that a∗l ∈ {0, 1,⊥}. If the majority symbol among the non-⊥ symbols of
〈a∗1, . . . , a∗N 〉 is defined, the recovering algorithm calculates it as vi and proposes it
as the decryption of ci (otherwise the algorithm fails). This procedure is repeated
for all ciphertexts c1, . . . , cn thus forming v = v1 . . . vn. Finally, the recovering
algorithm proposes as the private data of the owner the string s′ ⊕ v where s′ is
parsed from the epk.
Security Analysis: We will first sketch correctness and three security properties, i.e,
security, privacy, recoverability. First observe that correctness is trivial, according to
the correctness of the underlying encryption scheme E while IND-CPA security is also
relatively obvious since the extra information exposed due to our extension are some
independent values (ω1 . . . ωn, s). Now regarding the privacy property, we can see that
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the EnKey algorithm in Scheme-I is a KEM/DEM mechanism [42], using a KEM which
encrypts each bit of the key with a secure encryption. Given {ci}, the adversary is not
able to predict the bit ωi with a sufficient bias, thus every ωi is random conditioned on
the adversary’s view. This proves privacy (assuming no secret-key oracle O(esk, ·) is
given). Regarding recoverability we can prove it w.r.t. essentially any distribution D.
The Rec algorithm produces a sequence of ciphertexts with plaintexts following D whose
correct decryption reveals the bits ωi by a majority argument. As long as the correctness
of the box B is non-negligibly larger than the collusion probability of D (which is a
minimal characteristic of “box usefulness”) the recovering algorithm will produce the ωi
values with overwhelming certainty since it can do a perfect simulation of ciphertexts
with D distributed plaintexts. The formal proofs are as follows:
Theorem 1. Scheme-I achieves IND-CPA security (against dishonest authority) and
privacy (without secret-key oracle) if the underlying PKE is IND-CPA secure. It also
satisfies black-box recoverability w.r.t. any δ > 0 and the class of distributions D = {D |
∃α : α is non-negligible and H∞(D) ≥ log 1δ−α}.
Proof. As explained above,the correctness and IND-CPA security is obvious. We will
demonstrate the proof for privacy and recoverability as follows:
First we examine privacy. Let us define E′(ω) as E(ω1) . . . E(ωn), a bitwise en-
cryption using E. (w.l.o.g, we assume messages are bitstrings with length n, if not,
challenger can do a proper padding on them). It is straightforward to see that E′ is IND-
CPA secure if E is, otherwise, one can easily distinguish E(0), E(1) by distinguishing
E′(m0), E′(m1), where m0,m1 are identical except at one bit.
Suppose C is the challenger of E′, A is the adversary who can break the privacy of
scheme-I. We will build a simulator algorithm S which uses A as an oracle to break the
IND-CPA security of E′.
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S first forwards the public key pk from C to A, he then chooses two random messages
m0,m1, sends them to C and gets the challenge c, also he receives s0, s1 from A. S
randomly select b0, b1, computes s′ = sb0 ⊕mb1 , and sends (pk, c, s′) to A as epk. If A
returns b0 correctly, S outputs b1 as his answer, otherwise he outputs 1− b1.
It is easy to see that the simulator’s advantage of breaking the semantic security
of E′ is at least half of the advantage that A has to break the privacy (denoted by ∆).
If c = E′(m1−b1), then s′ perfectly hides sb1 since sb0 ⊕mb1 now is independent with
epk, A can only guess b0 correctly with probability 1/2. If c = E′(mb1), the epk is in a






2 + ∆)− 12 = ∆2 .
Next, we examine recoverability. It is obvious that the KeyGen and EnKey procedures
can be easily simulated. Note that the way we sample (x, y) in the Rec algorithm, every
query is an encryption of a message independently sampled from D (the only exception
is that D almost always outputs only one message but in this case, any box becomes
“trivial”). Thus, the recovering query is identically distributed as normal decryption
queries and B would have δ-correctness for every recovering query!
Now we analyze the number of repetitions needed (in terms of an asymptotic function
of the security parameter λ) to guarantee we are almost certain that s will be returned
in the Rec algorithm.
First, we call an experiment useful if m0 6= m1, otherwise, we record a ⊥ for this
query. The probability of having one useful experiment after sampling N0 pairs of
(m0,m1) will be 1−Col(D)N0 , where Col(D) is the collusion probability of distribution
D which denotes the probability of sampling a same element from two independent trials.
Observe that Col(D) < 1−γ, for some non-negligible γ, if D is not a trivial distribution
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which has probability almost 1 over one single element. If we repeat N0 = O(log2 λ)
times sampling, we will get a useful experiment with probability almost 1.
Further, for one useful query, only two answers x, x+ y (m0,m1 respectively) are
considered correct, all others are ignored (denoted by ⊥). The probability of getting at
least one correct answer after repeating N1 times useful experiments is 1− (1− δ)N1 , if
N1 = O(log
2 λ), this probability is almost 1(with negligibly small difference).
Recall that δ = p(D) + α, where p(D) = 2−H∞(D) denotes the predicting probability
of D . In one useful experiment, the probability of returning an incorrect but non-⊥
answer is at most p(D), since this happens only when B returns mb while the correct
answer is m1−b, for b = 0, 1 (recall that m0,m1 are independently sampled from D).
Now we focus on non-⊥ answers only, the probability of an incorrect answer appearing
among the non-⊥ answers is at most q = p(D)2p(D)+α (This can be argued as follows: suppose
p(D) = p+ t,where p is the probability of returning an incorrect but non-⊥ answer in
one query and t ≥ 0; then, the probability of obtaining an incorrect but non-⊥ answer
among all non-⊥ answers is at most pδ+p ≤ p+tδ+p+t = q). Suppose X is the random
variable that denotes the number of appearances of incorrect but non-⊥ answers after
collecting N2 non-⊥ answers, µ denotes the expectation of X which is no bigger than
N2q. The probability that correct answers do not constitute the majority is Pr[X ≥ N22 ].
Using the upper tail of the Chernoff bound:Pr[X > (1 + β)µ)] ≤ e−β
2µ
3 , we can verify
that this probability is bounded by exp(−N2α2/(24p(D)2 + 6p(D)α)).
So if we collect more than N2 = O(α−2 log2 λ) non-⊥ symbols, the majority will be
occupied by the correct answers with probability almost 1 (negligibly small difference),
and hence we can recover the bit.
Combining above, if we repeat the recovering procedureN0×N1×N2 = O(α−2 log6 λ)
times for each bit of s we will successfully recover s with probability almost 1.
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Remark 2. Note that the restriction for the class of distribution is optimal in the sense
that otherwise, the box would be “trivial”.
2.4.2 Generic CPA-secure leakage-deterring PKE with an honest authority
In this section, we relax further the requirements of leakage-deterring PKE to
minimal by constructing a scheme based on any secure PKE. We will only consider
IND-CPA security with honest authority in this section and we will show how to go
beyond this and achieve security against dishonest authorities (and actually IND-CCA2)
in the next section.
Linear-size construction. To make the exposition more accessible we present first a
less efficient construction (with linear size ciphertexts in the length of hidden information);
then we show our main generic construction with constant size ciphertext. Consider a
semantically secure PKE E. The main idea of the construction is as follows. For each
bit of private data there is a pair of public keys, and the owner has only one of the secret
keys. The ambiguity of which secret key the owner has offers the opportunity for the
recovering algorithm to work. We call this construction Scheme-II, details are as follows:
• KeyGen(1λ): This algorithm generates n = |s| key pairs (pk1, sk1), . . . , (pkn, skn).
• EnKey(O,A): (O,A) have inputs (pk1, . . . , pkn, s, sk1, . . . , skn), and (pk1, . . . , pkn, s)
respectively, where s ∈ {0, 1}n. A randomly generates r ∈ {0, 1}n which we call
indicating string, and n new random public keys pk′1, . . . , pk′n. The enhanced
public key epk is n pairs of public keys (pk01, pk11), . . . , (pk0n, pk1n), together with
s′ = r ⊕ s, where for i = 1, . . . , n, pkrii = pki, pk1−rii = pk′i, and the enhanced
secret key is esk = (sk, r), where sk = (sk1, . . . , skn).
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• Enc(epk,m):This algorithm first randomly picks m1, . . . ,mn−1, and computes
mn = m −
∑n−1
i=1 mi (wlog we assume that additive secret-sharing works over








• Dec(esk, c): To decrypt ciphertext c, this algorithm chooses from c the ciphertexts





• RecB,D(epk, δ): With access to a decryption box B and a plaintext distribution
D for which the box supposedly works with δ-correctness, the algorithm recovers
each bit si of s by repeating the following procedure N times (the exact value of
N will be specified in the analysis):
It first samplesm,m′ independently, according toD, randomly choosesm1, . . . ,mi−1,mi+1,
. . . ,mn, and computes m0i = m−
∑
j 6=imj , and m
1
i = m
′ −∑j 6=imj .
Then it feeds B with [(c01, c11), . . . , (c0n, c1n)], where for all j 6= i, c0j , c1j encrypts the











The algorithm records a 0, if the response from the box is m, 1 if the response is
m′, and ⊥ in any other case including the case m = m′. For each i, the algorithm
will propose ri to be the majority of the recorded non-⊥ values (the algorithm
fails if majority is not well-defined).
The above procedure is repeated for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} to form a string r, and
finally, the algorithm outputs s = s′ ⊕ r, where s′ is parsed from epk.
Security analysis. We first sketch the security properties of Scheme-II. Let us call an
encryption using a single pair of keys as a “unit building block”. It is not hard to see
that IND-CPA security of the unit building block implies the IND-CPA of scheme-II
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(assuming authority is honest and taking into account the security of additive secret-
sharing). Regarding privacy, observe that s is perfectly hidden within epk as a one-time
pad ciphertext. Finally, regarding recoverability w.r.t any distribution D, the recovering
algorithm can attempt to query different encrypted messages in any single unit location.
Due to the secret-sharing throughout all pairs, any box (even partly successful) has
to include a key for each coordinate. Due to these facts, the recovering algorithm can
detect which secret key does the owner possess at each location something that leads
to the calculation of the indicating string and hence the recover of the private data. A
detailed analysis is as follows:
Theorem 2. Scheme-II achieves privacy(without secret-key oracle access). It also
satisfies IND-CPA security (with honest authority) and black-box recoverability w.r.t. any
δ > 0 and the class of distributions D = {D | ∃α : α is non-negligible and H∞(D) ≥
log 1δ−α}, if the underlying encryption is a regular IND-CPA secure PKE.
Proof. The privacy property is trivially achieved because the owner private data is
hidden with a one-time pad. Also it is easy to see correctness, owner has one key for
each pair and can successfully decrypt one of the ciphertext in each pair. We prove the
IND-CPA security with honest authority, and recoverability as follows.
We first prove the IND-CPA security of a simplified version of Scheme-II, (recall
that we named it “unit building block”) in which there is only one pair of public keys
(pk01, pk
1
1), the secret information s will be one bit only. During encryption, one encrypts
message m under both public key (without doing secret sharing of the message).
Claim 3. The unit building block E∗ of Scheme-II is IND-CPA secure if the underlying
encryption E is IND-CPA secure.
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Proof. of the claim: For any two messagem0,m1, we define the pairE(pk01,mi), E(pk11,mj)
as Eij . We would show that both E00, E11 are indistinguishable from E01, thus E00 is
indistinguishable from E11.
Suppose A can distinguish E00 from E01 with advantage ∆, one can use A to break
the semantic security of E as follows:
Assume C is the challenger of E, when the simulator receives pk from C and a private
bit s from A, he randomly selects another public key pk′, and sends A (pk′, pk, s⊕ 1) as
epk. Then, the simulator forwards m0,m1 from A to C. Whenever the simulator gets a
challenge ciphertext c from C, he computes c′ = E(pk′,m0), and sends (c′, c) to A as his
challenge. The simulator will outputs A’s guess directly to C (suppose that A outputs 0
for E00, and 1 for E01).
It is easy to see that, (c′, c) is exactly E00 if c = E(m0), or E01 if c = E(m1), so
simulator breaks semantic security of E with the same advantage as A distinguishes
E00, E01. Similarly, we can prove E01, E11 are indistinguishable. Thus E00 = E∗(m0),
and E11 = E∗(m1) are indistinguishable.
With the above claim, we will reduce the security of the unit building block E∗ to
the security of Scheme-II. Suppose C is the challenger of E∗, A is the adversary who
successfully breaks the semantic security of Scheme-II with advantage ∆, we will build a
simulator to break the security of E∗ using A.
After receiving a private string s from A, the simulator forwards the first bit s1 to C.
After receiving (pk01, pk11, b1) from C, the simulator generates another n−1 pairs of public
keys and secret keys {(pkbi , skbi )}i=2,...,n−1;b=0,1, and sends [(pk01, pk11), . . . , (pk0n, pk1n), s′]
to A as epk, where s′i = bi, and b2 . . . b|s| are random bits.
After getting m0,m1 from A, the simulator randomly selects n − 1 messages
m2, . . . ,mn, computes m = m0 −
∑n
i=2mi, m
′ = m1 −
∑n
i=2mi, and forwards m,m
′
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to C. When the simulator receives a challenge c = (c01, c11) from C, then, for all
i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, b ∈ {0, 1}, he computes {cbi = Enc(pkbi ,mb)}, and sends A his challenge
[(c01, c
1





Simulator directly outputs A’s guess as his own guess to C assumes that A outputs
0 for m0 and 1 for m1. It is easy to see that the simulator’s advantage of breaking the
IND-CPA security of Scheme-II is exactly ∆.
Next we prove the recoverability holds. First we argue that adversarial box can not
distinguish recovering queries (for some pair, two ciphertext contain different messages)
from normal ciphertext. Essentially, we will argue that the box will have similar
performance in both cases. Note that when a box gets a normal ciphertext and the
message is sampled according to D, it will return a correct answer with probability at
least δ due to the δ-correctness, and in such cases, the box will return an incorrect but
non-⊥ answer with probability at most p(D) because of the fact that no information
about the incorrect answer is contained in the decryption query.
Claim 4. Suppose the underlying encryption scheme E satisfies -semantic security (i.e,
no ppt adversary can distinguish E(m0) and E(m1) with advantage  for any pair of
different messages (m0,m1)), then any box with δ-correctness created by a ppt adversary
will return a correct answer with probability at least δ − 2 and will return a incorrect
but non-⊥ answer with probability at most p(D) + 2, when fed with a recovering query.
Proof. of the claim: We prove for probability of returning a correct answer only, for
the case of incorrect but non-⊥, it follows straightforwardly. First note that, in a
recovering query, the messages are also sampled independently from D. Suppose there
is an adversary A producing a box B with δ-correctness when queried with normal
ciphertext and with (δ − ∆)-correctness for a non-negligible ∆ when queried with
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recovering ciphertext, one can use A to distinguish two ciphertexts E(m0), E(m1) in
the IND-CPA game of E as follows:
First, the simulator receives public key pk from the challenger C of E, also it receives
n public keys (pk1, . . . , pkn) and s from the adversary A.
The simulator randomly chooses a position i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a random bitstring
r ∈ {0, 1}n, and chooses n− 1 random public keys pk′1, . . . , pk′i−1, pk′i+1, . . . , pk′n. The
simulator sends A the enhanced public key epk = [(pk01, pk11), . . . , (pk0n, pk1n), r ⊕ s] ,
where for all j 6= i, pkrjj = pkj , pk1−rjj = pk′j , and pkrii = pki, pk1−rii = pk.
A then produces a decryption box B and a distribution D. To create a challenge
ciphertext for B, the simulator first randomly chooses two messages m,m′ according to
D, then he randomly chooses n− 1 messages m1, . . . ,mi−1,mi+1, . . . ,mn. Further, he
computes m0i = m−
∑
j 6=imj , and m
1
i = m
′ −∑j 6=imj , then sends m0i ,m1i to C, and
receives a challenge c from C. The simulator then randomly selects mbi from m0i ,m1i , and
feeds B with ciphertext [(c01, c11), . . . , (c0n, c1n)], where for all j 6= i, both c0j , c1j contain the





If B returns the right message (if b = 0, it is m, if b = 1, it is m′), then the simulator
returns b as his guess, otherwise, he returns 1− b.
It is obvious that if the simulator guesses correctly(mbi is the message C encrypts in
c), the challenge for A is a normal ciphertext, otherwise, it is a recovering query. Thus,




2(1− δ + ∆) = 12 + ∆2 , thus ∆ ≤ 2.
Similarly, we can show the probability of returning an incorrect but non-⊥ answer
will be 2 close to p(D), too.
The rest parts are very similar to the analysis of theorem 1. For each bit of the
owner data, in each query there are only two potentially correct answers (m,m′ as we
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used in the Rec algorithm in scheme-II). Since for each query, we have the probability
of returning a correct answer is almost δ, and the probability of returning an incorrect
but non-⊥ answer is almost p(D), we only need to proceed to estimate the number of
repetitions needed. The analysis is also composed of three main steps, we first estimate
the number of samples needed for getting a useful experiment, and then estimate the
number of repetition needed for collecting at least one correct answer, then we estimate
the number of correct answers needs to be collected to ensure that the majority will
be the correct answer. With the above claim, the performance of the adversarial box
is negligibly close to that in scheme-I, thus the number of repetitions needed is also
O(α−2 log6 λ). For details of the calculation, we refer to the proof of theorem 1.
Main generic construction. In Scheme-II, the sender splits the message into n pieces.
This makes the ciphertext size (number of ciphertext units) linear in the length of the
owner’s private data. We now improve the generic construction to achieve a ciphertext
size O(log 1δ ) by using an error correcting code to create the indicating string, where δ
is a specified minimum correct decryption probability that is assumed to be constant
and is a parameter of the construction. We call this construction Scheme-III.
• KeyGen(1λ): Same as in Scheme II.
• EnKey(O,A): (O,A) have inputs (pk1, . . . , pkm, s, sk), and (pk1, . . . , pkm, s) re-
spectively where s ∈ {0, 1}n; the parameter m is selected based on n according
to an ECC (e.g., from [70]) that corrects up to m5 errors. A randomly generates
r˜ ∈ {0, 1}n, computes the indicating string r = ECC(r˜). Also, A selectsm random
public keys pk′1, . . . , pk′m. The protocol terminates with O obtaining (epk, esk) and
A obtaining epk, where epk is (pk01, pk11), . . . , (pk0m, pk1m), together with s′ = r˜⊕ s,




i, and esk = (sk, r).
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• Enc(epk,m): To encrypt a message m, the algorithm first chooses a random subset
S ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} with size t = 5 ln 4δ . Then it randomly picks m1, . . . ,mt−1, and
computes mt = m−
∑t−1












,mi) for b ∈ {0, 1}.
• Dec(esk, c): To decrypt ciphertext c, this algorithm chooses from c the cipher-
texts corresponding to the indicating string r projected on S, and returns m =∑t
i=1 Dec(skSi , c
rSi
i ).
• RecB,D(epk, δ): With access to a decryption box B and a plaintext distribution
D, the algorithm recovers each bit si of s by repeating the following procedure N
times (the exact number will be specified in the analysis):
It first randomly selects a subset S ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} with size t.
If i ∈ S, and i is the k-th element of S, the algorithm randomly chooses m,m′
independently according toD as well as random valuesm1, . . . ,mk−1,mk+1, . . . ,mt.
Then, it computes m0k = m−
∑
j 6=kmj , and m
1
k = m
′ −∑j 6=imj . It feeds B with
[(c01, c
1




t )] where, for all j 6= k, the pair c0j , c1j encrypts the same message
mj using pk0i , pk
1






k) for b ∈ {0, 1}.
If i 6∈ S, the algorithm proceeds by performing a regular encryption of a plaintext
from D.
If i ∈ S and the response of the decryption box is m, the algorithm records 0; if
i ∈ S and the response is m′, this algorithm records a 1; Otherwise (in any other
case including i 6∈ S or m = m′), it records ⊥. For each i the majority of the
non-⊥ recorded values is proposed as the value of ri. If no majority is defined, a
random bit is produced as ri.
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The above procedure is repeated for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, and a string r is formed.
The decoding algorithm of ECC is now executed on r to obtain r˜. The algorithm
terminates by returning s = s′ ⊕ r˜, where s′ is parsed from epk.
Security analysis. The IND-CPA and privacy properties are essentially the same as
in scheme II. We only discuss recoverability which is significantly more complex. The
intuition is that because of the ECC the Rec algorithm would work as long as a linear
fraction of bits of r can be recovered. As we will prove in the appendix, suppose that q
is the number of positions among the m for which our recoverability procedure fails. We
will show that the probability of correct decryption will become roughly smaller than
e−tq/m = δ5q/m. From this we derive that any decryption box operating with probability
at least δ (as postulated) can make our algorithm fail in at most m/5 of the m secret
keys which is sufficient for correct decoding. The full analysis is presented as follows:
Theorem 5. Scheme-III parameterized by any δ > 0, achieves privacy (without secret-
key oracle access). Further, if the underlying public key encryption scheme is IND-CPA
secure, it satisfies IND-CPA security (with honest authority) and black-box recoverability
w.r.t. the class of distributions Dδ = {D | H∞(D) ≥ log |s| + log 1δ − c}, where c is a
constant (depending on the ECC) and |s| the length of the embedded private information.
Proof. All properties except recoverability are the same as Scheme-II. We only analyze
recoverability below. The major difference in this analysis is that we need to examine
the maximum number of positions for which the recoverability algorithm can fail while
still maintaining that the decryption box B has more than δ-correctness.
First the number of experiments for each index i, denoted by N is calculated as in
the proof of theorem 1 with the following modifications: First, we use a probability α0
in place of α, which is defined as (δ − κ)/m2 where κ = p(D) = 2−H∞(D) denoting the
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predicting probability. Second, we repeat more times due to the fact that randomly
selecting S will not always contain i to be a “useful query” for recovering. But sampling S
randomly (instead of always containing some i) aims at producing the recovering queries
indistinguishable from normal ciphertext. Suppose now the target of the recovering
algorithm is the i-th bit, in one selection, the probability Pr[i ∈ S] is Ct−1m−1/Ctm = t/m.
From the lower tail of Chernoff bound, the probability of selecting N3 times without
hitting i once is smaller than e−(
N3t
2m
−1). After randomly sample 4m/t times, one will be
sure that one of the subsets will contain i, and one useful query is created. In total, The
recovering procedure repeats for N0 ×N1 ×N2 ×N3 times, where N0, N1, N2 are as in
the analysis of theorem 1 where α is substituted with α0 (note that if we can reset the
box across experiments the ciphertexts for which i 6∈ S can be omitted).
The main challenge in the proof of the theorem is the fact that the boxB might behave
differently depending on i and thus force us to err in a number of locations i. We will prove
that we can bound this number and hence our error-correction layer will be sufficient for
recovering the hidden information in the epk. Let δi = Pr[B decrypts correctly | i ∈ S].
We divide the indices i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} in two sets, Bad and Good, according to the
rule i ∈ Good if and only if δi ≥ κ + α0. Based on our choice of N , if i ∈ Good
the recoverability will return the proper bit in the i-th coordinate with overwhelming
probability. In order to upper bound the size of Bad consider the following. Let D be
the event of correct decryption. We have that,
Pr[D] = Pr[D | S ∩ Bad = ∅] · Pr[S ∩ Bad = ∅] + Pr[D | S ∩ Bad 6= ∅] · Pr[S ∩ Bad 6= ∅]
Regarding Pr[S ∩ Bad = ∅] observe that if k = |Bad|, the probability is bounded




i=0(1− km−i) ≤ (1− km)t. From inequality ex ≥ 1 + x, we
can get p(k, t) ≤ e−kt/m. Regarding Pr[D | S ∩ Bad 6= ∅] note that it is bounded by
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∑
i∈Bad δi ≤ m(κ+α0) (This bound follows directly from the fact that Pr[F | ∪ni=1 Ai] ≤∑n
i=1 Pr[F |Ai], for any event F,Ai). We now derive the following,
δ ≤ Pr[D] ≤ e−tk/m +m(κ+ α0)
From which we obtain the upper bound k ≤ mt · ln(δ −m(κ+ α0))−1. Now observe
that due to the condition for the min-entropy, we derive a bound on κ ≤ 2cδ/|s| = c′δ/|s|,
for some constant c′. From the choice of α0 we can prove that δ −m(κ+ α0) ≥ δ/4 as
long as c is selected appropriately (taking into account the error-correcting rate which
is constant). We plug this condition and the fact that t = 5 ln(4δ−1) we conclude that
k ≤ m ln(4δ−1)/5 ln(4δ−1) = m/5.
The rest is similar to the proof of theorem 2, whenever the i-th secret key is contained
in the decryption box, as argued in the analysis of theorem 2, adversary will have similar
performance when fed with a recovering query, and from the estimation of number of
repetitions, if one repeat O(α−20 m log
6 λ) = O(α−2λ5 log6 λ) times(given that the length
of the codeword m = O(λ), and α = δ − p(D)), one can recover ri correctly as long as
i ∈ Good with overwhelming probability. So the number of errors in recovering r is at
most k, while the ECC is able to correct up to m5 errors, and
m
5 ≥ k, thus r0 will be
recovered correctly with overwhelming probability and hence also s.
Remark 3. In this construction, the ciphertext size is parameterized by the correctness δ
which is influenced by the min-entropy of the distribution the box works on. Essentially, if
the desired min-entropy that the scheme should be leakage deterring against gets smaller,
then the ciphertext size should increase.
Remark 4. The generic construction can also be easily adapted to the identity based
setting. To accomplish this, observe that we can replace pkbi with (ID|i, b), instantiate the
IBE system with a hierarchical IBE scheme and apply the above generic construction to
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derive an identity based leakage-deterring encryption. We omit the detailed construction
of identity based leakage-deterring encryption, but for the sake of completeness, we
present the definitions needed in the appendix.
2.5 Generic CCA2 Secure Construction with Dishonest Authority
In this section, we introduce a general method to construct an IND-CCA2 secure
leakage-deterring encryption with dishonest authority from any leakage-deterring PKE
which satisfies IND-CPA security with honest authority, and any IND-CCA2 secure
standard PKE. The main idea is to compose these two encryptions to form a nested
encryption with the outer layer encryption to be the IND-CCA2 secure one. Recoverability
could be maintained because the Rec algorithm can run the Rec algorithm of the inner
leakage-deterring encryption to collect queries, and encrypt them using the outer layer
public key to form its own recovering queries.
Construction Suppose E1 is any IND-CPA secure leakage-deterring PKE (with an hon-
est authority), and E2 is any IND-CCA2 secure PKE. We call the following construction
Scheme-IV.
• KeyGen(1λ): This algorithm first executes the KeyGen algorithm of both E1, E2,
and return (pk1, sk1), (pk2, sk2).
• EnKey(O,A): This is a protocol between O,A with inputs (pk1, sk1, s) and (pk1, s)
respectively; it proceeds by executing the EnKey protocol of E1 to get (epk1, esk1)
first, and this protocol terminates with O obtaining enhanced key pair (epk, esk),
and A obtaining epk only, where (epk, esk) = ((epk1, pk2), (esk1, sk2)).
• Enc(epk,m): To encrypt a message m, this algorithm runs the encryption algo-
rithms of both of E1, E2, and returns the ciphertext as c = Enc(pk2,Enc(epk1,m))
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• Dec(esk, c): To decrypt a ciphertext c, this algorithm runs the decryption algo-
rithms of both E1, E2 and returns m = Dec(esk1,Dec(sk2, c)).
• RecB,D(epk, δ): With access to a decryption box B and a plaintext distribution
D, this algorithm calls the Rec algorithm R1 of E1. For each query c of R1, this
algorithm feeds B with Enc(pk2, c). It then passes the responses of the box to R1
and returns whatever R1 returns.
Security Analysis Correctness is obvious. Privacy, recoverability and IND-CCA2
security follow easily from the security of the outer layer encryption and the properties
of the inner-layer encryption. The details are presented below:
Theorem 6. Scheme-IV is IND-CCA2 secure with dishonest authority if E2 is a IND-
CCA2 secure PKE, and achieves same privacy and recoverability as the underlying
leakage-deterring PKE E1.
Proof. We will reduce the IND-CCA2 security of the outer layer encryption E2 to the
security of scheme-IV. Suppose the challenger of E2 is C, and the adversary of scheme-II
is A. We can build a simulator algorithm to attack the security of E2 by using A, the
adversary on scheme-IV.
After receiving the public key pk from C, the simulator randomly chooses a key
pair (pk1, sk1) for E1, the inner layer encryption. Also, he randomly chooses a secret
string s. The simulator then sends A (pk1, pk, s) and receives the enhanced key pairs
(epk, esk) = ((epk1, pk2), (esk1, sk2)).
When A asks a decryption query ci, the simulator forwards it to C and gets an
answer of c1 = Dec(sk, ci), and then he uses esk1 to decrypt the inner layer ciphertext,
and returns A the answer. It is simple to see that the ci is answered correctly.
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After receiving m0,m1 from A, the simulator encrypts them using the enhanced pub-
lic key of the inner layer encryption E1, sends (m′0,m′1) = (E1(epk1,m0), E1(epk1,m1))
to C and forwards the challenge c directly to A.
The simulator continues to answer A’s decryption queries as before. And sends A’s
guess b directly to C as his guess.
Since the challenge is exactly the encryption of m0 or m1, so the simulator would
have the same advantage for A to distinguish encryption of m′0,m′1 using scheme-IV.
As the EnKey protocol is the same as in E1, thus privacy of scheme-IV is the same as
that of E1; regarding recoverability, from the Rec algorithm we see that the ciphertext
queries in scheme-IV and that in E1 have a one-to-one correspondence, the algorithm
will return a correct value as long as the Rec algorithm in E1 can return one.
Remark 5. An alternative way to achieve IND-CCA2 security is to instantiate each
PKE scheme in the generic construction of section 2.4.2 with a lossy trapdoor function,
and apply the Peikert-Waters paradigm [109] to convert this IND-CPA secure scheme
into an IND-CCA2 secure scheme by utilizing a strong one time signature. We will use
only a unit building block as an example to demonstrate the idea, and the full construction
can be derived straightforwardly. Using the notation from [109], Fltdf (s, x) denotes a
lossy trapdoor function F evaluated at input x using public key s; Gabo(s′, vk, x) denotes
an all-but-one trapdoor function evaluated at input x using public key s′ and branch vk.
For details of these two primitives, we refer to [109].
The public keys will be (s0, s1, s′0, s′1, h0, h1), and the secret key is tb for a bit b,
where tb is the trapdoor corresponding to sb, and h0, h1 are random universal hash
functions. For Enc, the algorithm first generates a random key pair (sk, vk) for a strong
one-time signature scheme, randomly selects x0, x1, and output the ciphertext as c =
(vk, [Fltdf (s0, x0), Gabo(s
′
0, vk, x0), h0(x0)⊕m], [Fltdf (s1, x1), Gabo(s′1, vk, x1), h1(x1)⊕m], σ),
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where σ is a signature signed using sk on all the other components in the ciphertext.
The Dec algorithm just selects the corresponding ciphertext, and inverts Fltdf (sb, xb)
using tb to get xb, and checks whether Gabo(s′b, vk, xb) is well-formed and retrieves m
by hb(xb) ⊕ m ⊕ hb(xb). We can argue the IND-CCA2 security in a similar way to
the analysis in [109], with the minor difference in the indistinguishability between lossy
keys and injective keys where we use a pair of lossy trapdoor functions instead of one;
similarly, for the hidden lossy branch property we use a pair of all-but-one trapdoor
functions instead of one. We omit the detailed proof here. This alternative construction
will yield a more efficient IND-CCA2 scheme when applied over the generic construction
compared to the one we presented above. Furthermore, we can use the one-time signature
paradigm [31] in the setting of identity based leakage-deterring encryption as well.
To deal with the transformation from IND-CCA2 security with a honest authority to
IND-CCA2 security with a dishonest authority without using the nested encryption, we
can have the public keys in one of the pairs to be the same as the one generated by the
user, for which the authority does not know the secret key. The encryption algorithm
will always use this public key. It is easy to see that this “special” public key guarantees
the security in a model with a dishonest authority. Note that the EnKey protocol and the
Rec algorithm in the above alternative construction are the same as those in the generic
constructions and privacy and recoverability will not be affected.
2.6 Leakage-deterring Signature & Identification
In this section, we design leakage-deterring signatures and identification schemes.
The main idea is that we treat any functional box as an unforgeability or impersonation
adversary, and take advantage of “witness extractability" in the security arguments of
the underlying primitive to extract the secret-key, then unlock the private data. To
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achieve this type of extractability we apply rewinding, and hence this means that a
certain level of non-black-box access to the adversarial implementation is needed that
was unnecessary before. Specifically, in the case of digital signatures we assume the
recoverability algorithm can “hook” the hash function calls of the adversarial implemen-
tation while in the case of identification schemes the assumption is that the adversarial
identification can be rewound to a previous state (something that is true for software
adversarial implementations but not necessarily true in the case of a hardware adversarial
implementation). We stress that our leakage-deterring constructions do not employ any
additional intractability assumptions beyond the ones used in the underlying primitives.
2.6.1 Leakage-deterring signature In the random oracle model
We construct a leakage-deterring signature scheme based on a class of Σ-protocol-
based signature schemes as in [114]. The security proofs of these signatures rely on
the fact that if the adversary can forge one signature, then he could also forge another
correlated signature for the same message with the same random tape but a different
random oracle. Using these two forgeries that are correlated, one can extract the secret
key of the owner.
Our construction of leakage-deterring signature is based on two independent digital
signatures instances Sig0 and Sig1 that are unforgeable under adaptively chosen message
attacks. Further, Sig1 is required to be unforgeable in the random oracle(RO) model
following [114]; specifically, the signature has the form of (m,σ1, h, σ2) as in [114], and
satisfies h = H(m,σ1), and σ2 only depends on m,σ1, h, where H is a RO. We call the
following construction Scheme-V.
• KeyGen(1λ): This algorithm executes the KeyGen algorithm of Sig0, and returns
the key pair (pk0, sk0).
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• EnKey(O,A): This protocol is executed between O,A with inputs (pk0, sk0, s),
and (pk0, s) respectively. A runs KeyGen algorithm of Sig1 to generate a key pair
(pk1, sk1). The protocol terminates with O obtaining (epk, esk), and A obtaining
epk, where epk = (pk0, pk1, H(sk1)⊕ s), and esk = (sk0, sk1).
• Sign(esk,m): On input a message m, this algorithm returns the signature σ =
(σ0, σ1), where σ0 = Sign0(sk0,m), and σ1 = Sign1(sk1,m) = (σ11, h1, σ21).
• Verify(epk,m, σ): On input a message-signature pair (m,σ) and enhanced public
key epk = (pk, pk′), this algorithm returns 1 if both of the two signatures are valid,
0 otherwise.
• RecD(epk,B, δ): The recovering algorithm follows the security proof argument of
[114]: Whenever the box B asks a random oracle query (suppose total number of
such queries is bounded by q), the algorithm selects a uniform response from the
range of the random oracle and feeds it to the box; it also maintains a table of all
these queries. The recovering algorithm samples a message m according to D and





1), algorithm checks the table and identifies the index i of the first
query from B on (m,σ11). Then, it rewinds B to the state prior to the i-th query,
and continues the simulation picking new random query responses.
The above procedure is repeated until the box outputs another valid signature
(σ′0, σ′1) on the same message m, where σ′1 = (σ11, h′1, σ′2), and also the index i that
(m,σ11) was queried is the same for both σ1 and σ′1.
Now the algorithm can extract the second secret key sk1 from (m,σ11, h1, σ21), (m,σ11, h, σ′2)
using the Σ protocol properties of the scheme that define Sig1. The recovery of s
follows immediately.
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Security Analysis: We first give some brief intuition about the three properties. It is
easy to see that unforgeability against adaptively chosen message attacks can be derived
from the property of Sig0 as any forgery will imply also a forgery of Sig0. Note that
signing queries are easy to simulate because the simulator has the secret key for Sig1,
and can ask signing queries to the challenger for Sig0. Privacy w.r.t. a secret-key oracle
for any distribution can be achieved because any successful privacy attacker will have
to eventually query sk1 to the random oracle hence violating the unforgeability of Sig1.
Note that recoverability cannot violate privacy w.r.t. an arbitrary secret key oracle, since
it is achieved now via a non-black-box technique. It uses the fact that rewinding the
signing box and controlling the random coins in an execution, one can always find a pair
of signatures that reveal the secret key, something that yields the private data. Note
that we consider only the “non-trivial” signing box works for super polynomially many
messages, otherwise, it can be produced without containing the secret key. Details of
the analysis are as follows:
Theorem 7. Scheme-V is unforgeable under adaptively chosen message attacks if the
underlying signature Sig0 is unforgeable under adaptively chosen message attacks. It
achieves privacy w.r.t. any signing oracle if Sign1 is unforgeable under adaptively
chosen message attacks. Also, Scheme-V achieves non-black-box recoverability w.r.t any
non-negligible δ and any message distribution D with super logarithmic min-entropy.
Proof. Correctness is relatively obvious, the validity of a secret key for a signature scheme
can be easily verified, owner would check the validity when receiving the additional key
pairs from the authority. We will only demonstrate the security properties as follows:
We first examine the unforgeability. Suppose A is an adversary who breaks the
unforgeability of Scheme-V, and C is the challenger in the security game of Sig0.
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After receiving s, pk0 from A, C respectively, the simulator generates a random key
pair (sk1, pk1), and runs the EnKey protocol with A and terminates with A obtaining epk,
and the challenger obtaining epk, sk1, where epk = (pk0, pk1, s′) and s′ = H(sk1)⊕ s.
Whenever A asks a signing query on m, the simulator asks such signing query to C
to get σ0, signs with sk1 to get σ1, and returns A with (σ0, σ1).
If A outputs a forgery (σ∗0, σ∗1) on m∗ which is never asked for signing query, then
the simulator outputs m∗, σ∗0 as his forgery to C.
Next, we will show privacy (with secret key oracle access). We will reduce the
unforgeability of Sign1to the privacy property.
First, the simulator S gets pk1 from the unforgeability challenger C and creates
another key pair (pk, sk), and sends pk to the adversary A. After receiving s0, s1 from
A, S randomly chooses r and a bit b, and sends (pk, pk′, r ⊕ sb) as epk.
S can always answer the signing queries since he can sign with sk to get the first
half of a signature, and asks C for the second half.
Note that only when one queries an input a to the random oracle, it is possible for
him to predict even one bit of the output H(a). If the adversary can predict at least one
bit of s, that means he can predict at least one bit of r, thus he has to ask a random
oracle query about sk (which is the input of the random oracle for r) at some point.
The simulator simply collects all the random oracle queries of A, and checks whether it
is the secret key corresponding to pk1, whenever sk1 is found, the simulator stops and
outputs a signature using sk1 on a message which C is never asked for a signing query.
Further, we examine the recoverability. According to the notations in the general
forking lemma [9], we can see that acc = Pr[J ≥ 1] = Pr[F1 ∧ F2] = Pr[F2] Pr[F1|F2],
where F1 denotes the event that B makes a call to the hash function for a query m,
and F2 denotes the event that B outputs a valid signature for m. First, all messages
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submitted to be signed by Rec are sampled from D, thus B will output a valid signature
for each query with probability at least δ; hence, we have Pr[F2] ≥ δ. Second, an
efficient B can only store polynomially many hash values or message-signature pairs.
This is seen as follows: let L be the list of messages m for which it holds that B(m)
outputs a signature with non-negligible probability without querying the hash function
on that message. We claim that the size of this list L is is bounded by Q=poly(λ).
Indeed, if the list is super-polynomial one can execute B repeatedly and obtain all valid
signatures that form list L. The signatures determine a list of values of size Q from
the table of the hash function that B never queries to its hash oracle. It follows that
this corresponds to a superpolynomial amount of information that is encoded in the
description of B. By a standard information-theoretic argument one can show that this
is impossible as it suggests that the adversary that constructs the box can be used to
encode a super-polynomial amount of information in a polynomial size description (from
which the encoded information can still be recovered).
Now recall that H∞(D) is ω(log λ), thus for a random sample m from D the
probability that m is included in the list L is at most Q/2ω(log λ). It follows that
Pr[F1|F2] ≥ 1−Q/2ω(log λ) ≥ α for some non-negligible α.
Combining the above fact with Pr[F2] ≥ δ, we obtain that acc ≥ αδ. Following the
general forking lemma, we can see that the probability of finding a successful pair of
signatures on a same message in one rewinding is no smaller than (αδ)2/q − , where
 is a negligible function so that 1/ is the size of the range of random oracle, and q
is the number of random oracle queries. After repeating the rewinding procedure for
some polynomial in λ number of times, where λ is the security parameter, one can find
a successful pair with probability 1− ′ where ′ is a negligible function. With such a
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successful pair, one can extract the secret key sk1 as the knowledge extractor does in
the Σ-protocol (or as in the reduction in [114]), and outputs s = s′ ⊕H(sk1).
2.6.2 Leakage-deterring identification
We will construct a leakage-deterring identification scheme by using a similar ap-
proach as in the signature case. However here we will show our construction secure in
the standard model, and thus we need a novel method to embed the owner private data
into the enhanced public key. In fact we will need no additional assumption beyond the
one employed for the underlying scheme.
Our construction of a leakage-deterring identification scheme is based on the class
of identification schemes which are derived from zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge
protocols that can be parallelly composed. We utilize the fact that given access to
the code of any box that implements the identification functionality, one can rewind
the box and implement the knowledge extractor assured to exist due to the soundness
property of the zero-knowledge proof (this idea was used before to obtain the related
notion of non-transferability of credentials in [30,98]). We call the following construction
Scheme-VI and is based on a parameter t that we specify below.
• KeyGen(1λ): This algorithm executes the KeyGen algorithm of the underlying
identification scheme, and returns the key pair (pk, sk).
• EnKey(O,A): This is a protocol executed between O,A with inputs (pk, sk, s),
and (pk, s) respectively. A runs the KeyGen algorithm to generate t new key
pairs (pk1, sk1), . . . , (pkt, skt), and further, A calculates s′ = r ⊕ s, where r =
Ext(sk1|| . . . ||skt, ρ) and Ext is a strong randomness extractor (see below for
implementation remarks) while ρ is the random seed. The protocol terminates with
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O obtaining (epk, esk), and A obtaining epk, where epk = (pk, pk1, . . . , pkt, s′, ρ),
and esk = (sk, sk1, . . . , skt).
• Identify(P, V ): This protocol is executed between P, V with inputs (epk, esk), and
epk respectively. The protocol is the parallel composition of the t+ 1 underlying
identification schemes. The protocol terminates with V outputting 1 if he accepts
the proof of knowledge of all secret keys, and 0 otherwise.
• Rec(epk,B): Given B, Rec runs the knowledge extractor algorithm for the parallel
composition of the t schemes until all the secret keys {sk1, . . . , skt} are recovered.
Then it applies the extractor on ρ and returns s = s′ ⊕ Ext(sk1|| . . . ||skt, ρ).
Security Analysis: We first sketch the security properties. Recoverability is essentially
the same as the recoverability of Scheme-V. Impersonation resistance is also similar to the
unforgeability property of Scheme-V; this property mainly relies on the fact that nothing
related to the original secret key of the owner sk is added to the epk, therefore the
security of identification using the original (pk, sk) can be reduced to the impersonation
resistance of Scheme-VI. Regarding privacy, according to impersonation resistance, after
seeing a polynomial number of transcripts of interaction between P, V , there is still
unpredicatability on the secret key, (otherwise, one can impersonate by eavesdropping)
then applying the strong extractor one can get pure randomness out of the secret-keys,
and thus the owner data is hidden computationally. Details are given as follows:
Theorem 8. Scheme-VI is impersonation resistant if the underlying identification
schemes are impersonation resistant under parallel composition. It achieves privacy w.r.t.
the secret key oracle that plays the role of the prover and performs with the adversary
the identification protocol. Also, Scheme-VI achieves non-black-box recoverability w.r.t
any non-negligible δ.
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Proof. Correctness follows straightforwardly from the correctness of the underlying iden-
tification scheme. Also, as explained above, impersonation resistance and recoverability
are very similar to the unforgeability and recoverability of Scheme-V, thus we only focus
on the proof for privacy here.
We first show that every secret key ski still has sufficient conditional unpredicatability
given that the adversary adaptively makes queries for transcripts during identification.
Claim 9. The conditional unpredicatability of each ski is at least ω(log λ), where λ is
the security parameter, if the underlying identification scheme is impersonation resistant
against a passive adversary.
Proof. of the claim: After seeing adaptively queried transcripts, if there exists an
adversary A who can predict one of the secret keys ski with non-negligible probability
(conditional unpredicatability is asymptotically smaller than ω(log λ)), then one can build
a simulator which breaks the impersonation resistance of the underlying identification
protocol. In more details:
Suppose C is the challenger in the impersonation resistance game, when the simulator
receivers pk from C, he generates t−1 key pairs (pk1, sk1), . . . , (pki−1, ski−1), (pki+1, ski+1,
. . . , (pkt, skt), and sends A (pk1, . . . , pki−1, pk, pki+1, . . . , pkt).
The simulator asks the identification transcripts for pk from C, and for other public
keys, the transcripts can be perfectly simulated since he knows the secret keys.
When A outputs a guess for ski, the simulator uses this ski to execute Identify as a
prover with C as a verifier.
It is obvious that C will accept the identification attempt of the simulator on behalf
of the prover with the same probability that A correctly outputs ski.
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Under the above claim, the unpredictability of all the ski’s concatenated together
is sufficiently large, therefore after applying the randomness extractor, the output r is
uniform, thus the owner’s private data is hidden due to the fact that the embedding
works as a one-time pad.
Remark 6. The strong randomness extractor Ext should work on any source with
sufficient conditional unpredictability along the lines of [74]. For instance, we can use
the extractor derived from the Goldreich-Levin hard-core predicate [60]. Intuitively, one
can think of the view (protocol transcripts adaptively queried) of the adversary as the
output of a one way function on input {ski}. Using this, [60] implies an extractor of
log λ bits per instance and thus t should be as long as |s|/ log λ.
Remark 7. If one is willing to allow additional intractability assumptions, a more
compact construction for leakage-deterring signature (in the RO model) and leakage-
deterring identification is also possible5. The construction would utilize two key pairs
(pk0, sk0), (pk1, sk1) and the secret information will be embedded as E(pk1, s), thus only
sk1 will be used by the recoverability algorithm. Observe now that privacy will rely on
the security of the encryption scheme (and thus may require assumptions going beyond
the underlying identification scheme). Furthermore reusing the same key for signing
and decrypting may not always be secure and some specialized systems would need to be
employed, for instance cf. [72].
5We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
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2.7 Leakage-deterring Cryptography Applications
In this section we explore in more detail practical scenarios where leakage-deterring
cryptosystems can be used to provide novel solutions to security problems related to
sharing and transferring cryptographic functions.
Let us start with a more detailed motivating scenario: consider a user that maintains
all her e-mail encrypted on a mailserver. The user is approached by someone wishing to
buy all e-mails sent by the e-mail address x@y in the past, present and future. Using
a regular encryption, the user may release to the attacker an implementation of her
decryption function that works only if the plaintext is an e-mail sent by x@y (and
rejects all other input). If the user does not care about the secrecy of the e-mails from
x@y, she has no strong reason to be deterred from releasing the implementation (all her
other messages can still be relatively safe assuming the implementation is sufficiently
obfuscated or delivered in hardware). Using our encryption however, she is deterred:
if she releases the above implementation (even in the form of a hardware token) an
adverse action is guaranteed to take place (via the recoverability algorithm): her private
information will be revealed. Obviously, a determined secret-key owner can always
decrypt and release the plaintexts corresponding to those e-mails individually. But this
has to be done one by one, at a potentially high cost. In this scenario, leakage-deterring
public-key encryption ensures there is no way to optimize this operation: if one wants
to provide access to his decryption he has to do it on a “per-ciphertext” basis. Within a
PKI this enforces secret-key owners to practice more responsible secret-key management.
Recall privacy w.r.t. to secret key oracles (that would be the CCA flavor of our
privacy property) and recoverability can not be achieved simultaneously in the general
case: the two properties are mutually exclusive. Thus, one needs to choose a proper
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trade-off if he wants to implement leakage-deterring public key schemes. Regarding PKE,
our objective in this work is to maximize the scope of recoverability: it should work for all
(even partially functional) implementations; this makes our primitive most useful from a
self-enforcement perspective and necessitates the restrictions we have made in terms
of the privacy property. If the user wishes the private information to remain hidden,
she should provide no access to her secret-key. In the case of signature/identification
schemes the situation is more tricky since by nature of the functionality, the user is
expected to release signatures/identification transcripts publicly (which in some cases
they may even be adaptively selected). Thus, we must compromise and weaken our
recoverability property in some way. We resolved this by adopting a non-black-box
recoverability algorithm. As expected, if the implementation becomes “obfuscated” then
recoverability would be infeasible. We believe the trade-offs we utilized are natural for
the primitives studied, but of course different tradeoffs can be possible between privacy
and recoverability, and we leave them as future work.
Depending on different application scenarios, we can embed various types of private
owner information to deter the leakage of a cryptographic functionality. We list three
relevant scenarios below.
Self-enforcement. In the context of self-enforcement the owner of the cryptographic
functionality has embedded into her enhanced public-key some private information
that she normally prefers to keep secret. This can be e.g., her credit-card number or
similar piece of private information as suggested by Dwork, Lotspiech and Naor [51] that
introduced self-enforcement (in a different context - see related work in the introduction).
In this way, when using our leakage-deterring primitives, if the owner releases any
implementation of the cryptographic functionality, any recipient of the implementation
will become privy to the hidden information. This property “self-enforces” the owner to
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keep the functionality to herself and solves the problem of how to deter the sharing of
software or hardware devices that implement cryptographic functionalities.
All-or-nothing sharing of cryptographic functionalities. In this scenario, the
owner is obliged to embed the secret key of the cryptographic primitive itself into the
enhanced public-key (in practice this can be done e.g., by a trusted key generator algo-
rithm which will be running the embedding algorithm that is executed by the authority
in our model). Using our techniques this means that any working implementation of the
cryptographic functionality would leak the whole secret-key. In this sense, the crypto-
graphic functionality becomes “unobfuscatable”, any program that partially implements
it, say for some types of inputs, can be transformed to a program that implements it
perfectly. Leakage-deterring primitives used in this way suggest a type of all-or-nothing
property for cryptographic keys: owners of a cryptographic functionality cannot partially
share it, they either have to keep it to themselves or share it fully. In practice, one can
expect that this is also a type of self-enforcing mechanism: either all information about
the cryptographic key will be leaked or none.
Anonymity revocation from implementations. In this setting, the owner of the
cryptographic functionality operates it under a pseudonym (i.e., the enhanced public-
key is certified but without openly identifying the owner). However, the embedded
information is ensured by the authority to be either the owner’s real identity or an
identity credential that the owner prefers to hide. In this setting, using our methodology,
if any working implementation of the functionality is confiscated, it will be possible
to use the recovering algorithm to reveal the hidden identity credential. This in turn,
ensures some level of accountability: the owner remains pseudonymous as long as he
does not share the cryptographic functionality but can be identified in case any (even
partially working) implementation is leaked.
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2.8 Leakage-deterring Identity Based Encryption
Definition of IBE: [19,123] IBE is a public key encryption mechanism that any string
can be used as a public key, while the corresponding private key of a string can be
extracted by an authority. It is composed of four algorithms:
• Setup(1λ): On input a security parameter, this algorithm generates a master key
pair (mpk,msk).
• Extract(ID,msk): On input an identity ID, and the master secret key msk, this
algorithm outputs a key pair (pkID, skID) for this identity ;
• Enc(ID,m,mpk): On input a message m and an identity ID, this algorithm
returns a ciphertext c;
• Dec(skID, c): On input a ciphertext c and a secret key skID, this algorithm returns
the message m.
Regarding to 2-layer hierarchical IBE (HIBE) [58], there is an extraDerive algorithm,
that given the secret key of any identity ID ∈ {0, 1}t, it derives the secret key for any
identity ID||v ∈ {0, 1}2t which has ID as a prefix. For more details about the definition
of HIBE schemes, we refer to [58].
ID-based Leakage-deterring Encryption: In identity based setting, KeyGen and EnKey
can be merged into the EnExtract algorithm. Details are as follows:
• Setup(1λ) This algorithm generates a master key pair (mpk,msk).
• EnExtract(O,A) This is a protocol between a user O and a key generator A with
inputs (ID, s), and [ID, (mpk,msk), s] respectively. The protocol terminates with
both parties obtaining the enhanced key pair (epk, esk) = ((pkID, s′), skID) for
the input identity.
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• Enc(ID,m,mpk) On inputs message m and identity ID’s enhanced public key,
this algorithm returns a ciphertext c;
• Dec(skID, c) On input ciphertext c and secret key skID, this algorithm returns
the message m.
• RecB,D(epk, δ) Given oracle access to a decryption box B, and a message distribu-
tion D, which B has δ-correctness on, and with input the enhanced public key for
a certain identity, this algorithm returns s or ⊥.
ID-IND-CPA Security (for ID-based leakage-deterring encryption): The IND-CPA
security for identity based leakage-deterring encryption is slightly different with that
of leakage-deterring PKE which is defined in 2.3.2, as the authority is always assumed
to be honest in this setting. Details are described in the following game between the
adversary and the challenger:
• The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and returns mpk to the adversary.
• The adversary adaptively chooses identities ID1, . . . , IDq, and s1, . . . , sq as the
private data for each identity, and then interacts with the challenger in the
EnExtract protocol to get enhanced public and secret keys for these identities.
• The adversary chooses two messages m0,m1, a target identity ID which was not
queried for secret key before, and a string s∗, and sends them to the challenger.
• The challenger randomly choose a bit b, and sends c = Enc(ID,mb,mpk) and epk
to the adversary, where epk is the enhanced public-key of the user that corresponds
to ID with private information s∗.
• The adversary outputs his guess b′.
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We say an ID-based leakage-deterring encryption is ID-IND-CPA secure if Pr[b′ = b] ≤
1/2 +  in the above game, where  is a negligible function. If the adversary is required
to claim the target identity and the string in the beginning (before the secret key
queries), we call it selective-ID-IND-CPA secure. Furthermore, if decryption queries are
allowed for the target identity (with the exclusion of the challenge ciphertext) before
the adversary outputs his guess, we call it ID-IND-CCA2 secure.
We note that the enhanced public-key epk will not be used for encryption, to be
compliant with the id-based nature of the primitive. However, the epk still carries the
private information of the user and is assumed to be a public-value that is available to
anyone. The only time that this value is relevant is in the operation of the recoverability
algorithm that may happen only after a leakage incident takes place.
As in remark 4 at the end of section 2.4.2, following the generic construction of
leakage-deterring PKE, we can similarly construct an identity based leakage-deterring
encryption scheme by generating exponentially many secret keys for one identity, and
using the “indicating string" to select corresponding keys as in the generic construction.
We omit the detailed description of the construction here.
2.9 Conclusions and Open Problems
We introduced the notion of leakage-deterring cryptosystems. Our schemes have
the property that whenever an owner releases an (even partially) “functional” box for
others to use instead of herself, anyone who has access to the box can recover some
private information that is embedded into the public-key of the owner. We defined the
security properties of these primitives and we provided several constructions for public
key encryption, signatures, identification.
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Since this is the first step in the formal investigation of such primitives, several
interesting open questions remain. A natural question is how to combine the notion with
traitor tracing and other multi-user oriented cryptosystems. Another direction is with
respect to CCA2 security: our construction can potentially be optimized for efficiency
and avoid the nesting of two encryptions. A third direction is to see to what extent it
is feasible to construct leakage-deterring signatures and identification with black-box
recoverability in the standard model or more generally explore the tradeoff between
recoverability and privacy in a comprehensive fashion. Last but not least, it would be
desirable to see how the trust to the authority can be reduced (and e.g., obviate the





We put forth and construct a new primitive we call a traitor deterring scheme (TDS):
a multi-recipient encryption scheme where each recipient (henceforth also called a user)
has some secret information that is provided as a collateral and hidden in a public
directory. If the user is honest and keeps her key to herself her secret information remains
hidden. On other hand, if some users collude to produce an unauthorized decryption
device, any recipient of the device will be able to recover one of the colluders’ collateral
secret information.
TDS strictly strengthens the notion of a traitor tracing scheme (TTS) that was
introduced by Chor, Fiat, Naor [36] and further studied in numerous works cf. [20–22,
25,33,56,87,90]. TTS’s are multi-user encryption schemes that when some users (aka
traitors) collude to produce an unauthorized decryption device (aka a pirate decryption
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box), it is possible to recover at least one of their identities. TTS’s de-incentivize piracy,
in the sense that colluders may be identified once an unauthorized device is detected.
A TDS provides a stronger mechanism for de-incentivizing piracy. Observe that
in a TTS, recovering the identity of a traitor can only happen when the authority
becomes aware of the unauthorized decryption device. This means that if the traitors
operate stealthily there is nothing the authority can do to deter them. Furthermore, the
penalty that the authority may inflict to the traitors (e.g., canceling their subscription
or increasing their subscription fee) can only be applied “after-the-fact”, i.e., only after
the unauthorized decoder has been recovered and analyzed by the authority. In contrast,
in a TDS a penalty can be inflicted immediately when a user becomes a traitor and
shares her decryption key with the adversary. Indeed, given a user key in a TDS, the
adversary can recover the users’ hidden collateral that is -presumably- of some value and
the user prefers it to be hidden (e.g., it can be a user’s credit card number). Of course,
additional penalties may be applied after the authority notices the pirate decryption
device, exactly as in a TTS.
Compared to TTS’s, the main difficulty of constructing a TDS is that one needs to
enable a public recovering procedure which returns the user’s secret information which is
an element of an exponentially sized domain — in other words linear number of bits in
the security parameter λ need to be extracted from the pirate box. Contrary to that, in
a TTS, the authority only needs to recover the identity of a traitor, which is an element
of merely a polynomially sized domain — in other words just logarithmic number of bits
in the security parameter λ need to be extracted from the pirate box. As in TTS, the
recovering procedure should work given only black-box access to the pirate decryption
box which may be only partially working and furthermore, it should operate without
utilizing any private-key information, as in a TTS with public traceability [33].
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A TDS (or a TTS) can also be considered in a stronger adversarial model that we
call “the known ciphertext model.” In this model the adversary aims at communicating
a pirated copy consisting of a sequence of plaintexts that corresponds to a given set of
(polynomially many) ciphertexts; without loss of generality we can assume the pirate
copy is in the form of a pirate box that acts on the known sequence of ciphertexts. The
adversary aims at producing a pirate box of smaller size than the sequence of plaintexts;
we capture this in the model by requiring the “space rate” of the attacker to be o(1).
This problem was first considered by Dwork, Lotspiech and Naor [51] that proposed an
o(1) space rate solution assuming non-black-box recoverability and under an unfalsifiable
assumption [103] (specifically, the existence of incompressible functions of a specific
type). Constructing a TDS or a TTS in the known ciphertext model under a falsifiable
assumption is an open question.
Our contributions. We formalize traitor deterring schemes and we give two different
construction methods that we instantiate in various ways; further, we formalize the known-
ciphertext model in the spirit of [51] and we provide both feasibility and infeasibility
results for TDS in this model. In more detail:
1. We put forth the formal model for TDS. Such schemes enable the embedding of
hidden user-specific information in a public parameter, and have three security
properties: (i) security of plaintexts which is formalized in a standard fashion as
in public-key encryption; (ii) privacy of user information that is hidden in the
public parameters. This property should be upheld even if all other users conspire
against a user as long as the secret key of the user is not compromised; finally,
(iii) traitor deterring suggests that there is a recoverability algorithm that given
black-box access to some working implementation of a decryption device, it is
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capable of recovering the private information of at least one traitor, using only
public information.
2. We give two construction methods for TDS’s. The first one is based on finger-
printing codes and a new primitive we call a fuzzy locker. In a fuzzy locker, the
message is encrypted using a random codeword Ci of a fingerprinting code [36, 83]
as the key; the decryption operation returns the message given any codeword
C∗ that would result in the i-user being accused in the underlying fingerprinting
code. In the TDS construction, the recovering procedure will first retrieve a pirate
codeword C∗ from the decryption device, and the traceability of the fingerprinting
code will guarantee that one of the collusion’s codewords will be identified. We
then give a concrete construction of a fuzzy locker for CFN codes [36] using fuzzy
extractors [50] paired with efficient list decoding for Reed-Solomon codes [71, 126].
Our second construction method for TDS’s generalizes the constructions of [22,25]
that are based on comparison predicate encryption (CPE). Contrary to these
works however, for our method to work, we require that the user identity space is
exponentially large and sparse, so that a randomly chosen user identity can be
used as a secret key to hide the user secret information directly. To recover the
hidden information given a pirate decryption decoder we utilize a binary search
type of recovering mechanism to navigate through the exponentially sized domain
and discover one of the traitor identities. Given this identity we proceed to unlock
the user hidden data via trial and error. A CPE scheme can be directly obtained
via functional encryption (FE) using indistinguishability Obfuscation (iO) [55].
In order to obtain a construction based on standard assumptions we resort to
bounded collusion FE [63,65]. We provide a more efficient construction for this
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primitive via a combinatorial argument and we then use it to instantiate a CPE
with exponential size domain. Our TDS constructions are summarized in Fig. ??.
3. We revisit the problem of digital signets and self-enforcement [51] and we formulate
the “known ciphertext model” for TDS where the adversary knows the target set
of (polynomially many) ciphertexts before implementing the pirate box. In an
attack in this model, the adversary tries to achieve a favorable “space rate”, i.e.,
produce a decryption box that has size smaller than the total plaintext material
that is encoded in the known ciphertexts without leaking any of the traitors’
collaterals. Constructing a TDS in the known ciphertext model is equivalent to
the problem of constructing digital-signets with self-enforcement as defined in
[51] which is open under falsifiable assumptions; the construction of [51] assumes
an incompressible function of a specific type (this is an unfalsifiable assumption)
and works for any space rate o(1). With our TDS constructions we resolve the
open question showing feasibility under falsifiable assumptions for space rates
O(log λ/λ) while we show infeasibility for space rates Ω(log2 λ/λ) in the black-box
recoverability setting. It remains still open whether the weaker non-black-box
recoverability setting of [51] can allow for higher space rates; however we warn that
such “white-box” recoverability is too weak of a property for TDS’s since it provides
no solid guarantee that the collateral hidden traitor data will be made public
(hence the open question that remains seems to be of less relevance to practice). In
our result, we exploit bounds on the false positive rate of the membership testing
problem to show how our TDS schemes can be used while our negative result
applies Bloom filters [15] to provide an efficient attacker strategy (in this way we
resolve the open question circumventing incompressible functions altogether).
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Assumption Ciphertext size Upper bound on t Recoverability
Construction I PKE O(t2 log2(n/)) O(log(n/)/λ) Black-box
Construction I PKE O(t4λ) n Black-box
Construction II LWE O(t3+epoly(λ)) n Black-box
Construction II iO O(1) n Black-box
Figure 1: Comparison of our TDS’s; t is the collusion size, n is total number of users,
e = 1/poly(λ),  is the error term in the fingerprinting code which is negl(λ) and λ is
the security parameter. PKE denotes public-key encryption, LWE denotes the learning
with errors problem, and iO denotes general indistinguishability obfuscation.
4. We finally describe how one can use Bitcoin as a collateral in a TDS deployment.
Given the power of TDS’s, the idea is simple: since the collateral can be an arbitrary
string we can have the SP store as collateral the secret-key that corresponds to a
bitcoin address of the user. For the purpose of the subscription that corresponds to
the service the account should remain frozen (i.e., no outgoing transaction should
be made from this account otherwise the subscription will be cancelled). As long
as the user respects the service agreement the collateral remains safe and the user
may reclaim it when the service contract terminates.
Related primitives. As discussed above, a TTS aims at providing “a posteriori”
deterrence of malicious users while TDS provides, in addition, a proactive way of
deterrence. Furthermore, traitor tracing is possible only when the authority gains access
to the pirate box, while in a TDS, the mere act of sharing a decryption key (or any
implementation of a decryption algorithm containing such key) will lead to the leakage
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of one of the traitors’ secrets. We show that a traitor deterring scheme implies a publicly
traceable traitor tracing scheme [33] (cf. Section 4.3.1.1).
Another very related notion to TDS is digital signets for self-enforcement proposed
by Dwork, Lotspiech and Naor [51]. In this multi-user encryption system, the adversary
that controls a set of traitor user keys and wants to retransmit a certain plaintext that
was transmitted, will either send a message as long as the plaintext itself, or will have to
leak some of the traitors’ private data. The formalization of the problem in [51] assumes
that recoverability of the collateral information requires direct access to the traitor
keys (also called white-box access). In our terminology, they provide a symmetric-key
TDS that is only secure in the non-black-box sense. The construction provided by
[51] relies on the unfalsifiable assumption that f(x) = gx1 ||gx2 || . . . ||gx` is incompressible
(incompressible means given x, f , no adversary can come up with an intermediate value
y, such that: (1). |y|/|f(x)| = o(1); (2). one can recover f(x); (3). x remains hidden).
Kiayias and Tang studied the problem of leakage deterring (LD) public key cryptog-
raphy [85] in which if a key owner leaks any partial implementation of her decryption
box, a piece of secret information that is embedded in her public key will be revealed to
the recipient. Our notion of TDS is a generalization of LD from the single user setting
to the multi-user setting. We note that because of collusion attacks in the multi-user
setting the techniques for recoverability from [85] are not directly applicable for building
a TDS (even a scheme with ciphertext size linear in the number of users is not obvious).
3.2 Preliminaries
3.2.1 Definitions
Definition 4. A comparison predicate encryption is a predicate encryption for compari-
son predicate P , where P (x, y) = 1 if x ≤ y. It is composed of four algorithms:
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• CPE.Setup This algorithm inputs security parameter and outputs a master key pair
(mph,msk).
• CPE.KeyGen(msk, v) This algorithm takes master secret key, and an attribute v
as inputs and outputs a secret key skv.
• CPE.Enc(mph, x,m) This algorithm takes master public key, message m and an
attribute x as inputs and it outputs a ciphertext cx.
• CPE.Dec(skv, cx) This algorithm takes a secret key skv and a ciphertext cx as
inputs, it outputs m or ⊥.
A comparison predicate encryption satisfies the following properties:
Correctness. If x ≤ v, then CPE.Dec(skv, cx) = m;
Payload hiding. This property is essentially IND-CPA security (when the adversary does
not hold any key which can decrypt the challenge ciphertext) for the message of CPE
schemes. Consider the following game between a PPT adversary A and a challenger C.
• The challenger C runs the CPE.Setup algorithm and sends A the master public
key mpk.
• A selects arbitrary number of attributes v1, . . . , vq and asks for the secret keys; C
sends skv1 , . . . , skvq to A, where skvi = CPE.KeyGen(msk, vi);
• The adversary A sends two messages m0,m1 and an attribute x to C, and the
challenger randomly selects a bit b, computes cbx = CPE.Enc(mph, x,mb) and
returns cbx as the challenge ciphertext.
• A chooses other set of attributes and requests keys. At the end, A outputs her
guess b′.
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We require in the above game that for all {vi} attributes she used to request keys, x > vi.
A wins if she guesses correctly with probability close to 1/2, i.e., the advantage of A in
the payload hiding game AdvAph := |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 | ≤ negl(λ).
Attribute hiding. We also require the ciphertext hides the attribute in a IND-CPA
fashion, even if the adversary has keys allowing her to decrypt the challenge ciphertext.
Consider the following game between a PPT adversary A and a challenger C.
• The challenger C runs the CPE.Setup algorithm and sends A the master public
key mpk.
• A selects arbitrary number of attributes v1, . . . , vq and asks for the secret keys; C
sends skv1 , . . . , skvq to A, where skvi = CPE.KeyGen(msk, vi);
• The adversary A sends two messages m0,m1 and two attributes x0, x1 to C, and
the challenger randomly selects a bit b, computes cbx = CPE.Enc(mph, xb,mb) and
returns cbx as the challenge ciphertext.
• A chooses other set of attributes and requests keys. At the end, A outputs her
guess b′.
We requirem0 = m1 in the above game that if there exists vi that the adversary requested
a key for and x ≤ vi; and also we require that for each of the attributes v1, . . . , vq it is
either larger than max(x0, x1) or smaller than min(x0, x1). These two requirement are to
rule out the trivial attacks. A wins if she guesses correctly with probability close to 1/2,
i.e., the advantage of A in the payload hiding game AdvAph := |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 | ≤ negl(λ).
Remark: the two definitions can be merged into one as attribute hiding defined as above
implies payload hiding, we describe them separately for the ease of later presentation.
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Approximate membership testing problem. We also provide the definition of
membership testing problem used in the known ciphertext model TDS.
Definition 5. [15, 32] For a subset V randomly chosen from a universe U , the approxi-
mate membership testing problem with a false positive probability η is to produce a data
structure T such that, for a random element x ∈ U , if x ∈ V , T (x) always outputs 1,
while if x 6∈ V , T (x) outputs 0 with probability at least 1− η (i.e., it may output 1 with
probability at most η, a false positive).
3.2.2 Building blocks.
First, we put the simple parallel repetition construction of q-query secure FE
from a 1-query secure FE. Given a 1-query secure FE, 〈OneFE.Setup,OneFE.KeyGen,
OneFE.Enc,OneFE.Dec〉, a q-bounded FE is as follows:
• Setup(λ): This algorithm inputs the security parameter λ and runs OneFE.Setup N
times to generate (MPK,MSK) = {(mpk1,msk1), . . . , (mpkq,mskq)}, it returns
(MPK,MSK).
• KeyGen(MSK,C, i): This algorithm takes the master secret key MSK, a circuit
C and a counter i as inputs. It computes skC,i = OneFE.KeyGen(mski, C) and
returns skC = (skC,i, i) and updates i = i+ 1.
• Enc(MPK,m): This algorithm takes the master public key, and message m as in-
puts. It simply encrypts m under each master public key, i.e., CT = CT1, . . . , CTq,
where CTj = OneFE.Enc(mpkj ,m).
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• Dec(skC , CT ): This algorithm takes a secret key skC and ciphertext CT as
inputs. It picks the corresponding ciphertext and runs the decryption algo-
rithm of the 1-query secure FE decryption algorithm, i.e., it returns C(m) =
OneFE.Dec(skC,i, CTi).
We see that if the underlying 1-secure FE is succinct [63], then the resulting q-secure
FE is with ciphertext size O(q · poly(λ)).
In order to apply this construction to our traitor deterring scheme, we have to choose
q = n, where n is the total number of users. To see this, if any two keys skC1 , skC2 are
generated using a same master secret key, say msk1, then no security can be guaranteed
for the first 1-query secure FE instance, and thus the whole resulting CPE. Whenever
q ≤ n, there must exist a pair of users, their secret keys are generated using the same
master secret key. If such two users collude, we can not ensure the security of the TDS.
We also recall the bounded collusion FE from [65]. This construction is stateless.
They can guarantee security as long as there are no more than q keys corrupted
together, even if there are more than q secret keys issued. Given a 1-query secure
FE, 〈OneFE.Setup,OneFE.KeyGen,OneFE.Enc,OneFE.Dec〉, a stateless q-bound FE is as
follows:
• Setup(λ): This algorithm inputs the security parameter λ and runs OneFE.Setup
N times to generate (MPK,MSK) = {(mpk1,msk1), . . . , (mpkN ,mskN )}, it
returns (MPK,MSK) and parameters para = (d,D,N, S, v).
• KeyGen(MSK,Ci): This algorithm takes the master secret key MSK and a
circuit Ci as inputs. It first randomly selects a subset Γi ⊂ [N ] with size
dD + 1, and a subset ∆i ⊂ [S] with size v. It then generates the secret key
{skGi,j}j∈Γi , where skGi,j = OneFE.KeyGen(mskj , Gi), and the circuit Gi,∆i is
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defined as Gi,∆i(x1, . . . , x`, r1, . . . , rS) = Ci(x1, . . . , x`) +
∑
i∈∆i ri. It returns
skCi = (Γi,∆i, {skGi,j}j∈Γi)
• Enc(MPK, para,m1, . . . ,m`): This algorithm takes the master public key, public
parameters and a message vector 〈m1, . . . ,m`〉 as inputs. It first generate `
random degree-d polynomials µ1, . . . , µ` satisfying µi(0) = mi, and then it does
a d + 1-out-of-N secret sharing on each of the messages. Also, the algorithm
selects S random polynomials ζ1, . . . , ζS with degree dD satisfying ζi(0) = 0.
The encryption algorithm returns the ciphertext CT = {CTi}, where CTi =
OneFE.Enc[mpki, (µ1(i)), . . . , µ`(i)), (ζ1(i), . . . , ζS(i))] for i = 1, . . . , N .
• Dec(skCi , CT ): This algorithm takes a secret key skCi and a ciphertext CT as
inputs. The algorithm first runs the decryption algorithm of the 1-query secure
FE on corresponding ciphertext that it has a secret key, i.e., for each j ∈ Γi, it
runs OneFE.Dec(skGi,j , CTi) = gj , then use those values {gj}j∈Γi to interpolate
and returns g0 = Ci(m1, . . . ,m`).
Observe that for each i ∈ Γ, gi = GC,∆(x1, . . . , x`, r1, . . . , rS) = C(µ1(i), . . . , µ`(i))+∑
j∈∆ ζj(i) and this corresponds to polynomial η(·) = C(µ1(·), . . . , µ`(·)) +
∑
i∈∆ ζi(·)
which is with degree dD, because the inner layer µi(·) is with degree d and the outer layer
C(·) is with maximum degree D and ζi(·) also with degree D. With dD + 1 values gi,
one can do a standard interpolation to obtain g0 = C(µ1(0), . . . , µ`(0)) +
∑
i∈∆ ζi(0) =
C(m1, . . . ,m`).
For security, as 1-query secure FE is used as the underlying scheme, if colluded users
obtains secret keys from one same master secret key, say mski, then the security of such
FE instance is broken; we have to be sure that t colluded users can not break d+ 1 such
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instances so that the secret sharing with still guarantees security. This condition will
put a first restriction that | ∪j 6=i (Γi ∩ Γj)| ≤ d.
The purpose of using the random polynomials {ζi(·)} is to randomize the outcome of
OneFE.Dec(skC , (CTi)) so that each ciphertext containing the shares can be simulated
properly. This requires that there exists at least one ζi appears only for one secret key.
More specifically, we require that for every i ∈ [q], it satisfies that ∆i\ ∪j 6=i ∆j 6= ∅.
In [65], they chose parameters d = Θ(q2λ), N = Θ(D2q2d), v = Θ(λ) and S =
Θ(vq2), thus the resulting ciphertext size for the q-bound FE is Θ(N · S · poly(λ)) =
Θ(q6D2poly(λ)) even if the underlying 1-secure FE is succinct.
3.3 Definition and Security Modeling for TDS
We provide the formal definition and security model of traitor deterring schemes
and demonstrate their relationship to traitor tracing schemes.
Syntax of traitor deterring schemes. Informally, a TDS is a multi-user encryption
scheme with a deterring mechanism such that if some of the receivers collude to leak an
implementation of a (potentially only partially working) decryption device, any recipient
of the device will be able to recover one of the colluding user’s secret information which
is hidden in the public parameter of the system. Formally we have the following:
• Setup(1λ, s1, . . . , sn): This algorithm takes the security parameter, users’ secrets
s1, . . . , sn ∈ {0, 1}λ as inputs, and outputs system parameter para, an encryption
key pk, and a set of decryption keys sk1, . . . , skn.
• Enc(pk,m): This algorithm inputs para, pk and a message m, and outputs cipher-
text c.
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• Dec(ski, c): This algorithm takes para, pk, one of the secret keys ski and a cipher-
text c as inputs, and outputs m.
• RecB,D(pk, para): This algorithm takes para, pk as inputs and has oracle access
to a device B and a distribution D. The algorithm returns a string in {0, 1}λ or
the symbol ⊥.
The correctness of the scheme is standard and entails that Enc(pk, ·) can be inverted
by Dec(ski, ·) for any i = 1, . . . , n. The intended functionality of the algorithm Rec is
that if B is created by a collusion of receivers with secret keys ski1 , . . . , skit and operates
correctly for ciphertexts whose corresponding plaintext follows a distribution D, the
algorithm outputs at least one of the strings si1 , . . . , sit . We clarify the conditions under
which this is supposed to happen (as well as the other necessary security properties) in
the next paragraph.
Security model. There are three security requirements for a traitor deterring scheme,
security of plaintexts, privacy of user’s secrets, and traitor deterring.
IND-CPA security. Regarding security of plaintexts we consider a security property
of IND-CPA defined in a standard fashion: the challenger C runs setup for any s1, . . . , sn
and provides the adversary A with para, pk. In response, A provides two plaintexts
m0,m1 to C. Subsequently C computes ψ = Enc(pk,mb) for a random b ∈ {0, 1} and
provides ψ to A. A returns a bit b′ and C terminates with 1 if b = b′ and 0 otherwise. The
probability that C returns 1 means that A is successful and we denote it by SuccindcpaA (1λ).
For security to hold it must be that Pr[SuccindcpaA (1
λ)] ≤ 1/2 + negl(λ). The notion of
security can be extended in a straightforward manner to IND-CCA2.
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Privacy. Regarding the privacy of user secret information it should be the case that each
si value remains hidden within the public parameter even all other users are corrupted.
Formally, consider the following game:
• The adversary A sends an index i as well as private information s1, . . . , si−1,
si+1, . . . , sn and the pair si,0, si,1 to the challenger.
• The challenger randomly selects a bit b, and simulates the Setup algorithm on
input s1, . . . , si−1, si,b, si+1, . . . , sn. It sends to A the values para, pk, sk1, . . .,
ski−1, ski+1, . . . , skn.
• A returns a single bit b′ and C returns 1 if and only if b = b′.
The event that C returns 1 means A is successful and we denote it by SuccprivA (1λ). For
privacy of secret information to hold it must be that Pr[SuccprivA (1
λ)] ≤ 1/2 + negl(λ)
for any PPT adversary A.
It is also possible to define a weaker variant of the above definition where the
adversary A is restricted to a number t of secret-keys.
Traitor-deterring. Finally we define the traitor deterring property. In order to specify
the definition we need first to define the notion of δ-correctness with respect to a public-
key pk and a plaintext distribution D. A device B is δ−correct with respect to D and pk
if it satisfies that Pr[B(Enc(pk,m)) = m : m← D] ≥ δ. With the public parameter, and
a non-trivial pirate decryption box B which is created by the collusion of all users, the
recovering algorithm should determine of the colluder’s secret information si. Formally,
consider the following game:
• The challenger C simulates the Setup algorithm and the adversary A receives pk.
A then provides a vector of secret information s1, . . . , sn as well as an arbitrary
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subset T ⊆ {1, . . . , n} to the challenger C and A receives the secret keys of all
users in T , {ski | i ∈ T} as well as the public parameter para.
• A outputs an implementation B and a distribution D.
• C returns 1 if and only if RecB,D(pk, para) 6∈ {si | i ∈ T}.
We define by SuccdeterA (1λ) the event that C returns 1. We say a scheme achieves
fully collusion resilient, black-box traitor deterring w.r.t. a class of distributions D (that
may depend on δ) if for any ppt adversary A it holds that
Pr[B is δ-correct w.r.t. D ∧D ∈ D ∧ SuccdeterA (1λ)] = negl(λ).
In the above experiment we assume that Rec has resettable black-box access to B.
Even though we do not consider them here, weaker variants of the above formulation may
be relevant in some settings and can be “t-collusion resilient (as opposed to fully-collusion
resilient) or they may extend Rec algorithm’s access to B (e.g., in a non-black-box setting
Rec may have access to the traitor keys).
Definition 6. 〈Setup,Enc,Dec,Rec〉 is a (fully-collusion resistant, black-box) traitor
deterring scheme if it satisfies, (i) correctness, (ii) IND-CPA security, (iii) privacy and
(iv) fully-collision resistant, black-box traitor deterring.
TDS and TTS. We conclude the section by a brief argument that a traitor deterring
scheme is a strict generalization of a traitor tracing scheme (in fact of a traitor trac-
ing scheme with “public-traceability” [33]). Given a traitor deterring scheme 〈Setup,
Enc,Dec,Rec〉, the reduction is easy with the following simple observation. First we set
si = i for all i = 1, . . . , n. It follows that the Setup algorithm requires no other input
other than the security parameter λ. Observe now that the Rec algorithm will output
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one of the indices of the colluding users who jointly produce the decryption box B with
only access to pk, hence it is a traitor tracing scheme with public-traceability.
3.4 Traitor Deterring from Fingerprinting Codes
In this section, we will present our first technique of constructing a TDS from
fingerprinting codes. We first formalize a new encryption scheme we call fuzzy locker
(w.r.t a fingerprint scheme), from which together with a public key encryption, we will
construct a TDS. We then give a concrete construction of fuzzy locker for the CFN
codes [36].
First, let us recall the definition of fingerprinting codes [83]. A q-ary fingerprinting
code is a pair of algorithms (Gen,Accuse), where Gen is a probabilistic algorithm with
input a security parameter  and two numbers n, t denoting the number of users and the
maximum collusion size respectively, and t ∈ [n] = {1, . . . , n}. It outputs n q-ary strings
C = {C1, . . . , Cn} (called codewords), where Ci = ci1 . . . ci` for i ∈ [n], j ∈ [`], cij ∈ Q–the
alphabet set with size q and a tracing key tk. Accuse is a deterministic algorithm with
input a “pirate” codeword C∗, and a user codeword Ci (sometimes a tracing key tk) and
output in {0, 1}.
Suppose adversary A corrupts up to t users (whose indices form a set Ucor ⊂ [n]),
and outputs a pirate codeword C∗ = c∗1 . . . c∗` . We define the accused user set as
Uacc = {i ∈ [n] : Accuse(tk, C∗, Ci) = 1]. A fingerprinting code is called t−collusion
resistant (fully collusion resistant if t = n) if it satisfies: (i) traceability, if the strategy
of producing C∗ satisfies the “marking assumption", (for each i ∈ [n], c∗i = cji for some
j ∈ Ucor), then one of the colluders must be accused, i.e., Pr[Uacc ∩ Ucor = ∅] ≤ ; and
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(ii) soundness, the probability that an innocent user is accused is bounded by , i.e.,
Pr[([n]− Ucor) ∩ Uacc 6= ∅] ≤ . 1
3.4.1 TDS from fuzzy lockers.
Fingerprinting codes are combinatorial designs that enable testing whether a code-
word is used in generating a pirate codeword. They were demonstrated to be very useful
in building TTS in a line of previous works, e.g., [21, 36, 87]. The basic idea is that each
user will be assigned an “identity” which is represented by a codeword, and the secret
keys for the user will be selected from a group of keys according to his codeword. The
encryption algorithm will cover all the user keys. And the tracing algorithm will first
recover a “pirate codeword” by feeding the pirate decryption device with malformed (but
seemingly valid in the view of A) ciphertext, and then it will run the tracing algorithm
of the fingerprinting code to identify at least one of the colluded users who participated
in producing the pirate codeword.
The main challenge of upgrading the above paradigm to a TDS is the way of
embedding and recovering of the secret information of the users. To address this, we
formalize a new primitive we call fuzzy locker w.r.t a (publicly traceable) fingerprinting
code. In a fuzzy locker, a message is encrypted using a random codeword Ci. The
message can be decrypted (“unlocked”) only if one provides a pirate codeword C∗ such
that Ci will be accused by the accusation algorithm, otherwise, the message will remain
IND-CPA secure. Given such a primitive, one can construct a TDS as follows: the
embedding of the user private information can be simply done via encryption using the
user’s codeword (which is normally randomly selected according to the Gen algorithm).
The privacy requirement can be easily achieved via the security of the fuzzy locker. The
1In many fingerprinting schemes, the soundness holds unconditionally, (e.g.,[36, 127]).
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recover algorithm will first retrieve a “pirate codeword" from the pirate box and then
it will try decrypting all locked data using this pirate codeword. The traitor deterring
property can be guaranteed by the traitor tracing property of the fingerprinting code,
since at least one of the codewords used in producing the pirate codeword will be accused
and thus the private user data can be retrieved.
We first give the formal definition and security model of a fuzzy locker. W.l.o.g, we
can think of the Gen algorithm of the fingerprinting code C to operate in two phases,
first, using n, t and the security parameter to produce a secret state st and then uses a
C.Sample subroutine that produces the codewords one-by-one while updating st.
Definition 7. A fuzzy locker w.r.t a (publicly traceable) fingerprinting code C consists
of the following two algorithms:
• FL.Enc(Ci,m): Given a codeword Ci ← C.Sample and a message m, the encryp-
tion algorithm outputs a ciphertext c.
• FL.Dec(C∗, c): Given a ciphertext c and a string C∗, the algorithm outputs a
message m or ⊥.
Correctness: If C.Accuse(tk, Ci, C∗) = 1:
Pr[FL.Dec(C∗, c) = m] ≥ 1− negl(λ).
Security of a fuzzy locker. We define t-resilient security (fully resilient if t = n) of a
fuzzy locker scheme in the sense of IND-CPA security, by considering the following game
between a challenger C and an adversary A:
• The challenger produces st using Gen on input , t, n and sends C1, . . . , Ct ←
C.Sample(st) to A.
• A selects two messages m0,m1 and sends them to C.
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• The challenger randomly samples a codeword C0 ← C.Sample(st), randomly flips
a coins b, and sends c = FL.Enc(C0,mb) to the adversary A.
• A outputs her guess b′.
A fuzzy locker is t-resilient IND-CPA secure if:




Construction-I of TDS. Given a fuzzy locker and a public key encryption (PKE)
with the algorithms (KeyGen, Enc, Dec), we can construct a TDS as follows:
• Setup(1λ, s1, . . . , sn, t): The algorithm first runs the codeword generation algorithm
C.Gen which inputs the security parameter, and t, n, it returns tk, {Ci}i∈[n], where
Ci = c
i
1, . . . , c
i
`. The algorithm then runs the KeyGen of the PKE and returns q`
key pairs:
(pk1,1, sk1,1), . . . , (pk1,`, sk1,`);
(pk2,1, sk2,1), . . . , (pk2,`, sk2,`);
. . .
(pkq,1, skq,1), . . . , (pkq,`, skq,`)
Finally, the Setup algorithm takes users’ secrets s1, . . . , sn, tk, C1, . . . , Cn and all
those key pairs as inputs, and it outputs system parameter para, an encryption
key pk, and a set of decryption keys sk1, . . . , skn. Specifically, pk contains all the
public keys above; ski = {sk1,ci1 , . . . , sk`,ci`} for i ∈ [n]; and para contains tk and
〈ω1, . . . , ωn〉, where ωi = FL.Enc(Ci, si).
• Enc(pk,m): This algorithm is given pk and a message m. It first randomly samples
m1, . . . ,m`−1, then computes m` = m −
∑`−1
i=1 mi and cti,j = Enc(pki,j ,mj) for
i ∈ [q], j ∈ [`]; it outputs the ciphertext ct = {cti,j}.
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• Dec(ski, ct): This algorithm takes inputs para, pk, a secret key ski and a ciphertext
ct. It parses the secret key and the ciphertext, and computes mj = Dec(skj,cij , cti,j)
and further m =
∑`
i=1mi. The algorithm outputs m.
• RecB,D(pk, para): This algorithm inputs para, pk and has oracle access to a device
B and a distribution D. It first runs the following procedure for each index k ∈ [`]
to extract a pirate codeword from B:
1. It initialize the pointer value i0 = 1.
2. It samples m ← D, samples messages {mi}i 6=k and computes mk = m −∑
i 6=kmi.
3. It feeds ciphertext {cti,j} to B where ci,j = Enc(pki,j ,mj) if j 6= k or i > i0;
and ci,k = Enc(pki,k, ri) for i ≤ i0 and ri is a random message.
4. If in N runs (value will be determined in the analysis), the number of times n1
that B returns m is sufficiently smaller than that in the (i0 − 1) experiment
(the difference is denoted by n0 when i0 = 1, the experiment is using all
valid ciphertexts), or it returns ri0 +
∑
j 6=kmj the algorithm returns c
∗
k = i0;
otherwise, it stores n1, sets i0 = i0 + 1, and repeats from step 2.
The pirate codeword retrieved is C∗. The algorithm parses para to identify the
data 〈ω1, . . . , ωn〉. It then runs the decryption algorithm of the fuzzy locker on
all of them, i.e, for i ∈ [n], it runs FL.Dec(C∗, ωi) = si. The algorithm stops if
∃si 6= ⊥ and it returns si.
Security analysis. Due to lack of space, we present here only a brief sketch about the
security properties, and refer to the full version for the detailed proofs.
Regarding IND-CPA security, it follows in a straightforward manner from the security
of the underlying PKE scheme.
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Regarding privacy of the honest user secrets, follows easily from the security of the
fuzzy locker.
Regarding the black-box traitor deterring property, note that the Rec algorithm
proceeds in two steps, it first recovers a pirate codeword C∗ from the box B. If there
exists a colluder codeword Ci, such that Accuse(tk, C∗, Ci) = 1, then in the second step,
according to the correctness of the fuzzy locker, the decryption of FL.Dec(C∗, ωi) will
return si. The security of the fingerprinting code guarantees that if any pirate codeword
is produced following the “marking assumption”, it can be used to accuse at least one of
the colluders. The IND-CPA security of the underlying PKE scheme essentially enforces
the “marking assumption.” To see this, suppose the collusion user secret keys are {ski}
for i ∈ Ucor, for each index j, the alphabet c∗i for the pirate codeword at index i can not
be any cki for k 6∈ Ucor with probability significantly larger than the guessing probability
δ − α. Otherwise, these keys may be used to decrypt a ciphertext encrypted under a
public key pkk,i.
The choice of N,n0 can be easily determined as follows. As there must exist an
index i0 such that the probability of returning a correct plaintext (denoted by p1) is
at least [δ − (δ − α)]/q = α/q smaller than that for i0 − 1 (denoted by p2). From
the Chernoff bound Pr[X < (1 − ω)µ] ≤ e−ω2µ/2, let us use X1i = 1 denote the event
that decryption query for i0 − 1 is answered correctly while X2i = 0 denote that for
i0 it is not answered correctly. Also we use Xi = 1 denote the above joint event, i.e.,
Pr[Xi = 1] = Pr[X
1
i = 1 ∧ X2i = 0] = p1(1 − p2) ≥ p1 − p2 ≥ α/q. When we set
N = qα log
2 λ, n0 =
α
2qN , where λ is the security parameter, a pirate codeword must be
identified.
Theorem 10. Given a public key encryption scheme, and a fully secure fuzzy locker (for
a q-ary fingerprinting code), there exists a (public key) TDS satisfying: fully collusion
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resilient, black-box traitor deterring property w.r.t to any message distribution D that
has min-entropy H∞(D) ≥ − log(δ − α), where δ is the correctness required by the
adversarial device, α is a non-negligible amount that is significantly smaller than δ, and
the parameters N = qα log
2 λ, n0 =
α
2qN .
3.4.2 A Fuzzy locker for CFN codes.
We now propose a construction for a fuzzy locker w.r.t. CFN codes [36] using fuzzy
extractors [50]. Consider the CFN fingerprinting scheme where the collusion size is set
to be t; in order generate a codeword for a user j, the authority randomly samples
cj1, . . . , c
j
` ← [q]`. The tracing algorithm accuses the user whose codeword has the largest
number of locations that share the same symbol with the pirate codeword. Observe that
this accusation procedure is identical to finding the “closest” among all user codewords
to the pirate codeword. To put it in another way, the user codewords are random
strings, but the tracing property of the CFN code guarantees that under the “marking
assumption", any pirate codeword produced by a collusion of no more that t random
codewords will have a small L1-distance to one of the colluder codewords. 2 To facilitate
the construction of the fuzzy locker we employ a fuzzy extractor [50] which enables one
to retrieve the same random string from two different but correlated strings that have
high entropy (cf. the fuzzy vault scheme [81]).
In more detail, most of the fuzzy extractors follow a correct-then-extract strategy.
When the two strings are close enough, an error correcting code (ECC) can be used to
eliminate their discrepancies and then a randomness extractor [32] is applied to extract
a uniform output (which will later be used as a key) from the high entropy codeword
2Actually, from the analysis of CFN one infers that if the pirate codeword and user codeword agree
on more than `/t symbols, the user can be accused.
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(which will be the source from the point of view of the extractor). However for the
fuzzy locker for CFN codes, the portion of disagreement (errors) between the codeword
used for encryption and the pirate codeword extracted for decryption is quite large and
beyond the decoding capability of a unique decoding ECC. We thus give up perfect
correctness for the fuzzy locker, and turn to the use of list decoding [71, 126]. In a
list decodable code, the error correction returns multiple candidates, but it can decode
efficiently a number of errors up to portion almost 1 (as opposed to unique decoding).
One last thing we need to be careful is that the rate of the ECC should be selected in a
way that the entropy loss will not prohibit randomness extraction.
Combining the above tools, we will use the uniform string extracted from the fuzzy
extractor as a secret key to encrypt the user secret data. We further will assume the
valid messages are easily identifiable, and that decryption using a wrong key will almost
never yield a valid message. These two assumptions are easy to achieve by including in
the plaintext a message authentication code or a signature on the message, for details
about this technique, we refer to [50,99].
Fuzzy locker for CFN codes.: We present below the fuzzy locker for CFN codes; the
choices of the parameters will be specified later. Given a randomness extractor Ext and
a secure symmetric key encryption (SE.Enc, SE.Dec):
• FL.Enc(C,m): The algorithm takes input C = c1 . . . c` U←− F `q , and message m.
It first samples a random (`, κ)q Reed-Solomon code X = x1, . . . , x` which can
correct up to ` − `/t errors, and computes Y = {y1, . . . , y`}, where yi = ci + xi
mod q; It then selects a random bitstring s and computes k = Ext(s, C), 3 and
c = SE.Enc(k,m). The algorithm outputs ct = (Y, s, c).
3we assume here extractors can be applied to large alphabet, if not, we can simply use the bit string
representing C to be the input to the extractor.
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• FL.Dec(C∗, ct): The algorithm inputs a pirate codeword C∗ = c∗1 . . . c∗` and
ciphertext ct. It first computes C ′ = c′1 . . . c′` where c
′
i = yi − c∗i mod q, and it
runs the list decoding algorithm on C ′ to get a list of RS codewords {X ′1, . . . , X ′L}.
It then computes a list of possible user codewords {C1, . . . , CL} where Ci = Yi−X ′i,
where “-” stands for component-wise modular subtraction. The algorithm tries
the following for every user codeword: it computes ri = Ext(s, Ci) and mi =
SE.Dec(ri, c). If there exists an m 6= ⊥, the algorithm outputs m, otherwise, ⊥.
Security analysis. Regarding correctness. First we recall the basics of the CFN code.
It randomly samples C ← F `q . Suppose t users (w.l.o.g, we assume they have codewords
C1, . . . , Ct) collude to produce a pirate codeword C∗. Due to the marking assumption,
each symbol c∗i it equals to one of the corresponding symbols in C1, . . . , Ct. It follows
easily that there exists a Ci, such that C∗ and Ci agree on at least `/t locations. We now
check the decryption algorithm on cti = FL.Enc(Ci,mi). C ′ = Y −C∗ = X + (C −C∗)
mod q, thus {c′1, . . . , c′`} agree with x1, . . . , x` on at least `/t locations. For a Reed-
Solomon code RS: Σκ → Σ`, it can decode at most `−√`κ errors. If we have `/t ≥ √`κ,
then RS would return a list of possible candidates which contains the actual X. Then
Y −X would yield the user codeword Ci; correctness then follows easily.
Regarding security: for any honest user whose codeword C that is uniformly
selected, we can think it is selected after the pirate code C∗ is produced. Follow-
ing the probabilistic analysis from [36], if ` ≥ 4t log n /3, and q ≥ 4t, it holds that
Pr[C∗, C agree on `/t locations] ≤ . It follows that the decoding algorithm will not
return any user codeword. A bit more formally, we can think of the ciphertext (Y, s, c)
as being generated following the KEM/DEM [42] framework, where Y, s encrypt the
session key k which is used to encrypt the data in c. Conditioned on Y, s, the min-
entropy of C can be calculated as ` log q − (`− κ) log |Σ| as s is independent of C, Y is
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of length `, and the original random codeword has entropy κ log |Σ|. Now if we have
` log q−(`−κ) log |Σ| ≥ Θ(λ), the strong extractor can output a sufficiently long uniform
key k, thus Y, s form a secure KEM. Now the IND-CPA security of the message follows
from the security of the symmetric key encryption.
Setting up the parameters. There are multiple restraints about selecting the right
parameters for the first construction of traitor deterring scheme from the CFN code.
More specifically, for parameters `, κ, n, t, , λ being dimension and degree of the RS
code, number of users, bound of colluders, error term in the fingerprinting code and the
security parameter respectively, they have to satisfy: (1). ` ≥ max(κt2, 4t log n ); (2).
` log q − (`− k) log ` ≥ Θ(λ).
When κt2 ≤ 4t log n , we can choose ` = q = 4t log n, and κ = Θ(λ). The resulting
traitor deterring scheme will have ciphertext size O(t2 log2 n ), and the upper bound of
the collusion size is t = O(log n /λ);
When κt2 ≥ 4t log n , we can choose ` = q = λt2, and κ = Θ(λ). The resulting
traitor deterring scheme will have ciphertext size O(λt4) for any collusion size t.
To summarize, if we select the parameters in a way that all the conditions above
are satisfied, then the correctness and security of the fuzzy locker for CFN code follows.
Then from the general construction, we can conclude that:
Corollary 11. Given PKE, there exists a (public key) TDS satisfying: fully-collusion
resilient, black-box traitor deterring property w.r.t. to any message distribution D that
has min-entropy H∞(D) ≥ − log(δ−α), where δ is the correctness probability required by
the adversarial device and α is a non-negligible amount significantly smaller than δ. And
it is with ciphertext size O(log n /λ) when t ≤ 4 log n /λ; and O(t4λ), if t ≥ 4 log n /λ.
Proof. We first analyze the properties of the fuzzy locker for CFN codes.
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Regarding correctness, suppose the pirate codeword C∗ = c∗1, . . . , c∗` makes a user
codeword C = c1, . . . , c` accused, i.e., Accuse(tk, C∗, C) = 1. That means for C −C∗ :=
c1 − c∗1, . . . , c` − c∗` , there are at least `t zeros for parameter of collusion size t. The
decryption algorithm first computes C ′ = Y − C∗ = X + (C − C∗) mod q, thus
{c′1, . . . , c′`} agree with x1, . . . , x` on at least `/t locations.
While the RS code can correct up to `−`/t errors, running the decoding algorithm on
C ′ will return the correct codeword X. It follows that Y −X = C. Then the decryption
algorithm simply runs the extractor on s, C and retrieves a session key k = Ext(s, C)
and runs the decryption algorithm on c to get the message m = SE.Dec(k, c).
Regarding security, we first show a simple argument. Given two symmetric key encryption
schemes SE1 = (SE.Enc1, SE.Dec1) and SE2 = (SE.Enc2, SE.Dec2), the KEM/DEM
mechanism using SE1, SE2 is IND-CPA secure if both of them are IND-CPA secure, i.e.,
we have a new symmetric key encryption SE : (SE.Enc, SE.Dec) defined as: SE.Enc(k,m) :
c1 = SE.Enc1(k, r), c2 = SE.Enc2(r,m) for a randomly chosen r.
Let us check the following game sequence. Game G0, it is the original IND-CPA game
for SE, in which the challenge ciphertext is generated as SE.Enc1(k, r0), SE.Enc2(r0,m0);
In gameG1, the challenge ciphertext will be generated as SE.Enc1(k, r1), SE.Enc2(r0,m0),
using two different r0, r1;
In gameG2, the challenge ciphertext will be generated as SE.Enc1(k, r1), SE.Enc2(r0,m1);
In gameG3, the challenge ciphertext will be generated as SE.Enc1(k, r0), SE.Enc2(r0,m1);
G0, G1 are indistinguishable because of the IND-CPA security of SE1. To see this, a
simulator the challenge SE.Enc1(k, rb) and simulates SE.Enc2(r0,m0) and forwards them
to the adversary A distinguishing G0, G1. It is easy to see that the answer from A can
be used directly to predict b;
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G1, G2 are indistinguishable because of the IND-CPA security of SE2, as the SE1
part now is essentially independent with the SE2 part carrying the messages;
G2, G3 are indistinguishable because of the IND-CPA security of SE1, and can be
similarly argued as the indistinguishability between G0, G1.
Now we instantiate SE1 as follows: given a random CFN codeword C, and a uniform
string s, an extractor is applied to define the message k = Ext(s, C); Now the output
of SE.Enc1(C, k) is defined as (Y, s), i.e., C is used the secret key to SE.Enc1, while
k plays the role of message. Note that Y, s information theoretically hides k, if we
ignoreSE.Dec1(·). To see this, H∞(C|Y, s) = ` log q − ` log |Σ| + κ log |Σ|, and the
parameter selection guarantees that H∞(C|Y, s) ≥ Θ(λ) thus the distribution of k is
statistically close to uniform andH∞(k|Y, s) ≈ λ (All other informations are independent
thus we omit them here). Thus, SE1 defined in this way is IND-CPA secure, and further
the fuzzy locker for CFN code is fully-resilient IND-CPA secure.
Then following Theorem 10, and the parameter selection, we can conclude that we
can construct a traitor deterring scheme from any PKE schemes.
3.5 Construction from Comparison Predicate Encryption
In this section, we will present our second technique of constructing traitor deterring
schemes based on comparison predicate encryption with an exponentially large attribute
space. We first give the general construction of TDS, then instantiate the comparison
predicate encryption from (optimized) bounded collusion functional encryption. The
resulting TDS exhibits better efficiency than our CFN construction for larger collusions.
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3.5.1 TDS from CPE.
In a CPE, decryption succeeds only when v ≤ x, where x, v are the attributes for
the the ciphertext and the secret key respectively. Moreover, besides standard security,
it also requires an attribute hiding property that no adversary A can distinguish c0, c1
which have attributes x0, x1 (assuming x0 < x1) respectively, as long as A does not have
a secret key skv such that x0 ≤ v < x1 (even if A has secret key skv that can decrypt
both c0, c1). (This corresponds to the fully attribute hiding of predicate encryption [?]).
It was shown in [22,25] that a weaker version of CPE (called private linear broadcast
encryption in [22], which has only a polynomially large attribute/identity space) implies
a TTS. In the construction, each user is assigned an integer index as identity, and
the encryption scheme has the property that Enc(pk, i,m) is indistinguishable from
Enc(pk, i+ 1,m) provided A does not hold ski. Thus the tracer can do a linear scan
in the identity space and feed ciphertexts generated using attributes from 0 to n + 1
for each test. If he notices a gap between the responses for some i, and i + 1, then
the user i will be accused. And the gap is guaranteed to exist as all users can decrypt
Enc(pk, n+ 1,m) and no user can decrypt Enc(pk, 0,m).
To construct a TDS, we observe that if the indices are chosen randomly from an
exponentially large space, they could be used as secret keys to hide the user private
information. Unfortunately, it is not clear how to generalize [22, 25] to an exponentially
large identity space. We tackle this problem by constructing CPE’s for an exponential
large attribute space from functional encryption; furthermore, we apply a binary search
type of tracing. In particular, in each step of search (feeding a sequence of tracing
ciphertexts using a corresponding pivot identity), the recovering algorithm only consider
two states for the pirate box. It is functioning, if the decryption probability is close
to the claimed correctness of the pirate box, δ; or not functioning, otherwise. Then
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the recovering algorithm decides to move to a smaller pivot or a larger one.Given
a CPE (CPE.Setup,CPE.KeyGen,CPE.Enc,CPE.Dec) and an authenticated encryption
(AE.Enc,AE.Dec), our second construction of TDS (construction-II) is as follows:
• Setup(λ, n, s1, . . . , sn): The setup algorithm first runs the CPE.Setup algorithm
to output a master key pair (mpk,msk), then it randomly selects n bitstrings
id1, . . . , idn with length `, (that is as an integer, each idi ∈ [2` − 1]), and runs the
CPE.KeyGen algorithm to generate secret keys for the users. For user i it assigns
the identity idi and then generates the secret key ski =CPE.KeyGen(msk, idi). It
embeds the secret information of the user si as the ciphertext ωi = AE.Enc(idi, si).
The setup algorithm outputs public key mpk, para, and secret keys sk1, . . . , skn,
where para = 〈ω1, . . . , ωn〉.
• Enc(mpk,m): This algorithm runs CPE.Enc(mpk, 2`,m) and returns the corre-
sponding output c as ciphertext.
• Dec(ski, c): This algorithm runs CPE.Dec with input ski and ciphertext c and
returns m or ⊥.
• RecB,D(mpk, para): The algorithm maintains a counter j with initial value `− 1
and repeats the following procedure until j = 0: It first samples a sequence of
messages m1, . . . ,mN from D; then it generates the query ciphertexts c1, . . . , cq,
where ci =CPE.Enc(mpk, p,mi) for the position p = 2j and records how many
correct answers does the box B produce; If the number of correct decryptions is
more than n0, the algorithm will set the pivot for the next test position to be
p := p− 2j−1, otherwise p := p+ 2j−1; The algorithm then decreases the counter
j := j − 1 and repeats the procedure. The values for the parameters N,n0 will be
determined in the analysis. Suppose the above algorithm stops at position p. The
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Rec algorithm then runs AE.Dec(p, ωi) on all ωi and returns the first non-⊥ value
si.
Remark: We may implement the authenticated encryption as SE.Enc(k, s||σ) where
σ = Sig(s), where Sig is a signature scheme and the verification key is included in para
where SE.Enc is any secure symmetric key encryption scheme.
Analysis. Correctness and privacy follow straightforwardly, so we focus on the intuition
of the black-box traitor-deterring property. Let us first present the following observations.
(1). If all the colluder identities are smaller than the index p used in the tracing
ciphertext, the box will decrypt correctly with probability close to δ. This holds because
of the the attribute hiding property that CPE.Enc(mpk, p,m) is indistinguishable from
the regular ciphertext CPE.Enc(mpk, 2`,m). From this it can be deduced that failing to
decrypt with probability close to δ suggests that at least one colluder identity is larger
than p, thus the algorithm will not err by moving to a larger pivot. (2). Similarly, if all
colluder identities are larger than the pivot index p used in the tracing ciphertext, the
box will work with just negligible probability because of the payload hiding property. It
follows that decrypting with a probability close to δ (non-negligible) implies at least one
colluder identities is smaller than the attribute in the tracing ciphertext, and hence the
tracing algorithm will not err by moving to a smaller position attribute. (see lemmas in
the appendix.) The above observations imply that every move is towards a subspace
containing some pirate identities.
To be a bit more formal, consider a complete binary tree which represents the whole
identity space. We can think of the path walked by the Rec algorithm as moving along
such tree. It starts from the root (represented by index 2`−1) and moves to the root of a
complete subtree in each step. We will show via strong induction that in each move, the
subtree will contain at least one colluding identity.
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Theorem 12. Construction-II satisfies fully collusion resilient, black-box traitor de-
terring property w.r.t to any message distribution D that has min-entropy H∞(D) ≥
− log(δ−α) for some non-negligible α, s.t., δ ≥ 1.5α, where δ is the correctness probability
provided by the adversarial device, and the parameters N = α−2log2 λ, n0 = (δ − α2 )N .
Proof. Correctness follows directly from the correctness of the underlying CPE scheme.
Privacy is also straightforward, as the user identity is uniformly sampled, the IND-CPA
security of the underlying encryption scheme guarantees no information about the
plaintext is leaked.
Regarding the traitor-deterring property: Suppose a pirate box B is created using
secret keys of the users id1, . . . , idt, and it is with δ−correctness w.r.t a message distri-
bution D, s.t., H∞(D) ≥ − log δ0, where δ0 = δ − α, for some α. We first present three
lemmas that follow easily from the payload hiding and attribute hiding properties of
CPE.
Lemma 13. If the underlying CFE is payload hiding, and the tracing ciphertext C is
created using a pivot p and message m randomly sampled from D, and idi > p for all
i = 1, . . . , t, then: |Pr[B(C) = m]− δ0| = negl(λ).
Lemma 14. If the underlying CFE is attribute hiding, and two tracing ciphertexts
C1, C2 are created using message m, and pivots p1, p2 respectively, and for all i = 1, . . . , t,
idi 6∈ [p1, p2), then: |Pr[B(C1) = m]− Pr[B(C2) = m]| = negl(λ).
Lemma 15. If the underlying CFE is attribute hiding, the tracing ciphertext C is created
using a message m randomly sampled from D and a pivot p, and idi ≤ p for i = 1, . . . , t,
then |Pr[B(C) = m]− δ| = negl(λ).
We then estimate the parameters n0, N for determining whether B works. Following




Xi, {Xi} are independent random variables over {0, 1}, 0 < ω < 1, and
µ = E(X). In this setting, Xi is the event denoting when Rec feeds the i−th ciphertext
which encrypts a random message m sampled from D, the box B returns the plaintext
correctly. It follows that, if the traitor indices are all smaller than the pivot, B works
with δ-correctness, Pr[Xi = 1] ≥ δ. After repeating N times, the probability that at
most n0 = (δ − α2 )N correct answers are returned by B is bounded by e−α
2N/8. On
the other hand, if the traitor indices are all larger than the pivot, B works with only
probability δ − α. The probability that B returns more than n0 correct answers is
bounded by e−α2N/12.
Setting parameters N = α−2log2 λ, n0 = (δ − α2 )N , less than n0 correct answers
means that there must be a traitor index larger than the pivot; more than n0 correct
answers means there must be a traitor index smaller than the pivot.
Now we are ready to proceed to prove the theorem. We can represent all users as
leaves in a complete binary tree indexed by {1, . . . , 2`}; given this Rec moves a pivot
performing a binary search in this tree by selecting a sequence of subtrees S0, S1, . . .
in the following fashion: at move j ≥ 1, the pivot pj defines the subtree Sj−1 as the
subtree of the complete binary tree that is rooted at a node v that has pj as the index of
the rightmost leaf of the left subtree of Sj−1. Observe that S0 is the whole tree. We will
prove by strong induction that for all j ≥ 0, Sj contains a traitor. The base, j = 0, is
straightforward. Suppose that the statement is true for S0, S1, . . . , Sj−1. We will prove
for Sj .
Case 1. Suppose that Sj is a left subtree of Sj−1. This means that there is a traitor
with index at most pj (otherwise, if all traitors had a bigger index, then by lemma 13
the pirate box would be unsuccessful and the recovering algorithm would move to the
right subtree of Sj−1). Now suppose that none of the traitors belong to Sj and let u be
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the largest index of a traitor that has index at most pj . By the fact that u does not
belong to Sj we know that at least one of the subtrees S1, . . . , Sj−1 is a right subtree
of its containing parent subtree. Let Sk be such a subtree with the largest k ≤ j − 1.
Now note that when the recovering algorithm used pivot pk (which lies in the center of
subtree Sk−1) it holds that: u ≤ pk. Observe that there is no traitor with index in the
set {pk + 1, . . . , pj}. Based on lemma 14 the decision of Rec when testing with pivot
pj and pivot pk should be the same (with overwhelming probability). This leads to a
contradiction as Rec moved to the right (resp. left) when testing with index pk (resp.
pj).
Case 2. Suppose that Sj is a right subtree of Sj−1. This means that there is a
traitor with index bigger than pj (otherwise, if all traitors had an index that at most pj ,
then by lemma 15, the pirate box would have a close-to-δ-correctness and the recovering
algorithm would move to the left subtree of Sj−1). Now suppose that none of these
traitors belongs to Sj and let u be the smallest index of traitor that has index larger
than pj . By the fact that u does not belong to Sj we know that at least one of the
subtrees S1, . . . , Sj−1 is a left subtree of its containing parent subtree. Let Sk be such
a subtree with the largest k ≤ j − 1. Now note that when the recovering algorithm
used pivot pk (which lies in the center of subtree Sk−1), it holds that: u > pk. Observe
that there is no traitor with index in the set {pj + 1, . . . , pk}. Based on lemma 14,
the decision of Rec when testing with pivot pj and pivot pk should be the same (with
overwhelming probability). This leads to a contradiction as Rec moved to the left (resp.
right) when testing with index pk (resp. pj).
We can conclude that S` is a single leaf node and it also denotes a traitor.
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3.5.2 Instantiation of comparison predicate encryption.
Next we will give a concrete construction of CPE which supports an exponentially
large attribute space. We first note that, a straightforward instantiation can be obtained
from general functional encryption (FE) which can be constructed using indistinguisha-
bility obfuscation (iO) [55]. The resulting TDS will have only a constant size ciphertext
however it will rely on assumptions related to multilinear maps [55].
We now present an instantiation from standard assumptions. We note that there
exists a construction of bounded collusion FE from standard assumptions. In a traitor
deterring scheme there is only a potentially small (and in any case polynomially bounded)
subset of users that is colluding to produce a pirate box. We show how to construct a
CPE from bounded collusion FE.
Instantiation-I. General functional encryption secure for a single key query with succinct
ciphertext was constructed in [63]. A trivial way to amplify this scheme to a q-query
secure FE is to run q independent 1-query secure FE schemes in parallel. Each user
secret key is generated using a different master secret key (this step will require that the
authority maintains and updates a private state to keep track of which master secret
keys have been used), while each master public key will be used to encrypt the message
resulting in a vector of q ciphertexts encrypting the same message (see Appendix 6.2
for details). Unfortunately using this scheme to instantiate the CPE for a TDS would
force q = n. To see this, even if we choose q = n− 1, there exist a pair of users i, j such
that their secret keys are generated using a same master secret key (say the k-th master
secret key). When user i, j are corrupted together, then no security can be guaranteed
for the k-th 1-query secure FE instance, and the CPE scheme cannot be shown secure.
Thus the resulting TDS will have ciphertext size O(n · poly(λ)) which is not preferable
100
especially given that the collusion t might be much smaller than n. We then show how
to improve the ciphertext complexity.
Instantiation-II. A stateless q bounded FE was constructed in [65] from a 1-query secure
FE using techniques from secure computation, and their scheme can guarantee security
under arbitrary collusion with size q, even if more keys are issued (say n). We can use
such a t-bounded FE to instantiate a CPE facing t corrupted users. Unfortunately, the
parameters in [65] were chosen in a way that the ciphertext size is as big as O(D2t6λτ),
where D is the maximum degree of the polynomial representing the circuits describing
the functions that FE supports, and τ is the ciphertext size of the underlying 1-query
secure FE. For some parameters d,N , in the construction, there are N 1-query secure
FE instances. The encryption algorithm will do a (d + 1, N) secret sharing on the
message and will encrypt each share independently under the N 1-query FE instances.
Each user will be assigned a random subset (denoted by Γi, and |Γi| = dD + 1) of keys
each of which is generated using the corresponding master secret key. Note that prior to
encrypting each share is padded with additional randomness to ensure the simulation can
succeed. In total there are N ciphertexts each encrypting O(t2λ) number of plaintext
elements. (See Appendix 6.2 for details).
[65] requires that the collusion of size t can not break enough 1-query secure FE
instances to get d + 1 shares and obtain extra information about the message. More
specifically, it requires |∪i 6=j(Γi∩Γj)| ≤ d. We observe that if we can replace this condition
to be |∪i1,...,ia (∩iaij=i1Γij )| ≤ d, for any integer a ≥ 2, through a probabilistic analysis, we
can bring down N to O((Dt)1+eλ) (for e = 1/(a− 1)). Doing this optimization requires
us to use an a-query secure FE as the underlying building block. We can obtain a
succinct a-query secure FE for some polynomially bounded a by applying the technique
of [65] to the succinct 1-query secure FE of [63]. In this way we obtain a a-query FE
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that has ciphertext size O(poly(λ)) which is independent from the number of users.
Then we can apply the extended probabilistic analysis explained above and to obtain
a t-query FE with ciphertext O(t3+epoly(λ)). Note that we are using circuits for the
comparison predicate only and thus the degree D of the polynomial representing the
circuits is at most λ.
Our CPE instantiation. Our final CPE instantiation will be a hybrid of the two
instantiations above. When t ≤ n 13+e , we use instantiation-II, the optimized t-FE; when
t > n
1
3+e , we simply use instantiation-I of n-query secure FE. The resulting TDS will be
with ciphertext size min[O(t3+e · poly(λ)), O(n · poly(λ))]. As the succinct 1-query FE
can be built on fully homomorphic encryption [27] and attribute based encryption [66],
both of which can be based on the LWE assumption [115] efficiently. We summarize the
above, and refer detailed analysis to section 3.2.
Corollary 16. Under the subexponential LWE assumption, there exists a TDS satisfying:
fully collusion resilient, black-box traitor deterring w.r.t to any message distribution
D with H∞(D) ≥ − log(δ − α), where δ is the correctness probability provided by
the pirate box, α is a non-negligible amount and δ ≥ 1.5α. It has ciphertext length
min[O(t3+e ·poly(λ)), O(n ·poly(λ))], where n, t are total number of users and corrupted
users, e = 1/poly(λ), and λ is the security parameter.
Proof. We first analyze the parameters of the instantiation of comparison predicate
encryption in section 3.5.2.
For the parallel repetition construction, as every secret key is generated from a differ-
ent master secret key, and the ciphertext CT = {CTi}, and CTi = OneFE.Enc(mpki,m)
for the same message m. It is obvious that due to the security of the underlying 1-query
secure FE, every ciphertext is simulatable given C(m) by running the corresponding
1-query secure FE simulator.
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Next, we will analyze the optimized q-query secure FE. Following the analysis of [65],
the only difference of our scheme is that we use a c-query secure FE as the building block.
We can replace the first restriction to be | ∪i1,...,ic (∩icij=i1Γij )| ≤ d, as each instance now
can assure security given that the for less than d instances, the collusion of t users have
c keys. Now we can analyze that this condition will improve the size of N .
To be more specific, suppose Xij denotes the expected size of the intersection of two




E(Xij |Xi = X) Pr[Xi = X] = E(Xij |Xi = X).
To see this, for any X with size dD + 1, the expected value E(Xij |Xi = X) is the same
and the conditional distribution follows the hypergeometric distribution with dD + 1
good balls and tD + 1 draws, thus E(Xij |Xi = X) = (tD + 1)2/N .




Pr[Xij = i]E(Xijk|Xij = i) =
∑
i








Similarly, we can generalize the second formula to the expected size of intersection
of c random subsets which is (tD + 1)c/N c−1.
The expected size Ec of the disjoint of all possible intersection of c subsets: | ∪i1,...,ic
(∩icij=i1Γij )| (we denote as γ) is the summation of all combinations of Xi1,...,ic , i.e.,
Ec = q(q − 1) . . . (q − c+ 1) · (dD + 1)c/N c+1 ≤ (2qdD)c/N c−1.
If we let Ec ≤ d2 , i.e. let N = 4d(Dq)1+e, where e = 1 + 1/c, then following the Chernoff








While we are focusing on comparison predicate, which can be easily implemented
e.g., for two numbers x, v represented using bits x1 . . . x`, v1 . . . v`, the comparison
predicate [x ≤ v] ⇐⇒ [x = v] ∨ [x1 = 0 ∧ v1 = 1] ∨ [(x1 = v1) ∧ (x2 = 0 ∧ v2 =
1)] ∨ . . . ∨ [(x1 . . . x`−1 = v1 . . . v`−1) ∧ x = v], is with degree at most ` = O(λ).
Summarizing the above analysis, if we set d = λ, N = O(q1+epoly(λ)), we have
Pr[| ∪i1,...,ic (∩icij=i1Γij )| ≥ d] ≤ e−λ/6 = negl(λ). Then following the analysis of [65], all
the ciphertexts can be simulated.
The ciphertext efficiency of the optimized scheme is that O(N · S · τ) = O(q3+e ·
poly(λ)), where N is the number of ciphertexts, S is the number of plaintext elements
in each ciphertext, and τ is the size of ciphertext for each plaintext element of the
underlying succinct c−bound FE, where we can choose integer c = poly(λ).
On the other hand, the parallel repetition based construction is simply with ciphertext
efficiency O(n · poly(λ)).
As the succinct 1-query secure FE can be constructed assuming succinct FHE and
ABE for circuit, and the following two can be based on LWE assumption. Then following
theorem 12, we can conclude as in the corollary.
3.6 Traitor Deterring in the Known Ciphertext Model
In the known ciphertext model for TDS, the adversary has a weaker goal: it aims to
produce a pirate box that works w.r.t. a given sequence of ciphertexts.
Because the sequence of ciphertexts is fixed there is a trivial way to implement
the pirate decoder: simply store a database of all the plaintexts. Thus, in the known
ciphertext model, the adversary should only win when the size of the decoder is smaller
than the trivial attack; formally, we will associate an attack in this model with a “space
rate” that is equal to the size of the pirate box divided by the length of the total plaintext
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contained in the known ciphertext. An ideally secure scheme should work with respect
to any space rate o(1).
The known ciphertext model is applicable to the setting of distributing content via
CDs, or granting access to an encrypted database, since in these cases, the attack occurs
after the target ciphertexts become known. (In contrast, the original traitor deterring
model is applicable to all other settings, e.g., online streaming, and movie distribution
in Pay-TV etc.). Traitor deterring in the known ciphertext model reformulates in the
black-box public-key setting the problem of constructing digital signets as posed in
[51]. In [51] a construction for any space rate o(1) is presented however it requires the
unfalsifiable assumption that the function f(x) = gx1 ||gx2 || . . . ||gx` is incompressible (as
well as they assume non-black-box recoverability). They leave as open question whether
a construction exists that is secure under a falsifiable assumption; using our TDS’s we
resolve this open question in this section.
3.6.1 Definition: the known ciphertext model.
We provide the formal definition of the known ciphertext model that strengthens
our traitor deterring definition from Section 3.3.
(1− )-correctness. Since the pirate box B may work only for a fixed set of ciphertext
SC = {c1, . . . , cn}, we require for SC, it almost always works, i.e., Pr[B(i, ci) = mi] ≥
1− , where  = negl(λ) and mi is the Θ(λ) bit plaintext that is encrypted in ci (note
we also allow B to receive the index of the ciphertext).
Privacy: This is the same as in section 3.3.
Traitor Deterring for Known Ciphertexts. The main difference with the traitor deterring
property is that the adversary is aware of the ciphertexts before making the device B,
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and hence can embed some information into B so that B is able to check the decryption
queries and only work for the given ciphertexts. Formally,
• The challenger C simulates the Setup algorithm and the adversary A receives pk.
A then sends to C a vector of secret information s1, . . . , sn, an arbitrary subset
T ⊆ {1, . . . , n} as well as a distribution Pk with support set of a vector of k
plaintexts for some k = O(poly(λ)). 4 A receives the secret keys of all users in T ,
{ski | i ∈ T} as well as the public parameter para.
• C samples (m1, . . . ,mk) from Pk and sends A to a sequence of ciphertexts SC =
〈c1, . . . , ck〉; finally, A outputs an implementation B.
• C outputs 1 if and only if RecB(pk, para) 6∈ {si1 , . . . , sit}.
We denote the event that C outputs 1 in the above game by SuccKCdeterA (1λ). We say a
scheme achieves black-box traitor deterring for known ciphertexts with space rate s(k, λ)
if for any ppt adversary A,
Pr[B is (1− )-correct w.r.t SC ∧ |B|
kλ
= s(k, λ) ∧ SuccKCdeterA (1λ)] = negl(λ)
where |B| denotes the size of the program B. Note that for s(k, λ) = Θ(1) it is trivial to
construct a device B that allows the adversary to win the above game — simply store
all plaintexts m1, . . . ,mk in B. Thus, the question that is raised is whether it is possible
to deter with space rate that is o(1).
3.6.2 Feasibility and infeasibility for the known ciphertext model.
At first sight, it may seem impossible to have a black-box recovering algorithm in
the known ciphertext setting, since the Rec algorithm is restricted by the fact that
4This includes the case of encrypting one single long message (e.g., a movie file): it is first divided
into k blocks and each block is encrypted individually.
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the adversarial box is only guaranteed to work for a fixed set of ciphertexts. Indeed,
although the size of B can be smaller than the size of the ciphertexts it is supposed
to work for, there are ways for the adversary to embed some information and check
whether a submitted ciphertext belongs to the targeted sequence, while reject all other
ciphertexts submitted to it. We formalize this intuition and we show a simple attack
following this principle and rules out the possibility of black-box traitor deterring for
known ciphertexts for a range of space rates. However, we also observe that in order
for the box B to perform a membership test in the targeted ciphertext sequence, the
false positive probability of the testing algorithm increases as the storage used by B
gets smaller. When the false positive probability becomes sufficiently high, a random
sample of ciphertext will be answered by the box B with non-negligible probability δ,
and thus B becomes a δ−correct box in the regular model (as defined section 3.3); in
this way, we can still apply our constructions of traitor deterring schemes against known
ciphertext type of attacks. For ease of presentation, we consider only the 1-correct case,
while all results will also follow for the case of (1− )-correctness.
The intuition behind the proof of the following theorem is that when the suitable
space bound is imposed on the pirate device, the device will have to resort to using
the secret-key in a sufficiently large plaintext distribution that can be sampled with a
non-negligible probability from the plaintext space. As a result, the decryption box, is a
general purpose decryption box that is δ-correct for some non-negligible δ and thus our
recoverability algorithms developed for traitor deterring can be applied in the known
ciphertext model as well. We first present a lemma about the set membership problem.
Lemma 17. For a universe U with size u, and V ⊂ U with size v, and v  u, using
space τ , the false positive η in the approximate set membership test problem satisfies
2τ ≤ (2η)v.
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Proof. Let us denote the size of the universe as u, the size of V as v, suppose the size
of the storage used for the approximate membership testing problem is no bigger than
τ , and the false positive probability is η. Since we consider here only the case with
false negative probability 0, we can think of the correspondence between the stored
information and the subset of elements which the algorithm actually accepts. There are
in total C(u, v) many subsets from U with size v. By definition, with a false positive
probability η, the algorithm will accept (outputs 1) u′ = v + η(u− v) many elements
when they are randomly sampled from the universe. It follows that we can think of any
specific memory string T as an encoding of C(u′, v) subsets that can be recognized by T .
Since all subsets of size v are recognized it must be the case that 2τ ·C(u′, v) ≥ C(u, v);





u′(u′ − 1) . . . (u′ − v + 1)
u(u− 1) . . . (u− v + 1)
=
(η(u− v) + v) . . . (η(u− v) + 1)
u(u− 1) . . . (u− v + 1)
≤ (η(u− v) + v
u− v )




the last inequality holds when u v.
Theorem 18. There exists a TDS with superpolynomial in λ plaintext space that satisfies
black-box traitor deterring for known ciphertexts with space rate s(k, λ) = O(log(λ)/λ) =
o(1) for any k = Ω(λ).
Proof. We will show that a TDS satisfying black-box traitor deterring with any pirate
box with λ−c-correctness is also a TDS satisfying black-box traitor deterring in the
known ciphertext model for any c ∈ N for the stated space rate.
First, we recall a lower bound of the false positive probability in the approximate
membership testing problem (see section 3.2.1 for definition) when the space of the
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tester is upper bounded. For a universe U with size u, and V ⊂ U with size v, and
v  u, using space τ , the false positive η of any membership tester satisfies 2τ ≤ (2η)v.
(see Lemma 17 above). Applying logarithm to both sides, we can get η ≥ 2− τv−1, thus if
τ ≤ c · v · log λ, we have η ≥ λ−c.
Next, we will use the above result to show that a useful decryption box B with
size O(k · log λ) will have non-negligible correctness w.r.t. uniform distribution over the
message space. Specifically, we will build an approximate membership tester T (using B)
for V = {(m1, c1), . . . , (mk, ck)}, a subset of the universe U of all plaintext/ciphertext
pairs, with a similar storage as follows. Whenever queried a uniformly random pair
(m, c), T queries B with c, if B outputs m, T outputs 1, otherwise T outputs 0. It is
easy to see that if (m, c) ∈ V , T always accepts; if (m, c) 6∈ V , T accepts with probability
δ, where δ = Pr[B(c) = m ∧ (m, c) 6∈ V ]. Furthermore, T only needs an extra storage of
O(λ) bits to store the query and compare whether the answer of B is valid. In the setting
that k = Ω(λ), the storage of T is still O(k · log(λ)). Observe that if δ is negligible, T is
a membership tester which violates the bound in Lemma 17.
With the above claim, we can see that for a randomly sampled ciphertext, the box B
will answer with some probability δ and thus we can run the Rec algorithm and retrieve
the corresponding secret information of one of the colluders assuming that the TDS
works for δ w.r.t any distribution D for which it holds that δ ≥ 2−H∞(D) + α where α is
an arbitrary non-negligible function.
Impossibility results. Next we will show that the above bound of the size of B is
essentially tight, by describing a generic attack against any traitor deterring scheme
for known ciphertexts. The attacking strategy is simple: using Bloom filters [15] the
adversary produces a box that contains a membership tester built in so that it will
answer only when the decryption query belongs to the ciphertext set. This makes two
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boxes implemented using different keys indistinguishable via only oracle access, thus
black-box recoverability will contradict privacy in this setting.
Proposition 19. There does not exist any, even 1-resilient, black-box TDS in the known
ciphertext model for space rate s(k, λ) = Ω(log2 λ/λ) for any k.
Proof. We will show an attack that uses up to Ω(k · log2 λ) space can defeat the black-box
traitor deterring if the privacy of the user data is also required.
The adversary A selects a set k of distinct plaintexts S = {m1, . . . ,mk} and sets
them as a distribution Pk. A further corrupts user i and receives the corresponding set
of ciphertexts S = {c1, . . . , ck}. A creates a membership tester T with a false positive
probability  for S, such that T can be constructed using space O(k log 1 ). Using Bloom
filters, [15, 108], if A uses space Θ(k log2 λ), then  will be negl(λ). A produces a pirate
box B with T built in, and when is given input c, B first checks whether c ∈ S (besides
the storage, this checking program has only a constant description). Assuming the test
passes, the algorithm applies the key ski to decrypt the ciphertext.
Assume there is a black-box recovering algorithm recovers user i’s secret information,
given oracle access to B. There is another adversary corrupts a different user j and build
a box B′ s.t., it is the same as B when inputs passes the tester, B′ uses skj to decrypt
the query and respond. It is obvious that the input/output distribution of B,B′ is
statistically close (with the only difference because of the negligibly small false positive),
these two boxes cannot be distinguished by any algorithm via only oracle access to them.
Thus the Rec algorithm will also return the same output, i.e., secret information of user
i when having oracle access to B′, hence contradicting the privacy property.
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3.7 Using Bitcoin as a Collateral in a TDS
Bitcoin is a decentralized cryptocurrency [102] that uses a publicly maintained ledger
to store transactions and record transfers between bitcoin accounts. Each bitcoin account
is essentially a hash of a public-key and the owner of the secret-key has the ability to
transfer funds from the account by posting a transaction in the bitcoin network that
contains a signature generated by account’s secret-key. The characteristic of bitcoin
accounts is that the secret-keys represent complete ownership of the account.
We consider a TDS deployment for a broadcast service where a service provider (SP)
wants to use a certain amount of bitcoin as collateral. Upon initiation of the service the
SP generates bitcoin accounts corresponding to each of the n users setting si = (ai, ki)
where ai is the bitcoin address and ki is the associated secret-key. When a user joins
the system it requests from the user to transfer some amount of x bitcoin to the ai
bitcoin account. The SP shares the account information (ai, ki) with the user so that
it is ensured that the x bitcoin is a collateral and the user has the option to obtain
the collateral back whenever she wishes (and cancel her subscription). At the same
time the SP gives to the user the secret-key ski that corresponds to the account, and
the user from this point on can use the service and decrypt ciphertexts associated with
the service. In regular intervals the SP checks the public ledger to see whether any
active account has an outgoing transaction (no matter it is transferred to the recipient
or to the colluder herself). If there is such a case the subscription of the user should
be cancelled (this would require the revocation of the key ski an issue that we do not
explicitly deal here but can be handled generically via e.g., a re-key operation where the
SP at regular intervals refreshes the keys of the system keeping the same collaterals for
all the remaining subscribers). Observe that due to the properties of TDS for as long as
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the user respects the service agreement and does not share her secret-key her collateral
bitcoin remain safe. The user can collect her collateral bitcoin whenever she wants to
terminate the service.
3.8 Conclusion and Open Problems
We formalize and construct a new cryptographic primitive of TDS to achieve proactive
deterrence of unauthorized device redistribution. We also revisit the open problem of
digital signets and reformulate it in a known ciphertext model, and show how we can
utilize TDS to solve it under parameter choices that allow a possibility result. Finally
we show how bitcoin can be used as a collateral for deployment of a TDS.
There are many interesting open problems remain. The first one is how to construct
a TDS with constant size ciphertext under standard assumptions. This may require a
fuzzy locker for, e.g., Tardos code [127] which currently uses a secret tracing algorithm.
Also, a construction of unbounded collusion secure CPE is another alternative which
has its own interests. Furthermore, combining a TDS with a revocation system as in
[105] to obtain a “Trace Deterring and Revoke scheme” would be complementing this
line of works. And finally, a game theoretic analysis to find the right amount of bitcoin
required to deposit so that it might be better-off for the adversary not to corrupt more
than t users will address important efficiency and security trade-offs for TDS’s.
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Chapter 4
Cliptography: Clipping the Power of Kleptographic
Attacks
4.1 Introduction
Consider the conventional use of a cryptographic primitive, such as an encryption
scheme: To encrypt a desired plaintext, the encryptor simply runs an implementation
of the encryption algorithm obtained from a hardware or software provider with the
plaintext as input. Although the underlying algorithms may be well-studied and proven
secure, malicious implementations could still leak secret information exclusively to the
provider/manufacturer without being noticed (through a covert channel that relies on an
embedded backdoor). It is notable that such leakage is possible even if the implementation
produces “functionally and statistically clean” output that is indistinguishable from that of
a faithful implementation. While the underlying concept of kleptography was proposed
by Young and Yung two decades ago [130,131], the recent Snowden revelations [92, 110]
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provided striking real-world examples that awakened the security community to the
seriousness of these issues. As a result, the topic has recently received renewed attention;
see, e.g., [7, 11, 47, 100]. In particular, Bellare, Paterson, and Rogaway [11]1 studied
algorithm substitution attacks, with focus on symmetric key encryption. Soon after,
Dodis, Ganesh, Golovnev, Juels, and Ristenpart [47] studied pseudorandom generators
(PRG) in this backdoored setting.
4.1.1 Our contribution
We continue this line of pursuit. Specifically, we are motivated to develop crypto-
graphic schemes in a complete subversion model, in which all algorithms of a scheme
are potentially subverted by the adversary. This model thus significantly generalizes
previously studied settings, which rely on trusted key generation or clean randomness
that is assumed private from the adversary. We study two fundamental cryptographic
primitives in the complete subversion model—one-way functions and one-way trapdoor
funtions—and apply these primitives to construct other cryptographic schemes such as
digital signatures and PRGs. Along the way, we identify novel generic defending strate-
gies. We intend to stimulate a systematic study of cliptography, to provide a broader
class of cryptographic building blocks and a larger set of defending strategies, eventually
clipping out potential kleptographic attacks that arise from maliciously implemented
components. As mentioned above, prior to our work kleptographic attacks on various
primitives have been addressed in weaker models; see Related work in Section 4.1.2. In
detail, we show the following:
• We study (trapdoor) one-way functions in the presence of kleptographic attacks.
We first introduce a notion of strong forgeability that captures natural kleptographic
1This paper won the 2015 PET award.
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attacks, namely: there is a specification that is proven secure for a (trapdoor)
one-way function; the sabotaged function generation algorithm delivers a similar
output distribution as the specification distribution; however, with a pre-chosen
backdoor, the adversary can invert the entire family of functions that are generated
by this subverted algorithm. We then show that such (adversarial) objects can
indeed be constructed from (trapdoor) one-way functions by showing that random
padding, in particular, renders the cryptosystem vulnerable. We also provide a
weaker notion, forgeability, for one-way functions, that captures the case where
the adversary only sets up the public parameters for which she keeps a backdoor.
• Our main goal is to provide defending mechanisms against kleptographic attacks.
We construct unforgeable (trapdoor) one-way functions via a general transforma-
tion that “sanitizes” arbitrary OWFs by randomizing the function index. This
transformation clips out all potential correlation between the function and the
possible backdoor that the adversary may possess. Additionally, we introduce a
split-program strategy to make the general method above applicable using only
standard hash functions. In the split-program model, the function generation algo-
rithm is composed of two parts: a (randomized) randomness generation algorithm
RG that outputs an (ostensibly) uniform bit string, and a (deterministic) function
generation algorithm dKG that converts such random string into the function index.
We remark that our results even allow the sanitizing algorithm to be implemented
by the adversary.
• In Section 4.4, we investigate how to construct backdoor-free PRGs. Previously,
Dodis et al. [47] investigated “backdoored PRG” in which the adversary sets up a
PRG instance (i.e., the public parameter), and is able to distinguish the output
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from uniform with a backdoor. They then proposed immunizing strategies obtained
by applying a keyed hash function to the output, but assuming the key is unknown
to the adversary in the public parameter generation phase.
We construct backdoor-free PRGs in the complete subversion model. Our first
construction is based on the classic Blum-Micali using our strongly unforgeable
OWF and the Goldreich-Levin hardcore predicate [61]. In addition, in [47], Dodis
et al. show that it is impossible to have a public immunizing strategy for all PRGs
by applying a public function to the PRG output. This is because there always
exists a PRG (having the immunizing function built in) that reveals the seed to
the adversary bit by bit in each iteration. We circumvent their impossibility result
via an alternative public immunizing strategy. Instead of randomizing the output
of the PRG, we randomize the public parameter of PRG, which gives us a general
construction for PRG in the complete subversion model.
• Having constructed unforgeable (trapdoor) one-way functions, we next explore the
power of such primitives. In Section 4.5, we observe that unforgeable trapdoor one-
way functions immediately give us a way to construct key generation algorithms
(for digital signature schemes and stateless) against kleptographic attacks. We then
showcase a concrete example of digital signature scheme in the complete subversion
model. More concretely, we achieve this result by (1) using the unforgeable
trapdoor one way permutation directly as a key generation algorithm, and then
(2) instantiating the unique signature mechanism with the full domain hash. In
previous works, [4, 11] demonstrated that a unique signature scheme is secure
against kleptographic attacks, assuming that the key generation algorithm is honest
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and all the message-signature pairs can be checked by the lab/user. Our result is
the first digital signature scheme allowing the adversary to sabotage all algorithms.
Discussion. Careful readers might have noticed our general defending technique is
different with previous known methods of destroying the steganographic channel. They
either gave up the randomized algorithm to use deterministic ones; or using a trusted
random source to re-randomize the output. While we can simply randomize the index
and public parameter with even a potentially subverted hash function. A common
feature of those randomized algorithms we consider in this paper is that they are only
used once, i.e., generating the key/public parameter and other algorithms just use it.
This property allows our simple strategy to destroy the connection to backdoors. To put
it another way, we improve the state-of-the-art of defending kleptographic attacks from
against essentially deterministic algorithms only to against one-time use randomized
algorithms. Eventually, we would like to defend against any multi-use randomized
algorithms.
4.1.2 Related work
The concept of kleptography—subverting cryptographic algorithms by modifying
their implementations to leak secrets covertly, was proposed by Young and Yung [130,131]
in 1996. They gave concrete examples showing that backdoors can be embeded into
the public keys of commonly used cryptographic schemes; while the resulting public
keys appear normal to the users, the adversary is nevertheless capable of learning the
secret keys. It may not be surprising that defending against such deliberate attacks
is challenging and only limited feasibility results exist. We next briefly describe these
existing results.
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In [80], Juels and Guajardo suggested the following idea: the user and a trusted
certificate authority (CA) jointly generate the public key; as a part of this process, the
user proves to the CA that the public key is generated honestly. This contrasts markedly
with our setting, where the the user does not have any secret, and every component is
provided by the big brother.
Bellare et al. considered a powerful family of kleptographic attacks that they call
algorithm substitution attacks, and explore these in both symmetric key [11] and public
key [7] settings. They first proposed a generic attack, highlighting the relevance of
steganographic techniques in this framework: specifically, a sabotaged randomized
algorithm can leak a secret bit-by-bit by invoking steganographic rejection-sampling; then
an adversary possessing the backdoor can identify the leaked bits from the biased output,
which appears unmolested to other observers. The analysis relies on the effectiveness
of covert subliminal channels [73, 124, 125]. They then introduced a framework for
defending against such attacks by focusing on algorithms that behave deterministically,
determining a unique output for each input: relevant examples of such algorithms
include unique ciphertext encryption algorithms (of encryption schemes).Their defending
mechanism does not, however, address the (necessarily randomized) process of key
generation—it implicitly assumes key generation to be honest. This state of affairs is
the direct motivation of the current article: we adopt a significantly amplified complete
subversion model where all cryptographic algorithms—including key generation—are
subject to kleptographic (i.e., substitution) attacks. This forces us to manage certain
randomized algorithms (such as key generation) in a kleptographic setting. The details
of the model, with associated commentary about its relevance to practice, appear below.
Dodis et al. [47] studied an alternative family of kleptographic attacks on pseu-
dorandom generators in order to formalize and study the notorious Dual_EC PRG
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subversion [35,107]. In their model, the adversary subverts the security of the PRG by
opportunistically setting the public parameter while privately keeping some backdoor
information (instead of providing an implementation). They prove the equivalence of
such a “backdoored PRG” and public key encryption with pseudorandom ciphertexts.
Then they proposed immunizing strategies obtained by applying a keyed hash function
to the output (of the PRG). Note that the (hash) key plays a special role in their model:
it is selected uniformly and is unknown to the adversary during the public parameter
generation phase. These results likewise inspire our adoption of the amplified complete
subversion model, which excludes such reliance on public randomness beyond the reach of
the adversary. We remark that our results on strongly unforgeable OWFs can be applied
to construct a specific “backdoor-free” PRG following the classic Blum-Micali framework.
Moreover, our general immunizing strategy, randomizing the public parameter of a
backdoored PRG instead of randomizing the PRG output, permits us to bypass an
impossibility result established by Dodis et al. for general public immunization based on
the PRG output.
Other works suggest different angles of defense against mass surveillance. For
example, in [49,100], the authors proposed a general framework of safeguarding protocols
by randomizing the incoming and outgoing messages via a trusted (reverse) firewall.
Their results demonstrate that with a clean trusted random source, many tasks become
achievable. As they rely on a “subversion-free” firewall, these results require a more
generous setting than provided by our complete subversion model.
Ateniese et al [4] continue the study of algorithm substitution attack on signatures
and propose two defending mechanisms, one is using a unique signature scheme assuming
the key generation and verify algorithms to be honest; the other is in the reverse firewall
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model that assumes trusted randomness. Our work remove those assumptions and work
in a complete subversion model.
4.2 Kleptographic Attacks and the Complete Subversion Model
In this section, we explain the kleptographic attacks in more detail and introduce
the complete subversion model.
Classical cryptography assumes that the relevant cryptographic algorithms are
faithfully implemented and, moreover, that participants have access to truly private
randomness. In reality, cryptographic algorithms may be implemented by an adversary
(e.g., the “big brother”); this potentially allows the adversary to exert malicious influence
on the behavior of the algorithms and, for example, learn secret information that is
not supposed to be leaked thru the algorithms. Kleptography studies how to apply
these attacks on real-world cryptosystems with the extra condition that the attacks are
undetectable. Specifically, while big brother wishes to monitor the system, he does not
wish to be exposed.
The detection conditions. We work under the assumption that for every crypto-
graphic scheme of interest, there exists a specification that is rigorously analyzed, proven
secure, and designed by honest experts; furthermore, one can actively actively check
whether implementations (supplied by the adversary) faithfully meet the specification.
This “checking” procedure, however, is only assumed to have oracle access to the poten-
tially sabotaged implementations. Following the formalization of Bellare et al. [11] of the
detection condition, the adversary’s algorithms must fool all ppt checkers.2 Specifically,
we say the adversarial subversion on cryptographic primitive Π is undetectable, if there
2Actually, we can even work in a model that relaxes the detection condition for our (trapdoor) one
way functions and PRG.
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exists a ppt adversary A, for any ppt checker/detecter A that plays the following detec-
tion game (Figure 2), it holds that |Pr[b′ = b]−1/2| ≤ , where  = negl(λ), IR1, . . . , IRk
are the algorithms implemented for cryptographic primitive Π, and IR1spec, . . . , IRspec
are the corresponding specifications for Π and the probability is over the coins of the
adversary A (for generating the backdoors or the implementations) and the detecter D.
IR0 ← 〈IR1spec, . . . , IRkspec〉
IR1 = 〈IR1, . . . , IRk〉 ← A
b← {0, 1}
b′ ← AIRb(λ)
Figure 2: The detection game.
We emphasize that the algorithms 〈IR1, . . . , IRk〉 may be randomized; indeed, the
striking historical examples require the adversary to embed a (randomized) backdoor
into the algorithms IRi in order to undetectably alter their behavior in a way that
can, e.g., leak private data to the adversary. In any case, it follows that the adversary
must certainly ensure that the output of any algorithm (randomized or deterministic)
is computationally indistinguishable from the output of the specified algorithm, taken
over any distribution of inputs of the checker’s choice (and the random coins of the
adversary).
We first formally present a simple observation that when a deterministic algorithm
with a public input distribution (whether specified by the adversary or not) is subverted
in a way that the implementation is inconsistent with the specification at a noticeable
fraction of inputs, then it is easily detected.
Lemma 20. If an adversarial subversion on deterministic algorithms 〈IR1, . . . , IRk〉
(with the corresponding specifications 〈IR1spec, . . . , IRkspec〉) is undetectable, then for every
public input distribution of X1, . . . , Xk, where Xi corresponds to IRi, it holds that:
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Pr[IRi(x) 6= IRispec(x) : x← Xi] ≤ , where  = negl(λ), and the probability is over the
coins for sampling inputs.
Proof. Suppose there exists an implementation IRi for a deterministic algorithm, and
a public input distribution Xi, such that, Pr[IRi(x) 6= IRispec(x) : x ← Xi] ≥ δ, for
a non-negligible amount δ; then there is a simple detecter algorithm D that samples






all j = 1, . . . , t. Following the Chernoff bound, there exists a j ∈ [1, t], such that
IRi(xij) 6= IRispec(xij) is with an overwhelming probability.
Remark 8. (i.) The above lemma states that for a deterministic algorithm, if the ad-
versary wants to make the subversion undetectable, then for any public input distribution,
the implementation will be inconsistent with the specification for at most a negligible
fraction of the inputs; In the rest of the presentation, we sometimes use the specification
directly for simplicity for deterministic algorithms with public input distribution. (ii.)
The above lemma does not require the input distributions to be honestly generated.
Corollary 21. Assume a hash function hspec is modeled as a random oracle, and h is
a (potentially subverted) implementation. If the subversion of h is undetectable, then for
any public input distribution X, Pr[h(x) = hspec(x) : x ← X] ≤ , where  = negl(λ).
To put it in another way, h can be still modeled as a random oracle w.r.t to input
distribution X.
With the above detection condition only, it is impossible to achieve meaningful
security for several cryptographic primitives. For example, as shown in [4,79], symmetric
key encryption and signature schemes are impossible that the adversary may learn the
secret key completely via the so-called “input-triggered subversion” [79]. In order to
show feasibility for those primitives, we may require some extra assumption. Bellare et
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al. introduced the decryptability assumption that all messages encrypted by a subverted
encryption algorithm should be decrypted to the original message by the specification
decryption algorithm [11]; and similarly Ateniese et al. used a verifiability assumption
[4] that every signature produced by the subverted signing algorithm should pass the
verification of the specification verification algorithm.
Degabriele et al. relaxed the perfect decryptability condition, and formalized a
stronger detection model for symmetric key encryption in [79]. In particular, the
detecter D may have access to the transcripts that the adversary uses to gain advantage.
Subversion resistance in this case means that if the subverted algorithms leak information
to the adversary, then from the recorded transcript, there exist an efficient detector that
can notice the subversion. We choose this formalization for our signature and public key
encryption scheme.
More formally, in the following game (Fig 3), the subversion advantage δs := |Pr[b′ =
b]− 1/2|, and the (strong) detection advantage δd is defined by |Pr[b′′ = b]− 1/2|. We
say the subversion on the algorithms 〈IR1, . . . , IRk〉 are strongly undetectable if δd is
negligible; the algorithms 〈IR1, . . . , IRk〉 are subversion resistant if δs ≤ δd.
IR0 ← 〈IR1spec, . . . , IRkspec〉
〈(IR1, z1), . . . , (IRk, zk)〉 ← A
IR1 = 〈IR1, . . . , IRk〉
z = 〈z1, . . . , zk〉
b← {0, 1}
b′ ← AIRb(λ, z¯)
b′′ ← AIRb(λ, τ)
Figure 3: The strong detection and subversion game, τ is the transcript of A for
producing b′.
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Remark 9. (i.) The strong detection model essentially describes the situation that the
“big brother” is worried about any possible detection. (ii. ) When we use the stronger
detection condition for signature and public key encryption scheme, the detection is
public (verifying the signatures or encrypting the messages using a public key), this is in
contrast with [11,79] that the detecter needs the user secret key.
Complete subversion model. Significant effort has been invested to defend against
such kleptographic attacks. However, the state-of-the-art of defending mechanisms
require the participants to have access to various trusted or private sources of randomness.
For example, as described above, key generation is assumed to be honest in [11].
Unfortunately, key generation, as shown in the original papers of Young and Yung,
[130,131], can be directly subjected to kleptographic attacks. This motivates our focus
on the complete subversion model, in which attacks may be launched against any of the
relevant cryptographic algorithms. This includes, e.g., the key generation algorithm, and
even the defending algorithm. We remark that the immunizing strategy of [47] requires
an honestly generated uniform seed unknown to the adversary when she implements
the algorithms. We will define security for each primitive we consider in this complete
subversion model. Likewise, we analyze our defending mechanisms in this stringent
model. We call this general paradigm cliptography.
4.3 One-Way Functions in the Complete Subversion Model
4.3.1 Formalizing kleptographic attacks on one way functions
Before studying the security for one-way functions (OWF) and trapdoor one-way
functions (TDOWF) in the presence of kelptographic attacks, we first recall the conven-
tional definitions of OWF and TDOWF.
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One-way function (OWF). A function family F = {fi : Xi → Yi}i∈I is one-way if there
are PPT algorithms (KG,Eval) so that (i) KG, given a security parameter λ, outputs
a function index i from Iλ = I ∩ {0, 1}λ; (ii) for x ∈ Xi, Eval(i, x) = fi(x); (iii) F is
one-way; that is, for any PPT algorithm A, it holds that Pr[A(i, y) ∈ f−1i (y) | i ←
KG(λ);x← Xi; y := fi(x)] ≤ negl(λ).
Trapdoor one way function (TDOWF). A function family F = {fi : Xi → Yi}i∈I is
trapdoor one-way if there are PPT algorithms (KG,Eval, Inv) such that (i) KG, given a
security parameter λ, outputs a function index and the corresponding trapdoor pair
(i, ti) from Iλ×T , where Iλ = I∩{0, 1}λ, and T is the domain of ti; (ii) Eval(i, x) = fi(x)
for x ∈ Xi; (iii) F is one-way; and (iv) it holds that Pr[Inv(ti, i, y) = x | i← KG(λ);x←
Xi; y := fi(x)] ≥ 1− negl(λ).
We note that, (trapdoor) one-way permutations can be defined similarly by setting
Yi := Xi. For simplicity, we often ignore Eval; for evaluating function with index i on
input x, i.e., Eval(i, x), we write it as fi(x).
4.3.1.1 Strong-forgeability and unforgeability for OWF/TDOWF
In this subsection, we define strong-forgeability to capture kleptographic attacks on
one-way functions. Note that the complemented security notion, unforgeability, provides
the guarantee that OWF is immune to kleptographic attacks. Similarly, we can define
strong-forgeability and the complemented notion, unforgeability, for trapdoor OWF.
Next, let’s start with expressing the intuition of capturing kleptographic attacks on
one-way functions.
We begin with a “laboratory specification” version of the OWF, (KGspec,Evalspec),
which has been rigorously analyzed and certified (e.g., by the experts in the cryptography
community).
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The adversary then provides an alternate implementation. Note that Eval is deter-
ministic on publicly known input distribution (i× Ui, where i is the output of KG, and
Ui is the uniform distribution over Xi). Following lemma 20, the event that an input is
sampled from KG and the Xi s.t., the implementation Eval is inconsistent with Evalspec
will happen with only a negligible probability. It follows that using Evalspec directly
for Eval will reduce the adversary advantage at most a negligible amount, thus we can
consider it as honestly implemented.We therefore focus on KG (the algorithm which
generates a function name).
The goal of the adversary is to privately maintain some “backdoor information” z
so that the subverted implementation of KG will output functions that can be inverted
using z. In addition, the adversary must be sure that the output distributions of KG(z)
and that of specification function generation algorithm KGspec are computationally
indistinguishable, to avoid detection. Formally, we define strongly-forgeable OWFs; we
note that this immediately allows us to define the complemented notion, unforgeable
OWFs.
Definition 8. A one-way function family F = {fi : Xi → Yi}i∈I (with the specification
function generation algorithm KGspec) is δ-strongly forgeable if there exist PPT
algorithms (BG,KG, Inv) so that given a backdoor z produced by backdoor generation
algorithm BG, i.e., z ← BG(λ), the function generation algorithm KG generates a
function index i that is (1) invertible given z, and (2) computationally indistinguishable
from that generated by the specification function generation algorithm KGspec. That is,
for every z ← BG(λ), it holds that:
(1) Pr[x′ = x | i← KG(λ, z);x← Xi; y := fi(x);x′ ← Inv(z, i, y)] ≥ δ
(2) {i | i← KG(λ, z)} c≈ {i | i← KGspec(λ)}
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Correspondingly, we say a one-way function family is unforgeable if it is not δ-strongly
forgeable for any non-negligible function δ.
The notion of strongly-forgeable OWF is closely related to the conventional notion,
TDOWF. See the following lemmas. These results state that if we want to use public
key cryptography, we have to accept the possibility of kleptographic attacks on OWFs.
Lemma 22. A (1− )-strongly forgeable OWF family is also a TDOWF family, where
 is a negligible function of the security parameter.
Proof. Suppose F := (BGF ,KGF , InvF ) is a (1− ) strongly-forgeable OWF family. We
can define (KG,Eval, Inv) for the TDOWF family as follows. The generation algorithm
KG is as follows: first run BGF (λ) and receive a string z; then run KGF with input (λ, z)
and receive a function index i; finally output (i, z). The inversion algorithm Inv for the
TDOWF is simply InvF , and the evaluation algorithm is defined as Eval(i, x) = fi(x).
We can easily see that (KG,Eval, Inv) is invertible once trapdoor is given: since F is
a (1− ) strongly-forgeable OWF family, it holds that by definition, Pr[InvF (z, i, y) =
x | x← Xi; y := fi(x)] ≥ 1−; therefore, Pr[Inv(i, y, z) = x | x← Xi; y := fi(x)] ≥ 1−.
We can also show the one-wayness: without z, no PPT algorithm can invert y
for a random x; otherwise assume (KG,Eval, Inv) is not one-way, then there exists an
adversary A who for i← KGF , can invert y := fi(x) with non-negligible probability. We
note that the specification function generation algorithm is one-way, i.e., for i← KGspec,
no one can invert y := fi(x) except negligible probability. Now, one can distinguish the
output distribution of KGF (z) from the output distribution of KGspec, simply by trying
inversion using A.
Next, we show how to construct a strongly-forgeable OWF from any TDOWF.
This substantiates the folklore knowledge that sufficient random padding can render
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cryptosystems vulnerable to backdoor attacks, e.g., [130,131]. Specifically, the random
padding in the malicious implementation can be generated so that it encrypts the
corresponding trapdoor using the backdoor as a key.
Lemma 23. One can construct a (1−)-strongly forgeable OWF from a TDOWF, where
 is a negligible function on the security parameter.
Proof. Consider a TDOWF F = {fi} with the associated algorithms (KGF , InvF).
Assuming the trapdoors can be represented using `(λ) bits, we construct a strongly
forgeable OWF family G = {gi,r}, where gi,r(x) = fi(x)||r and r ∈ {0, 1}`(λ).
The specification version of the sfunction generation algorithm KGspec is defined as
follows: run the KGF algorithm and receive a function index/trapdoor pair (i, ti); then
discard ti and sample randomly r ← {0, 1}`(λ); finally output (i, r). It is easy to see
that gi,r is one way because fi is one way (without ti).
While for the backdoored implementations, BG first outputs a random key k for
a symmetric key encryption scheme SE = (SE.Enc, SE.Dec) which is assumed to be
a pseudorandom permutation (PRP). KG(k) is defined as follows: it first runs KGF ,
and receives an index i together with the corresponding trapdoor ti; the second part
r˜ is generated by encrypting ti using k, i.e., r˜ = SE.Enc(k, ti). KG(k) outputs (i, r˜).
(gi,r˜(x) = fi(x)||SE.Enc(k, ti)). It is easy to see that with the backdoor k, one can define
the Inv as follows: it first decrypts r˜ using k to retrieve ti, and then inverts fi(x) by
running InvF with ti as an input.
Furthermore, since SE.Enc is modeled as a PRP, the distributions of (i, r) returned by
KGspec and (i, r˜) returned by KG(k) for any k are computationally indistinguishable.
The notions of strongly-forgeable OWF and TDOWF are similar in the sense
that they both posit a secret that enables inversion of the OWF. Observe, however,
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that a strongly-forgeable OWF has a further (critical) property: the distribution of
function names, is indistinguishable from a particular specification distribution. The
same principle yields a notion of strongly-forgeable TDOWF. Moreover, the adversary
can invert using the backdoor, without referring to the regular trapdoor. The formal
definition is presented below.
Definition 9. A trapdoor one-way function family F = {fi : Xi → Yi}i∈I (with the
specification algorithms KGspec, Invspec) is δ-strongly forgeable if there exist PPT
adversarial algorithms A = (BG,KG, Inv) so that given a backdoor z produced by backdoor
generation algorithm BG, the function generation algorithm KG generates a function
index i and the corresponding trapdoor ti, with the following properties: (1) fi is invertible
given z without providing ti, and (2) the output of KG is computationally indistinguishable
from that generated by the specification function generation algorithm KGspec. That is,
for every z ← BG(λ), it holds that
(1) Pr[x′ = x | (i, ti)← KG(λ, z);x← Xi; y := fi(x);x′ ← Invspec(z, i, y)] ≥ δ 3
(2) {(i, ti) | (i, ti)← KG(λ, z)} c≈ {(i, ti) | (i, ti)← KGspec(λ)}
Correspondingly, we say a trapdoor one-way function family is unforgeable if it is not
δ-strongly forgeable for any non-negligible function δ.
4.3.1.2 Forgeability and strong-unforgeability for OWF
The notion of strong forgeability models an attack where the adversary may provide
a subverted implementation of the defining algorithms. In many cases, it may also be
3The inversion algorithm of the TDOWF never appears in the security definition, thus we omit the
indistinguishability condition for this algorithm, considering it is honestly implemented as Invspec, and
focus only on KG.
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interesting to consider a weaker form of attack that the adversary simply provides the
function index, this is similar to the notion of backdoored PRG that the adversary sets
up the public parameters (as in the Dual_EC PRG example [35]). This is a weaker
definition in that the adversary only have to generate a backdoor that can be helpful
for inverting one single function instead of a family of functions (as in the case of
strongly-forgeable OWF). It is easy to see that this notion is equivalent to the standard
notion of TDOWF if the KGspec outputs the same distribution of the function index as
the regular generation algorithm of the TDOWF, thus we only consider this notion for
OWF. However, putting into the context of kleptography, it is suggested that when the
experts recommend standard for OWF, TDOWF should not be a good candidate.
More importantly, we will later consider unforgeability for OWF, thus the reverse of
the weaker notion will yield a stronger definition for unforgeability, and we will give a
generic construction that converts any OWF into a strongly unforgeable OWF, which
means we can destroy the trapdoor structure generically.
Definition 10. A one-way function family F = {fi : Xi → Yi}i∈I (with the specification
of function generation algorithm KGspec) is δ-forgeable if there exist PPT adversarial
algorithms A = (KG, Inv) so that
1. Pr[x′ = x | (i, z)← KG(λ);x← Xi; y ← fi(x);x′ ← Inv(z, i, y)] ≥ δ
2. The distribution of i is indistinguishable from the output distribution of KGspec.
Correspondingly, we say a one-way function family is strongly-unforgeable if it is not
δ-forgeable for any non-negligible function δ.
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4.3.2 Eliminating backdoors
In this section, we discuss methods for safeguarding OWF generation against klep-
tographic attacks. We first present a general approach that immunizes any OWF
generation procedure. We prove that hashing the function index is sufficient to eliminate
potential backdoor information. However, in many cases of interest, function indices
have specific algebraic structure. It is not clear in general how one can guarantee that a
public hash function has such “structure preserving” properties. In order to apply our
approach in more realistic settings, we propose a “split-program” model in which the
function generation algorithm is necessarily composed of two parts: a random string
generation algorithm RG that outputs random bits r, and a deterministic function index
generation algorithm dKG which uses r to generate the index.
Before going to the details of our feasibility results, we remark that the definitions
of (strongly) unforgeable OWFs can be found in Definitions 8 and 10. The definitions
essentially insist the sabotaged KG looks the same as the specification KGspec which is
rigorously analyzed. To put it another way, invertibility in the backdoored mode will be
restricted by the indistinguishability condition for the function index.
4.3.2.1 General feasibility results
We will show below that randomizing the function index (that is, the relationship
between names and functions) can provide satisfactory immunization against possibly
sabotaged function generation. The intuition behind this idea is that according to the
definition of forgeable OWF, each backdoor that frequently appears can only be useful for
inverting a sparse subset of one way functions (i.e., the range of KG(z) is exponentially
sparse for every z, otherwise, one can use such backdoor to break the one-wayness of
the functions generated by KGspec). Thus, randomizing the function index will map
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the function index to a “safe" domain, and destroys the possible correlation with any
selected backdoor. That said, it is difficult for the adversary to arrange a backdoor that
works for a disturbed subset of function index (after hashing), even if she knows the
immunizing strategy.
Constructing strongly-unforgeable OWFs. Given any OWF family F := (KGF ,EvalF ) :=
{fi}i∈I (which might be forgeable, and with specification KGspec,Evalspec) that is se-
cure if KGspec(λ) outputs uniform i from Iλ, we will construct a strongly unforgeable
OWF family G := (KGG ,EvalG) = {gi}. We assume a (public) hash function family
Hλ = {hλ : Iλ → Iλ} modeled as a random oracle (for each λ), and that h is randomly
sampled from Hλ. The key generation algorithm KGG is the same as KGF , and EvalG
is given as EvalF ∗ h, and it is defined as EvalG(i, x) := EvalF (h(i), x). (thus for each i,
gi(·) = fh(i)(·)). 4 See also the pictorial illustration in Fig 4.
KGF → i i→ h → i˜ x→ EvalF (˜i, ·) → y
Figure 4: Immunization strategy for OWF.
Remark 10. In the case that we can build hash functions that hash directly onto the
index space Iλ, then we can use the above immunization strategy. However, in practice,
it is not clear if we can always easily build hash functions on index space. To address
this issue, in Section 4.3.2.2, we introduce a new framework called “split-program model”.
There, we can use standard hash function, e.g., SHA-256 to work on the random bits
directly.
4 Note that the hash function can be implemented by the adversary, since it is deterministic and with
a public input distribution (the output distribution of KGF ). We can also interpret the specifications
for G as (KGspec,Evalspec ∗ hspec).
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Theorem 24. The OWF family G defined above is strongly unforgeable in the random
oracle model.
Proof. Suppose that G is δ-forgeable for a non-negligible function δ, and let (AKG,AInv)
be the adversarial algorithms of Definition 10. We will construct a simulator S which
will break the one-way security of F .
Suppose (fi˜, y) are the challenges S receives from the one way security challenger C,
where y = fi˜(x) for a randomly selected x. Then (i.) S first randomly samples a bit b to
decide whether to embed j into the answers to the random oracle queries from AKG or
AInv. (W.l.o.g., we assume all the random oracle queries are different.) (ii.) S runs AKG.
Suppose AKG makes q1 random oracle queries Q1 = {i1, . . . , iq1}. If b = 0, S randomly
selects an index t1 ∈ {1, . . . , q1}. When answering the random oracle queries i1, . . . , iq1
from AKG, S answers i˜ for h(it1); for all other queries, S answers with random elements
from the index set Iλ. If b 6= 0, S answers all these queries using random elements from
Iλ. S maintains a list for the query-answer pairs. AKG outputs a pair (i, z).
If [b = 0 ∧ i 6= it1 ], S aborts; otherwise, S runs AInv with inputs (i, y, z). Assuming
AInv asks q2 random oracle queries, S sets i˜ as h(i) (even if i is not asked) and for all
others queries, S answers with random elements from Iλ. AInv outputs x′.
If [b = 1 ∧ i ∈ Q1], S aborts; otherwise, it returns x′ as his answer to C.
Probabilistic analysis. Now we bound the success probability of S. Let us use W to
denote the event that S aborts, W1 to denote the event that b = 0 ∧ i 6= it1 , and W2 to
denote the event that b = 1 ∧ i ∈ Q1. We have
Pr[x′ = x] = Pr[x′ = x|W ] Pr[W ] + Pr[x′ = x|W ] Pr[W ] ≥ Pr[x′ = x|W ] Pr[W ]
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We first bound Pr[W ] as 1−Pr[W ], we have Pr[W ] = Pr[W1 ∨W2] ≤ Pr[W1] + Pr[W2] .
Assuming Pr[i ∈ Q1] = η, we bound Pr[W1] as follows:












η + (1− η)
]




η+ 12 ≤ 1− 12q1 .
Thus we can derive that Pr[W ] ≥ 1/(2q1).
Furthermore, conditioned on S not aborting, the input distributions of the adver-
saries (AKG,AInv) are identical to that of Definition 10. By definition of δ-forgeability,
Pr[AInv(˜i, fi˜(x), z) = x] ≥ δ, thus Pr[x′ = x|W ] ≥ δ.
Combing these facts, we conclude that if G is δ-forgeable for some non-negligible δ,
then there exists an algorithm S that breaks the one-way security of F with probability
at least δ/(2q1) (which is non-negligible). This completes the proof.
Remark 11. (i.) Actually, it is not very hard to see from our analysis that we can
even relax the detection condition for KG that it only has to pass one particular tester.
(ii.) We may also prove a similar result in the standard model, that the random oracle is
instantiated with a pseudorandom function PRF. However, in this case, the adversary
KG can only have oracle access to the PRF, but the Inv can have full access to the PRF
key. Still, this result will not be in the complete subversion model that the PRF requires a
trusted key. Thus we leave as an open problem that how to establish a general immunizing
result in the standard model. Furthermore, the above proof works even if the distribution
of i is different with the output distribution of KGspec, as long as it still belongs to the
index set.
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4.3.2.2 Practical results in the split-program model
Indices (names) of a one-way function family may have structure. For example, for
OWF based on discrete logarithm, fg,p(x) = gx mod p, the function index consists of
an algebraically meaningful pair (p, g), where p is a prime and g a random generator.
This would require that the hash function in the general immunization method above
maps (g, p) to (g′, p′); note that (g′, p′) is another algebraically meaningful pair with
the same structure. Furthermore, for a TDOWF, the hash function needs to map the
function/trapdoor pair to another function/trapdoor pair. It is not clear in general how
one can guarantee that a public hash function has such “structure preserving” properties.
To address this problem, we propose a split-program model in which every function
generation algorithm is composed of two algorithms, a random string generation algorithm
RG that outputs a uniform `-bit random string r, and a deterministic function index
generation algorithm dKG that transforms the randomness r into a function index i. In
this model, dKG is deterministic with a public input distribution (output distribution of
RG). Following lemma 20 and the elaboration in section 4.3.1.1, we can consider it to
be honestly implemented and we can focus on “cleaning up” the randomness generated
by RG. 5
Remark 12. It is not hard to see, the split-program model is quite general and can
be applied to most practical algorithms. To see this, the user gets the source code of
the implementation, which makes calls to some API for generating randomness (e.g.,
5 The split-program model essentially forces the adversary to concentrate the parts which may
potentially contain backdoors of a malicious implementation into RG. This gives us more flexibility to
apply the sanitizing strategy. Furthermore, conceptually, the immunizing strategy itself (e.g., Fig 4)
can be seen as a bigger piece of implementation in the split-program model, i.e., the hash function and
the actual KG algorithm should be individually implemented and checked.
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rand()) whenever necessary. The user can hook up the interface with the calls to the
API with the separate program RG provided by the big brother. In principle, one can
always augment a randomized KG algorithm to output the function index i together with
the randomness r used to generate i, thus the RG can be implemented as this augmented
KG, and discards the function index i from the output.
We first rephrase the standard OWF/TDOWF definitions in the split-program
model.
Definition 11. A function family F is one way in the split-program model if there exist
a pair of algorithms (RG, dKG) where (i.) RG, given a security parameter λ, outputs a
uniform `(λ)-bit string r; (ii.) dKG is deterministic: given the randomness r it outputs
a function index i ∈ Iλ; and (iii.) F is one-way under this procedure for generating i.
Similarly, we can define a TDOWF family in the split program model (In this case,
dKG outputs a function index together with a trapdoor). For the ease of presentation,
we often use the pair of algorithms (RG, dKG) to represent the OWF/TDOWF family F
in the split-program model. Next we define δ-forgeable OWF in the split-program model
by modifying Definition 10; we immediately have the complemented security notion of
strongly-unforgeable OWF in the split-program model. 6
Definition 12. A one-way function family F = {fi : Xi → Yi}i∈I (with the specification
version of function generation algorithm RGspec, dKGspec) is δ-forgeable if there exist
ppt algorithms (RG, dKG, Inv) such that:
6Note that it is easy to provide a more general definition to capture the fact dKG is also implemented
by the adversary, we can simply require the indistinguishability condition hold for the joint output
distribution of (RG, dKG). However as pointed out above, it is fine for us to consider the deterministic
dKG as honestly implemented for simplicity, because it has the public input distribution from h ◦ RG.
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1. Pr[x′ = x | (r, z) ← RG(λ); i ← dKGspec(λ, r, z);x ← Xi; y := fi(x);x′ ←
Inv(z, i, y)] ≥ δ .
2. The distribution of r is indistinguishable from the output distribution of RGspec.
Correspondingly, we say a one-way function family is strongly-unforgeable in the split-
program model if it is not δ-forgeable in the split-program model for any non-negligible
function δ.
Strongly-unforgeable OWF in the split-program model.
Given a OWF family F := (RGF , dKGF ,EvalF ) (in the split program model) whose
RGspec outputs uniform bits, and a public hash function h(·) randomly selected from a
hash family H : {0, 1}`(λ) → {0, 1}`(λ) which is modeled as a random oracle, we construct
an strongly-unforgeable OWF family G. G := (RGG, dKGG ,EvalG) can be described as
(RGF , dKGF ◦h,EvalF ), i.e., dKGF ◦h(r) = dKGF (h(r)) the function index i is generated
by dKGF using h(r) as randomness, where r ← RGF . See Figure 5 below:7
RGF → r r → h → r˜ r˜ → dKGF → i˜ x→ EvalF (˜i, ·) → y
Figure 5: Immunization strategy for OWF in the split-program model.
The intuition is analogous to that captured in the proof of Theorem 24: For a
backdoor z that frequently appears in the output of ARG, the “bad” set of randomness
(i.e., for which the dKG algorithm outputs a function that can be efficiently inverted
using z) should be sparse in {0, 1}`(λ). (Otherwise, one can break the one way security
7We emphasize that in the split-program model, we can use any regular hash function such as
SHA-256. Furthermore, this can be implemented by the adversary, as h has a public input distribution
(the output distribution of RG). This in turn guarantees dKG has a public input distribution (output
distribution of h ◦ RG).
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of F by simply running AKG to get z.) In this case, the probability that a uniform
random string falls into the “bad” set that z is useful for inverting is negligible. Hashing
the random bits will then break the delicate connection between the backdoor and the
function index that will be generated using the cleaned randomness. Specifically, it will
be challenging for the adversary to design an efficient connection between a backdoor z
and the “scrambled” sets of functions backdoored by z.
Theorem 25. The OWF family G described above is strongly unforgeable in the split-
program model if H is modeled as a random oracle.
Proof. First, the hash function h takes the output distribution of RG as input distribution;
thus following corollary 21 we can still think it as a random oracle.
Next, we will argue the following: assume G is δ-forgeable in the split program model,
i.e., there exist ppt adversaries (ARG,AdKG,AInv) satisfying Definition 12. Then we
can construct a simulator S that breaks the one-way security of F in the split-program
model.
Suppose r∗ is the randomness and y = fi(x) is the challenge value (for a randomly
chosen x) received from the one-way security challenger C, where i = dKG(r∗).
S first chooses a random bit b and runs ARG, which asks random oracle queries
{r01, . . . , r0q0} := Q0. If b = 0, S randomly selects t0 ∈ {1, . . . , q0}, and answers h(r0t0) =
r∗; all other queries are answered with uniform `-bit strings. If b 6= 0, S answers all
queries with random strings. S maintains a list for the query-answer pairs.
If [b = 0∧r 6= r0t0 ], S aborts; otherwise, it sets h(r) = r∗ and it runs AKG with inputs
r∗, and expects AKG to output i. S then runs AInv with inputs (i, y, z) and receives the
response x′.
If b = 1 ∧ r ∈ Q0, S aborts; otherwise, it sends x′ to the challenger C as his answer.
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Similar to the proof of Theorem 24, let W denote the event that S aborts: we can
bound Pr[W ] ≤ 1− 1q0 . Thus,
Pr[x′ = x] ≥ Pr[x′ = x |W ]Pr[W ] ≥ Pr[x′ = x |W ]
2q0
.
While following Definition 12,
Pr[x′ = x|W ] = Pr[AInv(z, i, fi(x)) = x] ≥ δ.
To summarize, in the split-program model, if G is δ-forgeable, S will break the one way
security of F with probability at least δ/(2q0).
Constructing unforgeable TDOWFs in the split-program model. More inter-
estingly, we can apply the same method to immunize a TDOWF in the split-program
model, whose RGspec outputs uniform bits r and whose (deterministic) dKGspec, given
r, outputs a function index and a trapdoor pair. However, in this case, we have to
assume the implementation RG to be stateless. The detection condition can guarantee
that the output of RG is unpredictable to the adversary. Then, similar to the OWF case,
hashing the randomness yields a uniform bitstring, and it ensures that the resulting
function index together with the corresponding trapdoor will be “safe.” 8 As pointed
out in Section 4.3.1, it is preferable to consider strong forgeability for TDOWF (since a
forgeable TDOWF can be seen as itself), thus we adapt Definition 9 to the split-program
model: 9
8It is easy to see that if RG is stateful and it maintains a counter state, ctr, there is a simple attack
that RG(z, ctr) runs PRFz(ctr), where z is the backdoor and used as the seed for the PRF. In this case,
the output of RG is completely known to the adversary, and also the trapdoor corresponding to the
outputted function index.
9Again, since dKG is deterministic with public input distributions, for simplicity we consider they
are honestly implemented as dKGspec, even though they are implemented by the adversary.
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Definition 13. A trapdoor one-way function family F = {fi : Xi → Yi}i∈I (with the
specification algorithms RGspec, dKGspec) is δ-strongly forgeable if there exist ppt
adversarial algorithms A = (BG,RG, dKG, Inv) so that given a backdoor z produced by
backdoor generation algorithm BG, the random string generation algorithm RG generates
an `(λ)-bit random string r, and based on such r the deterministic function generation
algorithm dKG generates a function index i and the corresponding trapdoor ti, with
the following properties: (1) fi is invertible given z without providing ti, and (2) the
output distribution of RG is computationally indistinguishable from that generated by the
specification algorithms RGspec. That is, for every z ← BG(λ), it holds that:
(1) Pr[x′ = x | z ← BG; r ← RG(λ, z); (i, ti)← dKGspec(λ, r);x← Xi; y := fi(x);x′ ←
Inv(i, y, z)] ≥ δ
(2) {r | z ← BG; r ← RG(λ, z)} c≈ {r | r ← RGspec(λ)}
Correspondingly, we say a TDOWF family is unforgeable if it is not δ-strongly forgeable
for any non-negligible δ.
The immunization methodology for OWF discussed before can also be used for
immunizing stateless TDOWF in the split program model. That is, given any TDOWF
family F whose RGspec outputs uniform bits r, a hash function h randomly selected
from a hash family Hλ : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}λ can be used to determine an unforgeable
TDOWF family G, see Figure 6 below:
RG(z) → r r → h → r˜ r˜ → dKG → (i, ti) x→ Eval(i, ·) → y
Figure 6: Immunization strategy for TDOWF in the split-program model.
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Remark 13. We can consider (h, dKG) as one single deterministic algorithm dKG ◦ h
which first run h on inputs r to get r˜ and run dKG on r˜. The new specification will be
(RGspec, dKGspec ◦ hspec).
Theorem 26. The TDOWF family G described above is unforgeable in the split-program
model if H is modeled as a random oracle, and the adversarial implementations are
stateless.
Proof. First, since the output distribution of a stateless RG is pseudorandom, thus for
any ppt adversary A, including the one that produces RG, Pr[r′ = r : r ← RG(z), r′ ←
A(z)] ≤ , where  = negl(λ).
The rest proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 25 that if one can break the strong
unforgeability of G, then we can construct a simulator that breaks the specification of F
in the split-program model.
4.4 Pseudorandom Generator in the Complete Subversion Model
As mentioned in the Introduction, our goal is to stimulate a systematic study of
Cliptography. Having studied the fundamental backdoor-free building blocks, unforge-
able OWFs, and unforgeable TDOWFs, we intend to mimic the classic footprints of
constructing cryptographic primitives from OWF/TDOWF, and provide solutions to
other important backdoor-free building blocks. As our first example, we will show
an interesting connection between our notion of unforgeable OWF and the notion of
backdoor-free PRG, recently studied by Dodis et al. [47]. Next we first review the basic
notions of PRG under subversion attacks. We then provide a specific solution based
on the Blum-Micali PRG; this result can be viewed as a mimic of the classic result of
Blum-Micali construction in cliptography. Furthermore, we examine how to extend the
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applicability of our general sanitizing strategy for OWF/TDOWF to more settings. We
will demonstrate a general method of public immunizing strategy for PRG. We remark
that, all algorithms in our backdoor-free PRG construction, including the sanitizing
function (which can be part of the KG algorithm in the specification), can be subverted.
Thus we provide the first PRG constructions secure in the complete subversion model.
4.4.1 Preliminaries: backdoored and backdoor-free PRGs
We adopt the definition from [47], that a pseudorandom generator consists of a
pair of algorithms (KG,PRG), where KG outputs a public parameter pk and PRG :
{0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}` → {0, 1}` × {0, 1}`′ takes the public parameter pk and an `-bit random
seed s as input; it returns a state s1 ∈ {0, 1}` and an output string r1 ∈ {0, 1}`′ . PRG
may be iteratively executed; in the i-th iteration, it takes the state from the previous
iteration si−1 as the seed and generates the current state si and output ri. We use PRGq
to denote the result of q iterations of PRG with outputs r1, . . . , rq (each ri ∈ {0, 1}`′).
In a backdoored PRG, the algorithms (in particular KG) are implemented by the
adversary (represented by Ainitial), outputs a public parameter pk together with a
backdoor sk. The output distribution PRG(pk,U) is still pseudorandom, where U is
the uniform distribution; however, with the corresponding backdoor sk, the adversary
(represented by Adist) is able to break the PRG security (e.g., the adversary can
distinguish the output from a uniform string).
We will rephrase the definition for backdoored PRG in our setting—as in the
definition of a forgeable OWF—there exist “specification” versions of the algorithms. In
particular, the parameter generation algorithm KGspec is with the requirement that the
distribution of the adversarially generated public parameter must be indistinguishable
from the output distribution of KGspec. It is easy to see that the output distribution of
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PRG(pk, s) for a uniformly chosen s is pseudorandom even pk is generated by Ainitial.
(Otherwise, one can easily distinguish the output distribution of Ainitial from KGspec.)
Additionally, as the PRG algorithm is deterministic, and its input distribution is public,
we may assume that the adversary implements it honestly as the PRGspec to avoid easy
detection so that we can focus on the KG algorithm. The formal definitions are presented
as follows:
Backdoored PRG. We re-phrase the definition of (q, δ)-backdoored PRG 10 as fol-
lows: We define a backdoored PRG game (see Figure 7) with a PPT adversary
A = (Ainitial,Adist) such that (i) the pk distribution is indistinguishable from that
generated by KGspec; and (ii) the adversary wins the backdoored PRG game with
probability δ, i.e., Pr[b = b′]− 12 ≥ δ.
(pk, sk)← Ainitial
s← {0, 1}`
r01, . . . , r
0
q ← PRGq(pk, s)
r11, . . . , r
1
q ← {0, 1}`
′·q
b← {0, 1}
b′ ← Adist(pk, sk, rb1, . . . , rbq)
Figure 7: The backdoored PRG game
Backdoor-free PRG. Then we say that a PRG is q-backdoor free if, in the above
backdoored PRG game, for all PPT adversaries A = (Ainitial,Adist), whenever pk is
indistinguishable from the specification distribution, the advantage is negligible, i.e.,∣∣Pr[b = b′]− 12 ∣∣ ≤ negl(λ).
10We ignore the running time of the adversary here for simplicity. Also, according to the detection
principle in section 4.2, lemma 20, the PRG algorithm is deterministic and with a uniform input
distribution, thus we can treat it as honestly implemented.
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Remark 14. The generation of the seed s is out of the scope of this paper (same as
[47]), since even the specification of pseudorandom generators do not cover this part.
Our techniques can guarantee a received implementation is as good as the specification.
Of course, it would be an important open question to consider the random seed generation
for practice.
4.4.2 Constructing backdoor-free PRG from strongly unforgeable OWP
In this subsection, we provide constructions for backdoor-free PRG based on strongly
unforgeable one-way permutation. We start with a basic solution based on a (simplified)
Blum-Micali PRG, and then extend it to a full-fledged solution. Before going to the
details of our constructions, we recall the classic generic construction of Goldreich-Levin
(GL), yielding a hardcore predicate [61] for any OWF f . We suppose the input x of
f is divided into two halves x = (x1, x2) and define the bit B(x) = 〈x1, x2〉; B(x) is
hard to predict given x1, f(x2), assuming that f is one-way. Moreover, if there is a PPT
algorithm that predicts B(x) with significant advantage δ given x1, f(x2), then there is
a PPT algorithm I that inverts f with probability poly(δ).
Basic construction. We will show that given a strongly unforgeable one-way permu-
tation (OWP) family F with algorithms (KGF ,EvalF ), the classic Blum-Micali PRG [?]
(using the GL hardcore predicate) is 1-backdoor free. Our basic construction (KG,PRG)
is as follows:
• Parameter generation algorithm pk ← KG(λ):
compute i← KGF (λ) and set pk := i;
• Bit string generation algorithm (s′, b)← PRG(pk, s):
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upon receiving s and pk, where pk = i, s = s1||s2 and |s1| = |s2| = `, compute
the following: s′1 := s1, s′2 := fi(s2) (or s′2 := EvalF(i, s2)), and s′ = s′1||s′2,
b := 〈s1, s2〉.
We can show in the lemma below that the basic construction above is a 1-backdoor
free PRG. The intuition is that in the (simplified) Blum-Micali PRG, a distinguisher
can be transformed into an OWF inverter (following the GL proof), thus an adversary
who can build a backdoor for this PRG implies that she has the ability to make F
(forgeable), which violates the strong unforgeability of F .
Lemma 27. Given a strongly unforgeable one way permutation family F , the basic
construction above is 1-backdoor free.
Proof. The specification KGspec of the simplified Blum-Micali PRG outputs a random
function index from the corresponding index set (by simply running the key generation
specification of F).
First, it is easy to see that the OWF function family G = {gi}, where gi(x1||x2) :=
x1||fi(x2), is strongly unforgeable if F is strongly unforgeable.
If the above basic construction is a (1, δ)-backdoored PRG for some non-negligible
δ, there exist PPT adversaries (Ainitial,Adist) such that (i.) Ainitial can output a pair
(pk, sk), where pk is indistinguishable from a randomly sampled public parameter; and
(ii.) Adist, with the backdoor sk, can distinguish s1||fi(s2)||B(s) (where B(s) = 〈s1, s2〉)
from a uniform (2` + 1)-bit string. It is not hard to see that we can then construct
algorithms (KG, Inv) that break the strong unforgeability of G.
In particular, KG runs Ainitial and outputs the received key pair (pk, sk), where pk
here corresponds to a function index i that is indistinguishable from a random index,
and sk corresponds to the backdoor z. Inv receives a challenge y = gi(x) and the
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backdoor z; it first constructs an algorithm AP . AP selects a random bit b, and runs
Adist(pk, sk, y||b). By the definition of Adist, if b = B(s), Adist (with sk) will output
0 with probability 1/2 + δ. It is easy to see that AP can predict the GL hardcore
predicate B with advantage δ/2, following the GL proof [61], there exists another
algorithm IAP (pk, sk, ·) that can invert y with probability δ′ = poly(δ/2). Inv runs
IAP (pk, sk, i, y) and recovers x′; Inv then outputs x′ if it is a valid pre-image of y. It
follows that Pr[x′ = x] ≥ poly(δ/2) = δ′ and G will be δ′-forgeable for a non-negligible
δ′, thus contradicts our assumption.
Full-fledged construction. We now extend our basic construction via iterations to
show that the full fledged Blum-Micali PRG construction, using our strongly unforgeable
OWF, achieves a q-backdoor free PRG for any q = poly(λ). Our full-fledged construction
(KG,PRG) 11 is as follows:
• Parameter generation algorithm pk ← KG(λ):
compute i← KGF (λ) and set pk := i;
• Bit string generation algorithm (s′, r)← PRG(pk, s):
upon receiving s and pk where pk = i, s = s1||s2, and |s1| = |s2| = `, compute the
following:
– let s01 := s1 and s02 := s2;
– for j = 1, . . . `′,









11PRGq can be defined in a straightforward manner that runs PRG for q iterations, each iteration
outputs `′ bits and updates the state for next iteration.
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– s′ = s`′ = s1||f `′i (s2); and r = b1 . . . b`′ .
Please see Figure 8 for pictorial illustration.
s1||s2 → s1||fi(s2)→ s1||f2i (s2)→ . . .→ s1||f `
′
i (s2)→ . . .
↓ ↓ ↓
〈s1, s2〉 〈s1, fi(s2)〉 . . . 〈s1, f `′−1i (s2)〉
Figure 8: One iteration of BM-PRG
Theorem 28. The full fledged construction above is q-backdoor free (for any polynomially
large q), if the underlying OWP family F is strongly unforgeable.
Proof sketch. Following Lemma 27, s1||f ji (s2)||bj is pseudorandom, i.e., it is indistin-
guishable from “u1, . . . , u`, v1”, even to the adversaries (Ainitial,Adist) who set i, where
{ui}, v1 are all random bits. While bj+1 is only related to s1, f ji (s2), it follows that to the
adversary Adist (who has the backdoor), b1 . . . b`′ satisfies the next-bit unpredictability.
Following the classic reduction from pseudorandomness to next-bit unpredictability, we
can conclude that b1 . . . b`′ is indistinguishable from uniform bits from {0, 1}`′ , even
to Adist. (This can be shown via the hybrid argument.) Then, inductively, we can
conclude that r1, . . . , rq are indistinguishable from `′ · q uniform bits.
Remark 15. It is easy to see that if starting from an OWF(not necessarily unforgeables),
the full fledged construction can be easily modified by replacing fi(·) with fh(i)(·).
4.4.3 General public immunization strategy for PRG
An impossibility result about public immunization of a backdoored PRG was pre-
sented in [47]. However, we observe that this impossibility result only applies to an
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immunization procedure that operates on the output of the backdoored PRG . The
application of strongly unforgeable OWF to backdoor-free PRG shown above inspires
us to consider a new, general immunizing strategy for backdoored PRG . We suggest
that—similar to the procedure above for eliminating backdoors in OWFs—one can
randomize the public parameters to sanitize the PRG. 12 The intuition for this strategy
to be effective in the setting of PRG is similar: if a specification KGspec that outputs a
uniform pk from its domain, no single backdoor can be used to break the security for
large amount of public parameters; otherwise, one can use this trapdoor to break the
PRG security of the specification.
Consider a PRG implementation (KG,PRG) (in which the KG algorithm might be
backdoored), which is proven secure if the KGspec outputs uniformly from its range
PP . Let h be randomly selected from a hash family H : PP → PP which is modeled
as a random oracle. Then we can construct a backdoor-free PRG, (KG,PRG ∗ h), i.e.,
applying the hash to the given public parameter to derive the actual pk that will be fed
into the PRG algorithm (the new deterministic pseudo randomness generation algorithm
PRG ∗ h defined as PRG ∗ h(pk, s) = PRG(h(pk), s)). Note that in order for this method
to work, we must insist that pk can not be null, and is indeed used by the PRG algorithm,
as in the case of, e.g., Dual_EC PRG. Also see the pictorial illustration in Fig 9.
Theorem 29. Assume (KGspec,PRGspec) is a pseudorandom generator if KGspec outputs
pk randomly from its domain. Given any implementation (KG,PRG), hashing the
12To interpret this results, since the solution of [47] requires a trusted seed/key generation and apply
the function to the PRG output, thus part of the PRG algorithm can not be subverted. It follows that
the construction of PRG in the complete subversion model was still open until our solution. In contrast,
our sanitizing strategy does not require any secret, and even the deterministic hash function can be
implemented by the adversary as part of the KG algorithm.
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KG → pk pk → h → p˜k s→ PRG(p˜k, ·) → r
Figure 9: Public immunization strategy for PRG.
public parameters as described above, i.e., (h ◦ KG,PRGspec) yields a q-backdoor-free
pseudorandom generator in the random oracle model for any polynomially large q.
Proof sketch. Suppose (h ◦KG,PRGspec) is a (q, δ)- backdoored PRG . Then there exist
a pair of adversaries (Ainitial,Adist) that can win the backdoored PRG game defined
in Figure 7 with advantage δ. We will transform these adversaries into an adversary S
that breaks the security of (KGspec,PRGspec).
Suppose the challenger of the specification version of PRG selects the parameter pk∗
and the challenge string r∗ is either PRG(pk∗, s) (for a uniform s ∈ {0, 1}`) or a uniform
string from {0, 1}`′·q for some `′.
The reduction follows the proof of Theorem 24: S attempts to embed pk∗ into the
answers to the random oracle queries. In particular, if Ainitial outputs pk, S wishes to
answer the random oracle query about pk using pk∗, i.e., h(pk) = pk∗. We then proceed
with a similar probabilistic analysis.
It is easy to see that if Adist can distinguish r∗ from an uniform string, then S will
be able to distinguish the output of the specification version from random which violates
the PRG security of the specification.
Remark 16. There are several points we would like to stress:
• If the public parameter contains only random elements from a group, e.g., the
Dual_EC PRG, we may simply encode them into bits and use the regular hash
functions like SHA-256, directly and convert the resulting bits back to a group
element;
149
• If the public parameters are structured elements, or the KGspec does not output
a uniform distribution, we can work on the split-program model that forces the
adversarial implementation to explicitly isolate its generation of randomness, and
make the randomness public as part of the public parameter.
• If we treat the immunizing method as part of the KG algorithms, i.e., h ◦ KG is a
single algorithm, we can let the adversary sets both (pk, p˜k) as the public parameter,
regular user simply uses p˜k as the actual parameter and the crypto experts can
check the validity of it. Similarly, in the split-program model, we can let the big
brother set the original randomness r and sanitized randomness r˜, together with
p˜k as the public parameters.
4.5 Signatures in the Complete Subversion Model
As an immediate application, in this section, we will demonstrate how to use
unforgeable OWFs and unforgeable TDOWFs as fundamental building blocks to construct
backdoor-free digital signature schemes in the complete subversion model.
We build on recent works of Bellare et al. [7, 11], who studied a family of algorithm-
substitution attacks (ASAs) on cryptographic primitives. In their ASAs, an encryption
algorithm is implemented by a saboteur who may have backdoors embedded; then the
sabotaged implementation judiciously samples randomness in order to generate the
outputs (e.g., ciphertexts) in a way that leaks the secret bit-by-bit via a steganographic
channel.
To defend against the ASAs, Bellare et al provided successful mechanisms of using
deterministic algorithms (e.g., signing) with unique outputs. However, we note that the
ASAs considered in [7, 11] are restricted in the sense that the adversary is not allowed
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to launch the ASAs on all algorithms; In particular, the key generation algorithm is
assumed to be implemented honestly and the adversary is not allowed to attack on it.
We are interested in securing cryptographic schemes in the complete subversion
model where the adversary is allowed to launch algorithm-substitution attacks on all
components of the schemes. We demonstrate below how our unforgeable TDOWF can
be applied to defend against the ASAs, even if the key generation algorithm has been
sabotaged. Together with the results of [7, 11], we then show a concrete example of
a digital signature scheme, achieving security in the case that all the algorithms are
sabotaged.
Subversion-secure signature scheme. We can define the existential unforgeability
in the setting of complete subversion 13 in a way that the public key is generated
using the adversarial implementation, and the signing/verification algorithm can also be
implemented by the adversary, while all the other steps are the same as the standard
definition.
Definition 14. We say a signature scheme (KG, Sign,Verify) (with the specification
version of key generation algorithm KGspec, signing algorithm Signspec and verifica-
tion algorithm Verifyspec) is existentially unforgeable in the complete subversion
setting, if for all ppt adversaries A = (Ainitial,Aforge), the following properties hold:
• The adversary A wins the unforgeability game defined below, with no more than a
negligible probability.
13This definition may be weaker than the general definition of surveillance security defined in [11]
that the output distribution of subverted algorithms looks the same as that of the specification even
to the adversary who has the backdoor. However, preserving its standard security in this complete
subversion model (we think) is good enough for each primitive to be used as normal.
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unforgeability game between a ppt adversary A = (Ainitial,Aforge) and a
challenger C:
1. Ainitial provides an implementation of KG, Sign, Verify (and an implemen-
tation of the hash function if needed) to the challenger (which may contain
backdoor information z).
2. C queries KG to learn the key pair (pk, sk), and sends the public key pk to
Aforge.
3. Aforge, having the backdoor z from Ainitial, asks signing queries for arbitrar-
ily chosen messages m1, . . . ,mq; for each mi from Aforge, the challenger C
queries Sign with input (sk,mi) to learn the corresponding signature σi, and
return σi to Aforge.
4. Aforge returns a message-signature pair (m∗, σ∗) to the challenger C; now C
queries Verify with input (pk,m∗, σ∗) to learn output b.
5. A = (Ainitial,Aforge) wins the game if m∗ 6∈ {m1, . . . ,mq} and b = 1.
• In the above game, the subversion of KG, Sign and Verify (and the hash function
if there is any) are strongly undetectable. (See section 4.2 for details.)
Construction. Following the result of [11], if the key generation algorithm is honest, a
unique signature scheme [?, 97] remains existentially unforgeable against the algorithm
substitution attack. In this case, the signing and verification algorithms are both
deterministic and the detection condition “forces" the adversary to honestly implement
these two. To obtain a complete subversion-secure solution from a unique signature
scheme, we still need to “upgrade” the key generation algorithm so that it is secure
against subversion attack.
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We may consider the following approach to obtain a subversion-secure key generation
algorithm: initially generate an unforgeable OWF f , and then randomly select a secret
key sk and compute the public key pk = f(sk). Since the OWF is unforgeable, it seems
that we may be able to force the adversarial key generation algorithm to output a “safe”
OWF. However, it is not clear how to show that the key pairs are well distributed.
We here consider an alternative approach; we use an unforgeable TDOWF, (KGF , InvF ).
More concretely, we use the key generation algorithm of unforgeable TDOWF to generate
a function index i together with the corresponding trapdoor ti, and set the index i as
the public key, and the trapdoor ti as the secret key. To be compatible with the unique
signature scheme, we choose to instantiate the unique signature scheme from the full
domain hash construction [13,40]. Details of the construction are as follows:
• Key generation (pk, sk)← KG(λ):
compute (i, ti)← KGF (λ), and set pk := i and sk := ti;
• Signature generation σ ← Sign(sk,m):
upon receiving message m, compute σ = InvF (sk, i, h(m)), where sk = ti.
• Signature verification b := Verify(pk,m, σ):
upon receiving message-signature pair (m,σ), if fi(σ1) = h(m) then set b := 1,
otherwise set b := 0; here pk = i.
Lemma 30. The algorithms Sign,Verify and the hash h in the full domain hash signature
scheme are subversion resistant (in the strong detection model).
Proof. Suppose (m1, y1), . . . , (mq, yq) and (m1, σ1), . . . , (mq′ , σq′) form the transcript
of the adversary in the subversion game, trying to distinguish (Sign,Verify, h) from
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(Signspec,Verifyspec, hspec). The transcript includes all the signing queries and the final
forgery.
First, it is easy to see that if there is any yi 6= hspec(mi), then there exists a detector
simply queries hspec and noticed this inconsistency with probability 1.
If there exists (mi, (σi) such that Signspec(sk,mi) 6= Sign(sk,mi) = σi, then there
exists a detecter algorithm D can always detect it with probability 1. D uses this
pair as an input (part of the transcript) and runs the specification Verifyspec on this
message-signature pair. Since the full domain hash is a unique signature, thus if they
are not the same as that using the Signspec, it will not pass the verification.
If there exists a pair (mi, σi) such that Verifyspec(pk,mi, σi) 6= Verify(pk,mi, σi),
similarly, there exists a detecter D can always notice it.
It follows that every hash evaluation is consistent with that using the hash specifica-
tion; every signature generated by the Sign algorithm is consistent with that generated
by the specification; every signature pass the Verify algorithm is indeed a valid signature.
If the adversary gains any advantage in the subversion game, there must be a pair that
is inconsistent with the specifications, then it can be detected with probability 1. We
can conclude that δs ≤ δd.
Remark 17. The strong detection condition in the signature setting in practice is more
reasonable than that in the symmetric key encryption setting as [11,79]. Since the nature
of signature schemes, the transcripts are for public verification anyway, anyone can verify
the validity, including the lab. While in the symmetric key encryption, the detection
requires the detecter to have access to the secret key. This essentially states that the every
user is a detecter who has access to the specification, which weakens the motivation for
considering the implementation subversion (since they have the specification anyway).
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Theorem 31. Given an unforgeable TDOWF F , the full domain hash signature scheme
is existentially unforgeable (under complete subversion) in the random oracle model, and
all the algorithms are stateless.
Proof. First, following lemma 30, the h,Sign,Verify algorithms we use are subversion
resistant. It follows that the adversary behaves the same as sending honest implementa-
tions for those algorithms (otherwise got detected), i.e., consistent with the specifications.
In particular, the hash function implementation can still be modeled as a random oracle
for queries of the adversary.
We will show that if there is a subversion attack, then one can break the unforge-
ability of F . Suppose (Ainitial,Aforge) are the adversaries who break the existential
unforgeability of the full domain hash signature scheme in the complete subversion
model with a non-negligible probability δ, we will construct S to simulate the adversaries
(BG,KG, Inv) as in Definition 9.
BG first runs Ainitial to receive the backdoor z and the implementation KG0 for the
signature key generation. KG simply runs KG0 and outputs a function index i := pk
and the corresponding trapdoor ti. S discards ti and sends pk to Aforge. Suppose
y = fi(x) is the challenge that Inv receives from the unforgeable TDOWF challenger,
Inv (constructed by S) will feed Aforge with z and runs it as follows to try to invert.
W.l.o.g, we assume Aforge asks a random oracle query for a message before she asks
for the signing query, (if not, the simulator can ask instead of her), and Aforge asks the
random oracle query for her final forgery m∗.
Suppose Aforge asks q random oracle queries m1, . . . ,mq. Inv randomly choose
j ∈ {1, . . . , q}, and answers the query with y = h(mj); He then chooses q − 1 random
elements σ1, . . . , σj−1, σj+1, . . . , σq, and answers the random oracle queries as h(mk) =
fi(σk) for k 6= j. Inv maintains a list.
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When Aforge asks a signing query mk, if mk = mj , Inv aborts, otherwise, Inv checks
the list and returns the corresponding σk. (Note that Sign algorithm can only have one
output for each message, thus the above procedure perfectly simulates the signing oracle
implemented by the subverted Sign algorithm). Aforge outputs m∗, σ∗. If m∗ 6= mj , Inv
aborts, otherwise, Inv outputs σ∗.
Let us use W to denote the event that Inv aborts. Following the classic proof of
security of the full domain hash signature scheme (e.g., [40]), Pr[W ] ≤ 1− poly(1q ), thus
Inv successfully inverts with probability at least δ0 = poly(1q )δ (as we assume Aforge
has δ advantage, and the Verify has to be honestly implemented to avoid detection).
This means F is δ0-forgeable, which contradicts our condition.
4.6 Conclusion and Open Problems
We initiate the systematic study of defending mechanism against kleptographic
attacks of cryptographic primitives when all algorithms are subject to the subversion,
we call cliptography.
We start from the fundamental primitives of (trapdoor) one way functions. We
formalize the notions of forgeable (trapdoor) OWF to capture the possibility of embedding
backdoors, in particular, into the function generation algorithms, and show how to launch
such attacks. More interestingly, we suggest a general sanitization method employing
randomization of the function index to destroy the possibility of embedding backdoor
information. To instantiate our method in practice, we propose a split-program model
in which the function generation algorithm consists of two components, a randomized
component RG and a deterministic component dKG; here, the first component RG
generates a uniform random string for the second component dKG, and then the second
component generates an index based on such random string. In such split-program
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model, we can directly apply our general method of immunizing one way function
generation to the randomness generated by RG.
We then pursue the possibility of building cliptography from unforgeable (trapdoor)
OWFs. In particular, we show how to construct a signature scheme and a pseudorandom
generator that preserves its security in the complete subversion model. These are
done by using our unforgeable trapdoor OWF and strongly unforgeable OWF as the
key/parameter generation algorithm. Finally, we show how to apply our immunizing
technique directly to the setting of PRG and present a general public immunizing
strategy for PRG.
Many important problems remain open about defending against kleptogaphic attacks,
and in general against mass surveillance. The immediate open questions left by our
paper would be: to what extend the results and techniques developed in this paper
can be used to build cliptography. In particular, can we construct other cryptographic
primitives that preserves their security in the setting that all algorithms are subject to
kleptographic attacks? There are also many other related open questions, to name a few:
(1) how to sanitize the OWF generation in the standard model? (2) how to eliminate the
subliminal channel in general? (3). Can we show some results in the complete subversion
model so that we can preserve the security for multiparty protocols? and finally, (4) how




Rate Optimal Asymmetric Fingerprinting from Tardos
Code
5.1 Introduction
In a fingerprinting scheme, cf. [24], a server (or service provider SP) distributes
a file to a set of users. The server has the flexibility to furnish a different version of
the file to each user. This is done by splitting the file into segments and offering at
least two variations per segment. Given these segments, the file can be assembled in a
fingerprinted fashion: at each segment the variation obtained corresponds to a symbol
over an alphabet. Therefore, each user’s file determines a string over that alphabet - the
user’s fingerprint (e.g., the data M is divided into n blocks, for each block i, there are
two versions m0i ,m
1
i , a user assigned with a binary codeword b1, . . . , bn will receive his
versions as mb11 || . . . ||mbnn ). The objective here is that if the users collude to produce
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a “pirate” version of the file by combining their segments, the server is still capable of
discovering (at least some) of the identities of the colluding users.
If the SP alone generates the fingerprints for users and directly transmits them the
fingerprinted files, we have what is known as a symmetric fingerprinting scheme. As
the server is fully trusted in this setting, the security requirement is that malicious
users cannot collude to frame any innocent user or evade the tracing algorithm. The
subtle issue is that the server and the user are both able to produce a pirate file so when
a pirate copy is brought to light, an honest SP cannot provide an “undeniable” proof
that a user is at fault and symmetrically an honest user cannot defend herself against a
malicious SP that frames her (say, due to e.g., an insider attack on the SP side).
In order to resolve the above issue, [111] introduced asymmetric fingerprinting
schemes in which no one (even the server) should be capable to implicate an innocent
user. Thus when a dispute happens, the server can provide a convincing proof that
a guilty user is at fault. It follows that the server should not be fully aware of the
fingerprint of each user (otherwise it is capable of impersonating them) and hence this
suggests that the download of the fingerprinted file should be performed in an oblivious
manner from the servers’ point of view. Now in this case, the Judge could resolve the
dispute between the server and a user (i.e., guilty users will be found guilty by the judge
while the server will not be able to implicate an innocent user in the eyes of the judge).
In the original papers [111–113] the file transfer stage was treated generically as an
instance of secure two party computation. Unfortunately, even with “communication
efficient” secure two-party computation [44,46,75,104] the communication overhead of
the resulting protocol is prohibitively high (e.g., even with the most communication
efficient generic protocols, [46,75], the communication rate — the size of the file over
total number of bits transmitted — will be at most 0.5 and their use will impose the
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additional cost of a prohibitively large CRS which needs to be known a-priori to both
client and server). With the discovery of optimal length binary fingerprinting codes by
Tardos [127], Charpentier et al. [34] observed that oblivious transfer could be used as a
building block for a Tardos-based asymmetric fingerprinting. Their proposed solution
however is sub-optimal (it has a rate still at most 0.5) and in order to achieve the
fingerprint generation it relies on commutative encryption, a primitive not known to
be constructible in a way that the resulting scheme can be shown provably secure.
Furthermore no complete security analysis is provided in [34] which leaves a number
of important security issues unaddressed (specifically “accusation withdrawals” and
“selective aborts” – see below).
Achieving rate close to 1 is the most critical open question in the context of
asymmetric fingerprinting from an efficiency point of view. Indeed, any asymmetric
fingerprinting is particularly sensitive to its communication overhead: the file to be
transmitted by the sender can be quite large (e.g., a movie file) and thus any scheme whose
communication rate is not close to 1 is likely to be useless in a practical setting. We note
that efficient asymmetric fingerprinting schemes can enable more complex applications;
e.g., as building blocks for “anonymous buyer-seller watermarking” [116, 117]; these
systems rely on asymmetric fingerprinting schemes to enable copyright protection (but
they do not consider the implementation of such fingerprinting schemes explicitly).
Furthermore, analyzing the security of an asymmetric fingerprinting scheme is
involved as the security requirements require that the SP cannot frame an innocent user,
while at the same time the malicious users should still not be able to escape from tracing.
The analysis should rely both on the security of the protocol and on the property of
the code, specifically, no user should be able to produce a pirate file that makes the
SP and the judge disagree. Given that Tardos tracing accuses a subset of the users
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(based on a threshold condition) it is possible for the judge and the SP to disagree on
some users. This type of attack has not been considered before; we call it accusation
withdrawal as it forces the SP to withdraw an originally made accusation since the judge
cannot support it. Ensuring that no accusation withdrawal happens protects the SP
from starting accusation procedures that are not going to succeed with high probability.
Finally, during the file transfer stage the user may abort. Given that these file transfer
procedures can be lengthy (due to the large size of the files to be downloaded) the
possibility of an adversary exploiting aborting and restarting as an attack strategy is
important to be included in the security model (and in fact we show an explicit attack
if many aborts are permitted — see below).
5.1.1 Our contributions.
Rate-optimality. We propose the first rate-optimal (rate is defined as the size of the
actual data over the size of total communication) asymmetric fingerprinting scheme.
Our scheme is based on Tardos codes [127]. To achieve this property, we use a rate
optimal 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer ((2,1)-OT), and a new rate-optimal 1-out-of-2
strong conditional oblivious transfer ((2, 1)-SCOT, [14]). Both are constructed in [82],
and they are built on the rate-optimal homomorphic encryption scheme developed in
the same paper. Based on these rate optimal protocols, we propose a rate-optimal
fingerprinted data transfer protocol (tailored specifically for bias-based codes including
Tardos codes).
More precisely, in a fingerprinted data transfer protocol, the sender has as private
input two pairs of messages and biases. The sender and the receiver simulate two private
biased coin tosses using SCOT and the receiver obtains one message from each pair
(which one of the two it receives, is determined by the outcome of the biased coin flip).
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The actual message transmission is based on the rate optimal OT protocol. Furthermore
the sender selects randomly one of the two SCOT-s and revokes its receiver security,
i.e., the sender will learn which one of the two versions the receiver has obtained in this
SCOT. This partial revocation of receiver-security will enable the sender to correlate
“pirate” files that are generated by coalitions of malicious users. Our final scheme inherits
the communication efficiency of the underlying SCOT and OT protocols and thus it is
communication-optimal: the rate of each data transfer is asymptotically 1.
A complete security analysis in the (extended) Pfitzmann-Schunter model:
we analyze the security of our construction in an extended version of the Pfitzmann-
Schunder model [112]. The extension we present is two-fold: first we extend the model to
capture the setting of multiple accusations. In the original modeling only a single colluder
was required to be accused. In the extended model we allow a set of users to be accused.
This accommodates accusation algorithms that are based on Tardos fingerprinting [127]
that have this capability. Group accusation in asymmetric schemes needs special care
from a security point of view: it makes the system prone to accusation withdrawal, the
setting where the server will have to withdraw an accusation because the judge is unable
to verify it. We demonstrate (through actual implementation experiments, see Fig 11)
that the straightforward application of Tardos identification (as may naively be inferred
from the description of [34]) does not preclude accusation withdrawal. We subsequently
show how to modify the accusation algorithm between judge and server so that no
accusation withdrawal can take place. Our second model extension concerns the explicit
treatment of the abort operation within the security model: all known asymmetric
fingerprinting schemes rely on two-party coin tossing. Given that fair coin tossing is
known to be unattainable [39] it follows that it may be possible for an adversarial set
of users to exploit this weakness and utilize a transmission abort strategy with the
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purpose of evading detection. We demonstrate that an explicit treatment of this in
the security model is essential as if one enables users to restart after an abort, it is
possible to completely break server security! (this fact went entirely unnoticed before).
By properly controlling aborts and restarts we show how security can be maintained.
5.2 Rate-Optimal OT and SCOT Protocols
We recall that an oblivious transfer (OT) protocol and a strong conditional oblivious
transfer (SCOT, [14]) protocol for predicate Q (s.t. Q(x, y) ∈ {0, 1}) implement securely
the following functionalities respectively (W.l.o.g., assume |m0| = |m1|):
fOT(b, (m0,m1)) = (mb,⊥), fQ−SCOT(x, (y,m0,m1)) = (mQ(x,y),⊥) .
Here, we will use the rate optimal OT and SCOT protocols derived in [82] from
our recently developed rate optimal large-output branching program homomorphic
encryption (LHE) scheme. Our LHE scheme enables the receiver to compute on
ciphertexts the value f(x, y), where x is his input, y is sender input, and f is an
arbitrary function that can be evaluated by a polynomial-size (integer-valued) branching
program. In the LHE scheme of [82], the receiver encrypts (by using a variant of
the Damgård-Jurik cryptosystem [45]) his input x, and sends the ciphertext Enc(x)
to the sender. The sender evaluates privately large-output branching programs like
in [76, 94], but does it in a communication-preserving manner. Let the output of
the evaluation be denoted as Eval(P,Enc(x)), where P is a branching program that
evaluates f(·, y) on input x. The sender returns a single “ciphertext” to the receiver,
who then (multiple-)decrypts it as in [76, 94]. The rate of the LHE scheme is defined as
r = (|x|+ |P (x)|)/(|Encr(x)|+ |Encr(P (x))|). Assuming |f(x, y)| is large, [82] showed
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by using an intricate analysis how to achieve a rate 1− o(1). We refer to [82] for more
information.
Rate-optimal OT. As shown in [82], one can define a rate-optimal (2, 1)-oblivious
transfer protocol as follows. Let the server have a database (m0,m1) and assume
that P [x, (m0,m1)] = mx for x ∈ {0, 1}. Thus, the size of P is 1. Since rate-
optimal (2, 1)-OT has many applications, we will call it oblivious download (OD).
Let ODs[Encr(x), (m0,m1)] denote the server side computation in this protocol, given
client ciphertext Encr(x) and server input (m0,m1).
Rate-optimal SCOT. Also, as shown in [82], one can use the LHE of to construct
an efficient SCOT protocol for the functionality fQ−SCOT(x, (y,m0,m1)), where Q has
a polynomial-size branching program (i.e., Q ∈ L/poly), as follows. Let P ′ be an
efficient branching program that evaluates the predicate Q(x, y). Let P be a large-value
branching program, obtained from P ′ by just replacing the leaf value 0 with m0 and
1 with m1. The LHE scheme (and thus also the resulting SCOT protocol) will have
computation, linear in the size of P ′, and communication (1 + o(1))(|x| + |m0|) and
thus rate 1− o(1). In the rest of the paper we will need the next instantiation of a new
rate-optimal SCOT protocol.
Rate-optimal SCOT for the LEQ predicate. Denote LEQ(x, y) := [x ≤ y]. It
is easy to see that LEQ can be evaluated by a branching program of size and length
` := max(|x|, |y|). Thus, one can implement fLEQ−SCOT securely in time Θ(`) and rate
1−o(1). Let us denote server computation in this protocol as LEQs[Encr(x), (y,m0,m1)].
Remark. The security of the OD,SCOT protocols are simple corollaries of the security
proofs from [76,82]. Also, one can also use an arbitrary efficient — with communication
o(|mi|) — millionaire’s protocol, like the one in [14] to find out b = [x < y], and then use
the oblivious download protocol to implement an optimal-rate SCOT protocol for the
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LEQ predicate. However, we think that the use of optimal-rate LHE from [82] (instead
of composing a millionaire’s protocol and an OD protocol) is more elegant.
5.3 Fingerprinted Data Transfer for Bias-Based Codes
In this section, we will introduce the main building block of our Tardos-based
asymmetric fingerprinting scheme, which we call fingerprinted data transfer.
As our fingerprinting scheme relies on the properties of fingerprinting codes (we
only focus on binary codes here), let us first recall the basics about fingerprinting codes.
A binary fingerprinting code [84] is a pair of algorithms (Gen,Trace), where Gen is a
probabilistic algorithm taking a number N , an optional number (upper-bound on the
detected coalition size) t ∈ [N ] = {1, . . . , N} and security parameter  as input and
outputs N bit-strings C = {C1, . . . , CN} (called codewords), where Ci = ci1 . . . cin for
i ∈ [N ] and a tracing key tk. Trace is a deterministic algorithm inputting the tracing
key tk and a “pirate” codeword C∗, and outputting a subset Uacc ⊆ [N ] of accused users.
A code is called bias-based [3] if each codeword Cj = c
j
1 . . . c
j
n is sampled according to a
vector of biases 〈p1, . . . , pn〉, where ∀j ∈ [N ]∀i ∈ [n],Pr[cji = 1] = pi, and pi ∈ [0, 1].
A fingerprinting code is called t−collusion resistant (fully collusion resistant if
t = N) if for any adversary A who corrupts up to t users (whose indices form a set
Ucor ⊂ {1, · · · , N}), and outputs a pirate codeword C∗ = c∗1 . . . c∗n (which satisfies
the marking assumption, i.e., for each i ∈ [n], c∗i = cji for some j ∈ Ucor), Pr[Uacc =
∅ or Uacc 6⊆ Ucor : Uacc ← Trace(tk, C∗)] ≤  (i.e., the probability that no users are
accused or an innocent user is accused is bounded by ε).
We also recall the Tardos code [127] Fnt here, it has length n = 100t2k, with
k = log 1 . The Gen algorithm generates a codeword as follows. For each segment index
j ∈ [n], it chooses a bias pj ∈ [0, 1] according to a distribution µ (see [127] for the
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definition of µ). Each bias satisfies 1300t ≤ pj ≤ 1− 1300t , where t is the collusion size. For
each codeword C = c1 . . . cn outputted by Gen, Pr[cj = 1] = pj , and Pr[cj = 0] = 1−pj
for all j ∈ [n]. Regarding security, there is a Trace algorithm such that, for any coalition
of size at most t, with probability at least 1− t/4 accuses a member of the coalition,
while any non-member is accused with probability at most .
5.3.1 Definitions of fingerprinted data transfer
Now we define our main building block of fingerprinted data transfer (FDT for
short). Recall that each user should receive a fingerprinted copy of the file according
to his codeword. In the case of asymmetric fingerprinting, the segments of the file will
be transferred in an oblivious fashion so that the server should be aware of only half of
the user fingerprinting code. To be more specific, all segments are transmitted using
oblivious transfer to enable the user to receive one of the versions, and for each pair
of segments (2i − 1, 2i), where i ∈ [n], the server will know one of the segments, the
version that the user receives.
Intuitively, if we double the length of the fingerprinting code (dividing the file into
2n segments), each user is essentially assigned two codewords, one is known to the server,
thus the Trace algorithm can be executed to identify malicious users; the other one is
unknown to the server, and will be revealed to the judge only when dispute happens. A
user will be accused only when both codewords are considered contributing to a pirate
file. In this way, a malicious SP S frames an honest user unless innocent users may be
accused in the fingerprinting code.
We also need to be careful that if malicious users know which half of the codeword
is known to the server, they may collude in a way that every codeword in the collusion
only contribute to half of the file thus no one will be accused on both fingerprints. Thus
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for the segments (2i− 1, 2i) for i ∈ [n], the index that the segment version is revealed to
the server is also oblivious to the user.
The asymmetric fingerprinting scheme will essentially be running FDT (defined
below) in parallel for all pairs of the segments (2i− 1, 2i), thus it is enough for us to
illustrate the idea by considering only the sub-protocol for one pair of segments. As
Tardos code is binary, there are only two versions for each segment. Consider two parties,
a sender S and a receiver R. The sender has two pairs of messages, two rational valued
“biases” in [0, 1] and one bit c as inputs. The receiver has no input. After the execution
of the FDT protocol, R will sample one message from each of the two pairs following
the binary probability distribution defined by the two biases and S will learn the output
of the receiver for the c-th pair. This describes the ideal operation of the primitive for
the case of one pair of segments. It is straightforward to extend to an arbitrary number
of pairs. The following is the formal definition of the fingerprinted data transfer for
bias-based codes including our main target Tardos code [127].
Definition 15. A fingerprinted data transfer functionality Π involves two parties, a







1), and a bit c ∈ {0, 1}; at the end of the protocol, R outputs {mbii }
for i, bi ∈ {0, 1} such that Pr[bi = 1] = pi; while S outputs bc. We can express this
(probabilistic) functionality as:
Π[⊥, ((p0, p1), (m00,m10,m01,m11), c)] = [(mb00 ,mb11 ), bc],where Pr[bi = 1] = pi
Somewhat similar functionalities have been used for completely different applications,
see, e.g. [2, 48]. The FDT protocol of Sect. 5.3.2 might be modified so as to be used in
these applications; we omit further discussions.
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Following the standard definitions in secure computation [59], we first define security
in the case that both sender and receiver are semi-honest (i.e., they follow the protocol,
but try to learn more by performing additional local computation). Recall that the
view of a party is composed of random variables of his inputs, coins and the messages
received from the other party.
Definition 16. If a protocol satisfies the following properties, we say that it securely
implements fingerprinted data transfer.
Correctness: The receiver will obtain (mb00 ,m
b1
1 ), satisfying that Pr[bi = 1] = pi for
i = 0, 1. The sender will receive bc with probability 1.
Receiver Security: The joint distribution of sender’s view and the outputs in a real the
protocol can be simulated by the inputs and outputs of the sender alone together with the
ideal outputs of the functionality. That is, ∀PPT semi-honest sender S, ∃ PPT S ′, s.t.,
S ′([(p0, p1), (m00,m10,m01,m11), c], bc) ◦ (mb00 ,mb11 , bc) is computationally indistinguishable
from V IEWS ◦OUTPUT .
Sender Security: The joint distribution of receiver’s view and the outputs in a real protocol
can be simulated by the inputs and outputs of the receiver alone, together with the ideal
outputs. That is, ∀PPT semi-honest receiver R, ∃ PPT R′, s.t., V IEWR ◦OUTPUT
is computationally indistinguishable from R′(mb00 ,mb11 ) ◦ (mb00 ,mb11 , bc).
Note that the bits of the codeword {bi} are publicly recoverable from {mbii }.
5.3.2 A communication-optimal fingerprinted data transfer protocol
On the receiver R side, for each pair of messages, say pair 0, FDT will enable an
oblivious sampling of one message from (m00,m10) according to the bias p0, i.e., R receives
m10 with probability p0. To enable efficient oblivious sampling, suppose p0 ≈ t0/T for
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some t0, where T = 2` and ` is the precision level (this provides an exponentially good
approximation). To run a coin tossing protocol to generate a random coin u, R and
the SP S can utilize a SCOT protocol (e.g., [14]) to transmit the data in a way that the
user receives m10 iff u ≤ t0. Doing this will allow the receiver to get m10 with probability
close to p0 = t0/T . Furthermore, they can run such procedure twice for the two pairs,
and then run a (2, 1)-OT protocol to reveal one of the bit to the SP.
Unfortunately, directly applying the SCOT protocol from, e.g, [14] will result in a
communication rate as low as 1/`, as the sender has to send ` ciphertexts with similar size
to m0i . Moreover, a malicious user may abort after receiving the file without revealing
half of his bits. To deal with these concerns, our protocol will be divided into two phases,
the first (the handshake phase) samples only the codewords according to the biases that
are specified by the sender; the second (the content-transfer phase) transfers the actual
content according to the codewords that have been drawn. In our implementation, we
will only use the SCOT protocol to sample the distribution (transfer only short messages)
and then employ a rate-optimal OT protocol (we call oblivious download, OD for short)to
execute the content-transfer after the OT protocol is run in which the SP is the receiver
and the SP sees one of the bits. We assume that during the hand-shake phase, the
sender and receiver exchange their public keys with the corresponding certificates.
Now we proceed to construct the new fingerprinted data transfer protocol. Suppose
the sender has p0 = t0T , p1 =
t1
T ; these determine two distributions over {0, 1}. The
sender also has two pairs of messages as inputs (m00,m10), (m01,m11), and prepares another
two pairs of (h00, h10), (h01, h11), where hbi = H(m
b
i)|i|b for i, b ∈ {0, 1}. We assume that H
is a collision resistant hash function shared by the sender and the receiver, and Com
is a secure (binding and hiding) commitment scheme. We choose Encr and Encs to be
good rate additive homomorphic encryption schemes (e.g. using the Damgard-Jurik [45]
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encryption to encrypt the message bit by bit as in [82]). Here, R knows the secret key of
Encr and S knows the secret key of Encs. Recall that LEQs[Encr(x), (y,m0,m1)] denotes
the sender computation in a concrete SCOT protocol that implements fLEQ−SCOT, and
ODs[Encr(x), (m0,m1)] denote the computation of the server in this protocol, given
client ciphertext Encr(x) and server input (m0,m1) (defined in Section 5.2). The full
protocol of FDT is presented in Fig 10.
We can estimate 1/α of our FDT protocol as follows:












where m is the message size and r is the rate as defined in Sect. 5.2. We can group
several terms into o(|mb00 |) as all those are encryptions (or commitments) of fixed size
short messages. Thus, when the LHE scheme is rate optimal as [82], our FDT protocol
(and further our asymmetric fingerprinting scheme, see next section) is also rate optimal.
Security analysis. We briefly explain the properties of our protocol in the semi-
honest model. Correctness follows from the coin tossing and the property of the
LHE [82]. For instance, µ0 = Encr(h10), C0 = Encr(m10), if r0 ⊕ s0 ≤ t0, in this case,
Pr[b0 = 1] = t0/T = p0. For security, as we are working in the semi-honest model for
now, the sender and receiver views can be simulated easily to preserve the consistency
with the output.
Lemma 32. Our protocol shown in Fig. 10 securely implements the fingerprinted data
transfer functionality. Specifically, it is correct; and it satisfies receiver security if
the underlying encryption Encr is IND-CPA secure; it satisfies sender security if the
underlying commitment scheme Com(·) is computationally hiding, and the encryption
Encs is IND-CPA secure.
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Receiver R Sender S
S selects r0, r1 ←r ZT , and
Com(r0),Com(r1)←−−−−−−−−−−−−− computes commitments Com(r0),Com(r1)
s0, s1 ←r ZT Encr(s0),Encr(s1)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
S computes c0 = Encr(r0 ⊕ s0)
S computes c1 = Encr(r1 ⊕ s1)
S computes µ0 = LEQs[c0, (t0, h10, h00)]
µ0,µ1,Encs(c)←−−−−−−−−−−−−− S computes µ1 = LEQs[c1, (t1, h11, h01)]
R retrieves hb00 , hb11
and computes uc =




S decrypts uc and checks the validity
Encr(b0) = LEQs[c0, (t0, 1, 0)]
Encr(b1) = LEQs[(c1, (t1, 1, 0)]
C0 = ODs[Encr(b0), (m00,m
1
0)]
C0,C1←−−−−−−−−−−−− C1 = ODs[Encr(b1), (m01,m11)]
R checks the validity,
outputs: mb00 ,m
b1
1 S outputs bc (as inferred by hbcc )
Figure 10: Fingerprinted Data Transfer. {(m0b ,m1b), pb = tbT )}b=0,1, c are inputs of S
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Proof. Correctness: it is easy to see. First, the exchange of random values enables both
parties to obtain uniform values {ri + si}i∈{0,1}; then, the SCOT protocol will enable the
receiver to receive h1i (thus bi = 1) with probability pi as Pr[ri + si ≤ ti] = ti/T = pi,
the rest simply follows from the correctness of the OD protocol.
Receiver Security: This property shows that the sender has no advantage predict-
ing b1−c given the corresponding value p1−c. In more detail, V IEWS ◦ OUTPUT is
composed of [(r0, r1, r¯), (p0, p1,m00,m10,m01,m11, c), (E(s0), E(s1), uc)] ◦ [(mb00 ,mb11 ), bc],









1), c are inputs, and E(s0), E(s1), uc are received messages, and
OUTPUT are (mb00 ,m
b1
1 ), and a bit bc which are consistent with the coin tossing and
the values of the biases.
The simulation strategy is as follows: the simulator S ′ first samples r0, r1, r¯ uniformly,
and then he samples b1−c according to the bias p1−c, then with input bc, S ′ chooses
s0, s1 according to the value of b0, b1, i.e., si + ri ≤ ti if bi = 1. And uc is generated
by encrypting hbcc which can be derived from mbcc . Ideal output as simply two samples
of messages mb00 ,m
b1
1 satisfying Pr[bi = 1] = pi, and bc. It is easy to see that the
simulated view preserves the correlation with outputs. And the simulated view is
different with the real view only at E(s1−bc). We can conclude that these two views
are computationally indistinguishable as the distinguisher only has public key of E,
otherwise the distinguisher can break the semantic security of E.
Sender Security: This property guarantees that the receiver learns nothing beyond what
he can learn from the messages he receives. The view of a receiver is composed of local
coins and received messages (s0, s1, s¯), (c(r0), c(r1), µ1, µ2, E1(c), E(mb00 ), E(m
b1
1 )), and
OUTPUT is the same as above. The simulation can be done similarly as follows, the




1 , the simulator R′ calculates the values of b0, b1, hb00 , hb11 , and then simulates
the transcript accordingly. Specifically, R′ commits to two values r0, r1 in a way that
consistent with b0, b1 without knowing the biases, if bi = 1, ri + si = 0, if bi = 1
ri + si = 2
`, doing these will preserve the consistency of ri + si ≤ ti if bi = 1 without
knowing the value of ti. R′ then generates ui using E(hbii ), and simulates E1(c) as E1(c′)
using a random bit c′; and finally, S ′ simulates C0, C1 using E(mb00 ), E(mb11 ).
We can see that the simulated view are consistent with the ideal output, the only
difference are at the committed value c(r0), c(r1) and E1(c). No efficient algorithm can
distinguish the two views, otherwise, it can break either the binding property of the
commitment scheme or break the semantic security of E1 which can be shown through
simple game transitions.
Work in the malicious model. Ultimately, we would like to design protocols to
defend against malicious adversaries who may arbitrarily deviate from the protocol.
The general method that in every step, both parties deploy zero-knowledge proofs to
show that they follow the protocol, could be inefficient. Note that our protocol is highly
structured, user misbehaviors can be easily detected by the SP with some routine checks
about the consistency in the transcripts. In the 2nd round in coin tossing phase, the
user could gain nothing by not following protocol, as simulation for malicious user is
not influenced by the choices of s0, s1. While in the 4th round, the SP checks the
validity of hbcc = H(mbcc )||c||bc, if uc is not calculated as in the protocol and passes the
checking, it means the malicious user finds a value equal to H(m1−bcc ). As the message
segment m1−bcc has sufficient entropy thus h1−bcc is also unpredictable, otherwise, the
user could easily find a collision by randomly sample messages from the distribution of
m1−bcc . To be more specific, suppose M is the space of m1−bcc and D is its distribution,
and H(M) = {H(m) : m ∈ M}, D will induce a distribution H on H(M). Suppose
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the sender can predict h(m1−bcc ) with probability δ, then the maximum probability of
H is no less than δ. Let us use h0 to denote the most probable value in H(M). The
adversary A simply sample mi randomly according to D, and computes the hash value.
Following the Chernoff bound, using O( 1
δ2
) many samples, A will almost certainly reach
h0 twice. At the same time, the probability that there are two same messages appear
in the sampled messages is exponentially small, as the most probable message from D
appears with negligible probability. Based on these two facts, A found a collision.
Regarding malicious SP, the user can also do some simple checks of the consistency
of the hash values. Note that there is a trusted judge that makes the final decision about
the set of accused users. We will show in next section (as the judge is not involved with
the FDT protocol) how we can take advantage of this third-party to “force” the SP to
follow the protocol, by adding some simple and efficient “proofs of behavior”. We require
the SP signs on each round of messages she sends together with the user identity, and
the user also signs on each round of messages he sends. We also let user store part of the
transcripts and reveal them to the judge in case of dispute. Through a careful analysis
of Tardos code property together with these simple mechanisms, we can argue security
of our asymmetric fingerprinting scheme in the malicious model.
5.4 An Optimal Asymmetric Fingerprinting Scheme Based on Tardos Code
Pfitzmann and Schunter [112] define an asymmetric fingerprinting scheme to be
a collection of four protocols 〈key_gen, fing, identify, dispute〉. The algorithm key_gen
can be used by a user to produce a public and a secret-key. The protocol fing is a
two-party protocol between a user and an SP that will result in the user obtaining the
fingerprinted copy of the file and the SP receiving some state of the user codeword. The
algorithm identify is an algorithm that, given a pirate copy and the state of the SP,
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outputs a non-empty set of public keys (corresponding to the accused user identities).
Finally the algorithm dispute is a 3-party protocol between the judge (or arbiter as it is
called in [112]), the user and the SP that either accepts the SP’s accusation or rejects it
(depending on the evidence presented by the involved parties). For brevity we refer to
[112] for the full syntax of the scheme. Regarding the security model, an asymmetric
fingerprinting scheme should satisfy two security properties: (i) security for the SP, that
states that no malicious coalition of less than t users can escape the accusation of one
of its members from the identify algorithm as well as the validation of this accusation
by the dispute protocol, and (ii) security for the user, that states that an innocent user
cannot be implicated by a malicious SP (who can also corrupt other users) in being
responsible for a certain pirate copy. Formally definitions are presented below:
Definition 17. A fingerprinting scheme satisfies t-collusion resilient SP security, if no
ppt adversary A wins the following game with a non-negligible probability:
• A sends corruption queries for up to t different users with public keys S =
{pki1 , . . . , pkit}. A then receives t copies of fingerprinted file each file has n
segments, i.e., for i ∈ S, Fi = f1i || . . . ||fni , where n is the length of the codeword,
and all secret states of those users.
• A outputs a pirate copy F0 satisfying the marking lemma that for each segment f i0
of F0, there exists an index j ∈ S, such that f i0 = f ij .
SP runs the identify algorithm on F ∗, and returns a set of public keys PK. The judge, SP,
and A (or corresponding users) then run the dispute protocol and suppose PKaccused is the
set of public keys accepted for accusation. A wins if, PKaccused 6⊆ S or PKaccused = ∅.
Definition 18. A fingerprinting scheme satisfies c-collusion resilient SP security, if no
ppt adversary A wins the following game with a non-negligible probability:
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• A runs key_gen for multiple times and runs the fing protocol with the SP using
at most t different public keys S = {pki1 , . . . , pkit}. These t fing protocols are run
independently. A receives t copies of fingerprinted file each file has n segments,
i.e., for i ∈ S, Fi = f1i || . . . ||fni , where n is the length of the codeword.
• A outputs a pirate copy F0 satisfying the marking lemma that for each segment f i0
of F0, there exists an index j ∈ S, such that f i0 = f ij .
SP runs the identify algorithm on F ∗, and returns a set of public keys PK. The judge, SP,
and A (or corresponding users) then run the dispute protocol and suppose PKaccused is the
set of public keys accepted for accusation. A wins if, PKaccused 6⊆ S or PKaccused = ∅.
Definition 19. A fingerprinting scheme satisfies innocent user security, if for any
user U , any PPT adversary A wins the following game with a negligible (in security
parameter) probability:
• U runs key_gen and the fing protocol with A using public key pku.
• A arbitrarily corrupts or generate codewords for other users, and A outputs a
pirate file F0.
A wins if A submits pku to the judge as output of identify algorithm and pku is accepted
for accusation in the dispute protocol.
Definition 20. A ppt adversary A plays the same game with the SP as in Definition
18, the conditional that A wins the game is changed to PK 6= PKaccused or PK = ∅,
where PK is the set of public keys identified by the SP and PKaccused is the set of public
keys outputted after dispute. A fingerprinting scheme satisfies t-collusion resilient SP
security under group accusations, if for any PPT adversary A can win this game with a
negligible (in security parameter) probability.
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In addition to the above basic requirements, we put forth two additional properties
that will be of interest.
Communication efficiency. The communication rate of an asymmetric fingerprinting
scheme is measured as the ratio of the length of the file that is distributed to the users
over the total communication complexity of the fing protocol. In a communication
optimal asymmetric fingerprinting scheme it holds that the rate approaches 1 as the
length of the file becomes larger. All known schemes in the literature [34, 111–113] have
rate at most 0.5.
Security for the SP under group accusations. In [112] the algorithm identify is responsible
for producing a single colluder whose implication is guaranteed to be validated by the
dispute algorithm. In [34] this is extended to group accusation, i.e., the identify algorithm
produces a set of accused users as output (this is possible given that the underlying
fingerprinting code enables such group accusation). For SP security to be preserved
under group accusations however, it should be the case that for each accused user, its
implication to the construction of the pirate copy is validated by the dispute protocol.
In the other case, the SP will have to withdraw at least one accusation (something that
may lead to problems in a practical deployment). Therefore a protocol solution should
guarantee in the setting of group accusation no accusation withdrawal can occur with
non-negligible probability. We refer the formal definitions to the full version.
5.4.1 Our construction.
We next describe our construction which satisfies the original security requirements
of [112] as well as the two properties that we described above. Specifically it is the
first asymmetric fingerprinting scheme with both optimal communication complexity
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and code length. And one can easily adapt our construction to other asymmetric
fingerprinting scheme from any bias-based code.
Recall the definition of Tardos code as explained in section 5.3, the main task is the
fing protocol, which will be constructed from our fingerprinted data transfer protocol (see
Fig 10) with some extra checks to achieve security in the malicious model in which the
adversary may not follow the protocol. To describe the generation of the fingerprinted
copy of each user in more detail, let us abstract each variant of a segment mbi with a
value in {0, 1},where i ∈ [2n], b ∈ {0, 1} and 2n is the length of the fingerprint. Thus,
the fingerprinted file of each user is a 2n-bit string, where each bit signifies which variant
of the corresponding segment the user received. It will be generated so that n bits from
a set L ⊆ [2n] will be known to the SP, while the other n bits (from [2n] \ L) will only
be known by the user. The user, however, will not know if a given location belongs to L
or not. Each of the parts L and [2n] \ L is an instance of the Tardos code [127]. The
two parts are produced by generating two segments at a time, using the functionality
achieved by the protocol in Figure 10, i.e., for the i-th pair of segments (2i−1, 2i), where







2i), ci] as inputs. Based on the security properties of
this protocol, the user receives two variants of two different segments, while the SP does
not know one of them and the user is oblivious regarding which one the SP knows. Our
asymmetric fingerprinting scheme proceeds as follows:
Key generation. The key_gen for the user is simply the generation of two public-secret
key pairs (pk1, sk1), (pk2, sk2). The first is for a digital signature scheme (which we use
as black-box), and the second is for the additively homomorphic encryption Encr used
in the fingerprinted data transfer.
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The fing protocol. The user inputs his public and secret keys while the SP inputs the
SP public keys, and system parameters, e.g., the level of precision `. Furthermore, the
protocol is stateful from the point of view of the SP. The state of the SP contains the
definition of the Tardos code parameters (e.g., probabilities {pi}). Also, the SP has as
private inputs a set L = {c1, . . . , cn}, and a file that is divided in 2n segments for each
one of which there are two variations. The i-th segment, b-th variant is denoted by mbi .
The fing protocol proceeds as follows: the SP and the user first carry out a
handshake protocol to prepare the system parameters including the exchange of the
public keys of each other; then for each i-th pair of segments with indices (2i −







2i), ci] as inputs, and these n protocols are run in
parallel. Also in each round, if the SP sends out a message, she signs on the message
together with the user’s identity; if the user sends a message, he signs it as well. During
protocol execution each party verifies that the messages they receive are proper and if
they are not they will abort the protocol.
Furthermore some additional checks are in place to detect the malicious behavior
within fing as explained at the end of section 5.3.2. These are as follows: The user
checks after receiving the actual data segments (in the last round) whether they are
consistent with the hash values (see Remark in section 5.3.2) he received in the 3-rd
round. The SP, checks the validity of the hash value she received in the 4-th round.
Also, both parties will store some information for input to the dispute protocol. The
user keeps the commitments received from the first round and the hashed values and
the encrypted bits of {Encsci} for i ∈ L, received in the 4-th round; the SP keeps the
encrypted random coins of the user received in the 2nd round. Note that these checks
do not enforce semi-honest behavior - nevertheless we will show (see Theorem 34,36)
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they are sufficient for security against malicious parties in the presence of the judge
(which is assumed honest).
We see that our fing protocol essentially runs out FDT protocol in parallel with only
some extra signatures, thus it inherits the rate optimality from FDT.
The identify algorithm. This algorithm takes a pirate file M , and all users’ half
codeword X1, . . . , XN together with the location indices L1, . . . , LN and the vector of
biases 〈p1, . . . , p2n〉 as inputs. It first extracts a codeword Y = y1 . . . y2n ∈ {0, 1}2n
from M (as we assume each bit is publicly computable from the segment). For the
ease of presentation, we describe the algorithm for one user with stored codeword










1−pj , if xj = 0
as in [127]. The service provider calculates the score of the user over the locations in L;
S =
∑
j∈L yjUj , and if S > Z, where Z = 20tk, the SP reports this user to the judge.
This is repeated for every user and a list of accused users is compiled and reported to
the judge.
The dispute protocol. This is a protocol among the SP, the judge and a user. The
two parties first submit to the judge the protocol transcript they stored. In more detail,
the judge requires the user to submit SP’s commitments sent in the 1st round and the
hash values; also, the judge requires the SP to submit the biases and the encryptions
from the user in the 2nd round as well as openings of her commitments. The judge
first verifies the code parameters, then does the following checks, (1). the validity of
the segments, i.e., they should be one of the versions. (2). the validity of all signatures,
if any signature is invalid, accuse the party who submits it. (3). Otherwise, the judge
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checks whether the user codeword is generated properly, i.e., each bit of the codeword
is consistent with the coin-tosses – whether bi = [ri + si ≤ ti] where bi is the i-th bit,
ri, si, ti are as in the FDT (the notation [·] here denotes a predicate). To finish this
check, the judge requires the SP to open her commitments, and the user to reveal his
coins in the ciphertext {Encr(si)}and prove their validity. (4). Furthermore, the judge
requests from the user to submit the encrypted locations {Encs(ci)} and requests the
SP to decrypt it and prove a correct decryption, so that the judge calculates the set of
locations L. Any party failed to prove the correct decryption will be accused.
If all the checks pass, the judge will recover user’s fingerprint x′ from the bits {bi},
also he inspects the pirate content and extracts the fingerprint y′. Then he computes
the U ′ as in the identify algorithm for locations L′ = [2n]\L using x′, y′ as inputs.







j , and make decisions if S
′ > Z ′, where Z ′ = Z/2 = 10tk, he validates
the accusation; otherwise, the user is acquitted.
Note that we are using a lower threshold on the judge-side, to counter-balance
the probability that a user is accused over L, but not over [2n] \ L. In fact this is an
essential feature of our scheme to ensure security for the SP under group accusations.
We in fact show that if Z ′ = Z it can happen with high probability that the SP will
have to withdraw an accusation; in Fig 11, we explore this experimentally by having
a coalition of 40 users where the pirate strategy is as follows: the pirate content is
formed via a majority strategy by the segments available to the coalition of size t. For
each segment with probability p (a parameter of the strategy) the pirate segment is
determined with probability p to be the majority of the segments of all t users or with
probability 1−p the segment of the first user. We variate the parameter p of the strategy
and we demonstrate from experimental data that for suitable choice of p the number
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Figure 11: The vertical axis represents the number of accusation withdrawals (i.e., for
how many users the service provider has to abandon its accusation); the total number
of colluding users is 40. The horizontal access is the parameter of the colluding strategy
p; for a suitably choice of p the accusation withdrawals reach 25% of colluders.
of accusation withdrawals can be as high as as a quarter of the coalition. One would
expect that in practice, such high level of accusation withdrawal would impact seriously
the credibility of the SP. In our construction, by appropriately differentiating the tracing
algorithm between the judge and the SP we circumvent this problem entirely. It should
be noted that this issue was not addressed in [34] where the Tardos tracing algorithm
was also used for determining the implication of users.
Remark: There are two phases when the judge requests one of the two parties to prove
a valid decryption of a bit. As we are using a variant of DJ encryption [45], the prover
can simply reveal the message together with the random coins used in encryption as it
decodes uniquely in this form. Specifically, if a message m is encrypted with random
coin r, it results in a ciphertext c = (n + 1)mrns mod ns+1, the prover can decrypts
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c to recover m and then obtains r = dn−s mod φ(n) mod n, where d = rns mod n is
computed from c · (n+ 1)−m mod (ns+1).
5.4.2 Security analysis.
We first give here explain the intuitions about the security analysis.
Security for the innocent user. We will show that no innocent user will be framed.
In the case of a semi-honest SP, she follows the fingerprinted data transfer protocol and
the accusation procedure, but will try to make a pirate copy to frame some innocent user.
As the FDT protocol satisfies the simulation based definition, from the composition
lemma [29], A semi-honest SP will have the similar behavior interacting with only an
oracle which returns her half of the codeword. In this case, the SP wins only when she
is able to break the innocent user security of Tardos code as shown in Theorem 2.1 in
[127] that an innocent user will be framed with a probability no bigger than  regardless
of what biases are used and what is the pirate copy.
Lemma 33. An innocent user will be accused with negligible probability by a semi-honest
service provider assuming that the encryption Encr used is IND-CPA secure.
Now we consider a malicious SP who may arbitrarily deviate from the protocol.
With the simple checks, there is only one class of deviations left (which is not yet clear
whether always detectable): the malicious SP submits different biases to the judge with
those used during fing; This includes many subtle attacks, e.g., in one instance of FDT,







1 ) (same for the hash values). Doing this the malicious SP
will know the complete codeword of the user. Similarly, the SP could swap the messages
in each pair, i.e., transmit version 1− bi if the code is bi. Both of these behavior can
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be seen as special case of the above deviation. In the first case, the user codeword is
essentially generated using a vector of probabilities 〈p1, . . . , p2n〉, where each pi ∈ {0, 1},
while the latter case is that each pi = 1 − p′i where p′i is the reported bias. As the
judge will check the constancy of the codeword with the coin tossing, the more indices
the SP reports different biases, the hight the probability she got caught. Through
a careful analysis, we manage to show that the probability of accusing an innocent
user and the probability of reporting different biases without being detected can never
be non-negligible simultaneously, which further implies that either the malicious SP
deviates without hurting the innocent user security, or the deviation will be almost
always detected by the judge.
Theorem 34. A malicious SP can frame an innocent user without being detected by the
judge with negligible probability if the underlying encryption Encr is IND-CPA secure,
the commitment scheme is computationally binding, the digital signature scheme we use
as black-box is existentially unforgeable, and the hash function is collision resistant.
Proof. First, the only way a malicious SP can deviate the FDT protocol without being
detected is via reporting a bias vector to the judge different with the one used in the
fing protocol. This includes the case that the malicious SP always use the same hbii ,m
bi
i
for both bi = 0, 1 which is equivalent to use pi = 1 or 0, and reports to an arbitrary p′i
without being detected by the judge. We call this event F1 and denote Pr[F1] = η1.
With the checks in each round, the deviations could be (1). The malicious SP does
not chooses a uniform r for the commitments. However in this case, as the user chooses
random s, the coin tossing still returns a random value. Changing r does not influence
the simulation of the sender view. (2). She submits different ciphertext for the 2nd
and 4th round trying to frame the user, however, this implies a forgery of the signature
scheme. (3). The SP uses different hash values and segments values to transmit. She
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could only use the other values in the input, otherwise, it will be detected by the user
and the judge. (4). The SP uses different segments to transmit, however, this can be
easily identified by the hash function property. The first half of case (3) is belong to the
deviation above which we analyze below.
Now, we examine the relation of η1 and the error probability  of accusing an innocent
user ( is given by the Tardos’ code). We show that the malicious SP can not make
both η1 and  non-negligible. Fix a pirate codeword y¯ and suppose the codeword x¯ of
an innocent user is generated with biases p1, . . . , p2n (but we focus on the L′ = [2n] \ L
coordinates here). Notice that the SP may only benefit by reporting a bias p′ < p
at certain locations j ∈ L′ such that yj = 1. Suppose the SP deviates from the true
vector by reporting, for each j ∈ L′, p′j = pj − δj . We assume that the judge knows
the parameters n, k, t of the code, and thus p′ is forced to satisfy pj − δj ≥ 1/(300t),
otherwise the judge will accuse the sender. Observe here that each δj is non-negative,
as reporting a p′j > pj , would decrease the score of the user. The probability the judge
does not realize the deviation is η1 =
∏
j∈L′(1− δj). This holds because the judge also
checks the coin tossing transcripts, the malicious SP can cheat only when she breaks
the binding property of the commitment scheme. When the judge has the coin tossing
transcript of the i-th commitment, he is able to detect the misbehavior of the SP with
probability 1− (pj − p′j).
Further, we will show that an innocent user accused by the SP will be convicted by
the judge with probability at most 1/4/η2/
√
t
1 , where t is the size of the coalition the









1−pj+δj , if xj = 0.
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Let also S′ denote the score of the innocent user under the reported biases, that is
S′ =
∑
j∈L′ yjUij . Our first task is to upper bound the expectation of the exponential
eαU
′
j , for an arbitrary j ∈ L′. We drop the subscript j in p, δ, U ′ for convenience. As in
the proof of Theorem 2.1 in [127], we’ll employ the inequality ex ≤ 1 + x+ x2, valid for
x ≤ 1. Observe that U ′ ≤ √300t and choosing α ≤ 1/√300t will suffice. Thus,
E[eαU
′
] ≤ 1 + αE[U ′] + α2E[U ′2].
We now upper-bound E[U ′] and E[U ′2] in terms of δ.
E[U ′] = p
√
1−p+δ























) ≤ √600t · δ
and similarly
E[U ′2] = p1−p+δp−δ + (1− p) p−δ1−p+δ
= (p− δ)1−p+δp−δ + (1− p+ δ) p−δ1−p+δ + δ 1−p+δp−δ − δ p−δ1−p+δ
= 1 + δ
(1−p+δ
p−δ − p−δ1−p+δ
) ≤ 1 + 300t · δ.
We now proceed by providing an upper bound for the expectation of the exponential
eαU
′ , using α = 1/(20t), and the inequality 1 + x ≤ ex, valid for all real x.
E[eαU
′
] ≤ 1 + αE[U ′] + α2E[U ′2] ≤ 1 + α2 + (α√600t+ α2300t) · δ















































where for the last inequality we assumed, without loss of generality, that δj = 0 when
yj = 0. Finally, by the Markov inequality,
Pr[S′ > Z/2] = Pr[eαS
′

















To summarize, the probability an innocent user accused by a malicious SP is convicted
by judge, is non-negligible unless η1 is negligible; In this case, the SP is semi-honest.
Security for the SP under group accusations. The analysis for the effectiveness of
the accusation procedure will also proceed in two steps. We first deal with semi-honest
users who will follow the fing protocol and the accusation procedure, but they will try
to make a pirate copy and avoid being accused. From the half fingerprint known to the
SP, the SP can always identify colluders. As the FDT satisfies the simulation based
security, the behavior of the adversary is essentially the same as the one interacting with
only an oracle returning the codewords of corrupted users, while no information about
which half of the codewords are known to the SP is leaked. Further we can show that
by relaxing the threshold on the judge side, whoever accused by the SP using the half
fingerprint will also be accused by the judge using another half fingerprint.
Lemma 35. Suppose Ucor, with |Ucor| ≤ t, is a coalition of users. If all users are
semi-honest during the fing protocol execution. The probability that no user is accused or
an accused user is acquitted by the judge is 1/16 +t/4 +0, where  is the parameter from
the Tardos code, 0 is negligible (to the security parameter), if the underlying commitment
scheme Com(·) is computationally hiding, and the encryption Encs is IND-CPA secure.
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Proof. In the semi-honest model, as we show in the previous section, what the users can
do is essentially the same as in the ideal model where they just receive the fingerprinted
copies according to the biases from an oracle. In this case, the codeword of the user
is a mix of two codewords, the one revealed to the SP while the other is hidden. In
particular, for each pair of locations (2j − 1, 2j), for j ∈ [n], the SP knows the codeword
of each user at exactly on of these locations. Following the analysis of [127], in the
ideal model, the accusation algorithm run by the SP (on the locations known to him)
will return at least one of the users participating in the coalition that produced the
pirate copy. Next, we will show that the user accused by the SP will also be accused by
the with an overwhelming probability. In particular, if  is the error parameter of the
instantiation of Tardos’ code, we show that an accused pirate by the sender is acquitted
by the judge with probability at most 1/16.
Let Y denote a pirate codeword generated by an arbitrary strategy. Define a
sequence of random variables D = (D1, . . . , Dm), where, for j ∈ [n], Dj is a binary
random variable taking the value 1 when 2j ∈ S (recall that S ⊆ [2n] is the set of
location known to the SP) and 2j − 1 /∈ S and the value −1 when it is the other way
around. If X denotes the codeword of a user u, then, for a location j ∈ [2n] with bias










1−pj , if Xj = 0.
For each j ∈ [n], let ∆j = Y2jU2j − Y2j−1U2j−1, and define ∆ =
∑
j∈[m] ∆jDj , so that
∆ is the difference between the score at the sender-side minus the score at the user-side.
Since the judge will accuse a user only if his score is at least Z/2 (where Z is the
threshold used by the Tardos code, it suffices to show that Pr[∆ > Z/2] ≤ 1/16.
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(1 + αE[∆j ]E[Dj ] + α
2E[∆2j ]) =
∏




where we used the independence of ∆j and Dj , and that E[Dj ] = 0, for all j ∈ [n].
Furthermore,
E[∆2j ] ≤ E[U22j−1] + E[U22j ] + 2E[|U2j−1||U2j |].
For any j ∈ [2n] we compute E[|Uj |] = 2
√
pj(1− pj) ≤ 1. Since U2j−1 and U2j are
independent for all j ∈ [n], E[|U2j−1||U2j |] = E[|U2j−1|]E[|U2j |] ≤ 1. Putting everything
together we obtain E[eα∆] ≤ e4nα2 . Recall that n = 100t2k and Z = 20tk. By the
Markov inequality,
Pr[∆ > Z/2] = Pr[eα∆ > eαZ/2] ≤ E[e
α∆]
eαZ/2
≤ e4nα2−αZ/2 = e−k/16 ≤ 1/16.
The case that malicious users can arbitrarily deviate from the protocol are easier to
analyze than Theorem 34 due to the simple checks. It is easy to see that in each round,
the user is forced to be behave honestly, otherwise the deviation will be detected with
overwhelming probability.
Theorem 36. Suppose Ucor, with |Ucor| ≤ t, is a coalition of users. Assuming Encs is
IND-CPA secure, the commitment scheme Com(·) is computationally hiding and the
signature scheme used is existentially unforgeable, and the hash function is collision
resistent. Then the probability that no user is accused or an accused user is acquitted by
the judge is 1/16 + t/4 + 0, where  is the error probability from the Tardos code, 0 is
negligible (to the security parameter).
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Proof. We will bound the probability ρ that a malicious user deviates the protocol but
passes the checks, and we denote this probability as ρi when it happens in the i-th step.
In the 1st step, 3rd step, and 5th step, the malicious user needs to forge a signature
of the SP if he wants to replace the commitments, hash values and encrypted bits, or the
messages to frame the SP, this can happen with only a negligible probability otherwise
we can directly break the underlying signature scheme used by the SP with this forgery.
In the 2nd step, the malicious user can not open to different numbers as his coin
tosses, due to the soundness of the proofs.
In the 4-th step, the malicious user deviates the protocol without being noticed by
the SP, if she transmits h1−bcc . However, she succeeds with only a negligible probability as
m1−bcc has sufficient min-entropy, h(m1−bcc ) should be also unpredictable (as elaborated
at the end of Section 5.3.2). It follows that ρ ≤∑i ρi, which is negligible.
5.5 Security Implications of Protocol Restarts
In the following, we consider the original Tardos code with length m = 100t2k and
threshold Z = 20tk, where c is the number of colluders and k = log 1 the security
parameter. For simplicity, we take t equal to the number of users n.
If the colluders are allowed restarts, they can act as follows. They do (µ− 1) restarts
each to receive a total of µmn bits. For the pirate codeword, they output a zero whenever
they can. Formally, for any j ∈ [m], let x be the number of ones the pirates have received
collectively at location j. They set yj , the bit of the pirate copy at j, as follows.
yj =

1 if x = µn;
0 otherwise.
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We are going to show that with this simple strategy, each pirate escapes with high
probability. To that end, let p denote the bias-vector, X denote the codeword of an










1−pj , ifXj = 0.
The score of the pirate can be expressed as S =
∑
j∈[m] YjUj . Our task is to upper-bound
Pr[S > Z]. We’ll use ex ≤ 1 + x + x2, valid for x ≤ 1. Since |Uj | <
√
300n, choosing
α < 110n we have




E[eαYjUj ] ≤∏E[1 + αYjUj + α2Y 2j U2j ]
≤∏(1 + αE[YjUj ] + α2E[U2j ]) = ∏(1 + αE[YjUj ] + α2).
For any j ∈ [m] we have
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Putting things together, and using 1+x ≤ ex, we obtain E[eαS ] ≤∏(1+α/(3µn)+α2) ≤
eα
2m+αm/(3µn). An application of Markov’s inequality now gives that:




For m = 100n2k, Z = 20nk, k = log(1/), α = 110n(1− 53µ), µ > 1,





Thus, even allowing a single restart per user, is sufficient for the pirates to escape
with high probability. Another way to view this, is that an instantiation of Tardos code
191
that can handle a coalition of size t, is not secure against a coalition of size 2t. The
simple way around this, is to instantiate the code so as to handle coalition size µt, and
allow each user at most µ− 1 restarts.
5.6 Conclusion and Open Problems
In this chapter, we constructed the first communication optimal asymmetric finger-
printing scheme, (i.e., the total number of bits transmitted in the protocol is almost the
same as the length of the files), based on Tardos code. This is an appealing feature,
especially for fingerprinting schemes in which large data (like movies) are transmitted.
Besides rate optimality, we also considered two properties: security against accusation
withdrawal and security under adversarial aborts, which are overlooked in previous
asymmetric fingerprinting schemes.
Since we are the first to study communication rate in this setting, it would be
interesting to examine other applications that requires a private preserving transmission
of a large size data. In general, it would be an interesting theoretic problem to consider
rate optimal secure protocols.
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Chapter 6
Making any Identity Based Encryption Accountable,
Efficiently
6.1 Introduction
Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) was introduced by Shamir [123], to remove the
need for maintaining a certificate based public-key infrastructure (PKI). Long time
after the concept was proposed, Boneh and Franklin constructed the first practical
IBE [19] in the random oracle model [12]. Since then, IBE has gotten more attention
and a lot of alternative schemes have emerged with an extended set of properties, cf.
[16, 17,23,57,69,119,128,129].
Although significant progress has been made in constructing secure and efficient IBE
schemes, a critical problem of IBE is that a trusted authority, called PKG, is required to
generate secret keys for all users. The possibility of the corruption of this authority (or
temporary misbehavior due to an insider attack) is considered one of the most important
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reasons hindering the deployment of IBE systems in practice [?, 1, 68]. The problem
is inherent since there is no user-side secret that is used when generating the secret
key corresponding to an arbitrarily formed identity; it follows that there is no built-in
incentive for the PKG in a standard IBE system to protect the users’ secret information.
Beyond the obvious privacy problem (the unavoidable fact that the PKG can decrypt
all users’ ciphertexts) there is also a more serious attack that can take place: the PKG
may share the users’ secret keys. One may address this by arguing that such malicious
behavior can be detectable by the user: for instance, a decryption program B leaked to
the public can be noticed by the user. In such case, the user could conceivably bring
the program to court and sue the PKG, thus the PKG would be deterred from such
behavior. However, notice that both user and PKG are capable of producing B thus the
device itself can not be used as conclusive proof about who is at fault.
In order to make the above detect-then-punish mechanism effective, Goyal introduced
the concept of accountable authority IBE, (A-IBE in short) [67], where a convincing
proof can be provided from which a judge can make a decision about who is at fault.
In order to achieve this characteristic, every identity must be corresponded with super-
polynomially many secret keys, and the PKG and the user jointly generate a secret key
for the user so that the PKG does not know which key is chosen by the user. Using the
secret key received by the user, any third party, a judge for example, can tell whether
the decryption device is made from the user secret key or not, thus the judge (and the
public) can identify unequivocally the creator of the device. A number of works followed
up this seminal result, [68, 91,93,118,132], further refining the notion of A-IBE.
Still, the adoption of A-IBE in practice is hindered by a couple of facts. First,
many constructions are inefficient (in the sense that they require linear in the security
parameter number of group elements, cf. Figure 12) or that the designs are incompatible
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with existing practical deployments such as RFC 5091 [26]. Second, when a user
accidentally loses his key, in all existing A-IBE schemes, the user and the PKG have
to discard this identity and generate a new key for the user using a different identity
(otherwise, it enables malicious users to frame the PKG). This artifact brings users
annoying inconvenience. These put forth the main motivations in our work: is it possible
to add accountability to any existing (that is potentially already deployed, e.g., RFC
5091) IBE system, with a minimum cost? furthermore, we ask whether such generic
transformation can be extended to allow identity reuse, without losing efficiency? If such
transformation exists, users may choose to “upgrade” their IBE scheme to be accountable
without requiring a modification to the basic algorithms of the underlying IBE.
Our contributions. In this work, we address both problems listed above. First, we
propose a generic construction of an A-IBE (in the so-called weak black-box model
with full security against malicious users, see definition in Appendix 6.2) that uses any
existing IBE in a black-box way. And this generic construction has ciphertext size only
2 times the underlying IBE ciphertext size. (we call this construction S-I). The key
observation behind our construction is that users can choose from a set of secret-keys
that are based on an extended form of their identity. When encrypting messages it
is possible for the sender to use only two ciphertexts to guarantee an honest user to
decrypt. However, it is also possible to generate a set of tracing ciphertexts that can
reveal part of the “fingerprint” of the secret-key that was assigned obliviously to the
user by the PKG. The presence of the partial fingerprint in a user decoder that is found
publicly incriminates the user, otherwise, incriminates the PKG.
We then consider how to allow identity reuse. This property is not known whether
achievable before, even with specifically tailored constructions. We achieve it while
maintaining the generic nature and the small size ciphertext. The main challenge for
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achieving identity reuse in A-IBE setting is that a malicious user can obtain multiple
secret keys corresponding to the same identity by claiming to the PKG that she lost the
key. Such malicious user could then implement a pirate box B using one key, and reveal
another key to the judge. A secret key tracing algorithm may erroneously accuse the
PKG, as, by definition, the key used to implement B is different to the key that the
user is currently using.
Our strategy is to add public traceability to our generic construction that will enable
the judge to differentiate among all the secret keys that were ever obtained by a user for
the same identity. Note that in S-I, part of the user fingerprint is recovered, if there is
a public reference for the user fingerprint, it might be possible for the judge to check
whether the recovered string matches. In order to implement this idea, we improve the
generic construction S-I to allow the tracing algorithm to recover the whole “fingerprint”
while maintaining the ciphertext size still to be small (at most logarithmic overhead, and
we call it S-II). With this new feature of S-II we developed, it is possible to deposit the
fingerprint (using a one way function) that the user chooses for selecting the secret key
to the PKG in a secure way so that: (i) it enables the judge to use a public tracing key T
to determine whether a recovered fingerprint matches the fingerprint, and (ii) it prevents
a malicious PKG from producing a pirate box without being traced with the help of T .
The main technical part is to design a proper one way function for the secure deposit of
the bitstring, together with an efficient zero-knowledge proof for the consistency between
the privately deposited fingerprint and that used in the OT protocol, bit by bit.
The intuition for S-II follows from the observation that if the “fingerprint” is generated
from an error correcting code, a linear fraction of it could be enough to reveal the whole
string. With a careful probabilistic analysis, we see that with slightly longer ciphertexts,
one is able to retrieve a larger fraction of the fingerprint from a pirate box. (this new
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mechanism also allows the length of the fingerprint to be reduced asymptotically, so as
the secret key size). This feature of S-II makes it a steppingstone for further allowing
identity re-use and public traceability. Our A-IBE tracing mechanisms are inspired by
previous works related to traitor tracing [21] and leakage-deterring cryptosystems [85].
With such public traceability, the scheme can be further extended to support identity
reuse. Each identity now will have multiple extended forms (instead of one in S-II),
and for each extended form indexed by a state, the user can use an independent string
as a fingerprint to request one secret key. During the i-th key generation protocol for
an identity, the PKG will store a public tracing key Ti and the updated state about
the current version of the extended form for each identity in a public directory. The
encryption algorithm will use the current version of the extended form of identity. The
tracing algorithm will run on all versions of the extended form of the identity, extract
(potentially multiple) fingerprints; subsequently, it will check whether they match the
public tracing keys. In this way, the tracing algorithm can decide that the key inside the
pirate box is the one the user is currently using or whether it is one of the keys claimed
to be lost, or is a key originating from the PKG. A malicious user can never frame the
PKG using a key claimed to be lost, and a PKG can not evade the tracing algorithm
if she ever leaks a decryption box for the user identity (even for previous versions of
extended form of identity).
Note that after adding public traceability and id-reuse to our generic construction,
the ciphertext efficiency and the generic nature are still the same as in S-II. The model
that T has to be stored for each user is the same as the only existing paper [91](that
was based on Gentry IBE [57]) providing public traceability. 1 Finally it is worth to
1In fact, it is not hard to see (explained in section 6.4.1) that the size of the public tracing key has
to grow linearly with the number of users.
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G-I G-II [68] [93] [118] [91] [132] S-I S-III
Generic no no no no no no no yes yes
Ciphertext size O(λ) O(λ) O(λ) O(1) O(λ) O(1) O(1) O(1) O(1)
Malicious User s s s a a a a a a
Malicious PKG w bb0 bb1 bb0 bb1 bb0 bb1 bb0 bb0
Public Traceable no no no no no yes no no yes
ID Reuse no no no no no no no no yes
Figure 12: Comparisons of all existing A-IBEs, ciphertext size means the number of
group elements; ‘s’ means selective, ‘a’ means adaptive; w, bb0, bb1 mean white box, weak
black-box and full black-box traceability respectively; S-I, S-III are our constructions.
point out that our construction allows these two properties to be optional services by
the PKG and the user may opt-in or opt-out to such properties at will when she requests
a key from the PKG. We remark that our generic transformations can go beyond IBE
and can be easily adapted to apply to more advanced systems like attribute based
encryption [69,119]. The performance comparison of all A-IBE schemes (including ours)
is summarized in Figure 12.
Related work. In [67], Goyal proposed the notion of A-IBE and gave two constructions.
The first one is traceable only in the white-box model (requires the key material of
the pirate box) while the second one is in the weak black-box model. We call those
constructions G-I, G-II and both have ciphertext size that includes a linear number of
group elements. In the following work of [68], Goyal et al. proposed a construction
having traceability in the full black-box model, but at the price of having (i) secret key
198
and ciphertext size that has linear in the security parameter number of group elements,
(ii) security against malicious users only in a selective model (where the adversary needs
to commit to its move ahead at the beginning of the game). Libert and Vergnaud [93]
made an improvement on G-I, and they gave an A-IBE with constant group elements
in the ciphertext that is proven traceable in the weak black box model. Sahai and
Seyalioglu [118] improved the security against dishonest users, and achieved full security
against dishonest users, but their construction still has a linear size ciphertext. Lai et al.
[91] proposed the first scheme with public traceability that the authority is required to
store a public tracing key for each user which is later used to generate tracing ciphertext,
and it is also traceable in the weak black-box model. Our public traceability can be
based on any IBE and uses a different tracing technique that we can directly compare
whether a recovered fingerprint matches the one contained in the public tracing key.
Concurrent to our work an E-print technical report [132] proposed an A-IBE with
traceability in the full black-box model, adaptive security against malicious user and
constant size ciphertext under non-standard assumptions. All these works rely on a
highly specific structure, specifically, Gentry IBE [57] as in [67,91,93, 132] or fuzzy IBE
[119] as in [67,68,118]; their techniques for accountability do not adapt in other settings
straightforwardly (and specifically none can be applied to current real world IBE’s such
as those of RFC5091 directly). Also, none of those works allows public traceability
(except [91]) or identity reuse.
There are also other proposals to deal with the key escrow problem in IBE. In [19],
Boneh and Franklin suggested that multiple authorities distributively produce the
master secret key. However, in principle, those PKGs still may collude to leak user’s
secret leaving the user defenseless; Al-Riyami and Paterson proposed the concept of
certificateless public key cryptography [1], and attempted to combine both the advantages
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of certificate-based PKI and IBE. The authority only has a partial secret key k1, and it
jointly generates secret key together with the user who has her own secret k2. However,
part of the public key must be in a special form corresponding to k2 and thus it can
not be as expressive as IBE. Hence such systems may be of more narrow applicability
compared to proper IBE schemes. Au et al [5] proposed the notion of retrievability that
from two secret keys of a user, one can compute the master secret key. The notion of
retrievability is interesting but it is achieved only in the white box model. Chow [38]
considers the notion of anonymous ciphertext indistinguishability, which requires that
the PKG cannot learn the recipient identity from a ciphertext, thus hoping that the
authority can not figure out which secret key to use to decrypt. This is an interesting
notion as well, but only meaningful in an IBE system with an extremely large number
of users; furthermore it does not protect against a PKG that targets a specific user and
publishes the decryption algorithm (which is the main defense objective of A-IBE).
6.2 Preliminaries
1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer protocol Briefly speaking, a 1-out-of-2 OT protocol
[106] is between a sender S and a receiver R. S has two messages (m0,m1) as input, and
R chooses one of them according to a bit b. S should not know b, while R should not
have any knowledge of m1−b.
We only provide a half simulation type of definition (cf. [106]). For sender security,
we make a comparison to the ideal implementation in which there is a trusted party
receiving m0,m1 from S and b from R, and sends R the message mb. We require that
∀m0,m1 and any efficient adversary A as the receiver, there is a simulator plays as the
receiver in the ideal world that, the output distribution of the simulator and A are
computationally indistinguishable. For receiver security, suppose t0, t1 represent the
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trascript sent by the receiver w.r.t input 0 and 1 respectively, we require that the sender
can not distinguish the distribution of t0 and t1.
Accountable authority identity-based encryption. Here we provide a general
definition for an A-IBE scheme, it is composed of the following algorithms:
• Setup(λ, δ) This algorithm takes the security parameter λ and the correctness
parameter δ as input and outputs master key pair (mpk,msk) and the system
parameters t(δ), `(δ).
• KeyGen This is a stateful protocol between a user and the PKG in which the
user has an identity ID and mpk, and the PKG has mpk,msk, ID as inputs
respectively. It ends with the user outputting her secret key skID or ⊥ if the
secret-keys are malformed, and the PKG output a tracing key TID and a current
state stID.
• Enc(ID,mpk,m, stID) This algorithm inputs a receiver identity ID, master public
key mpk, the message m and potentially a public state stID, and outputs the
ciphertext C.
• Dec(C, skID) This algorithm takes ciphertext C and user secret key skID as input,
and outputs the plaintext m.
• TraceB(ID, δ, TID). This algorithm inputs a pirate decryption box B for ID,
correctness parameter δ and a tracing key TID as input, it outputs “user”, “PKG”
or “⊥′′.
Note that the algorithms can be stateless as usual if identity reuse is not required. When
TID is public, then the A-IBE scheme has public traceability.
δ-correctness of a decryption device B, for regular A-IBE schemes, it is defined as
Pr[B(C) = m : C = Enc(ID,mpk,m)] ≥ δ; while for A-IBE schemes allowing identity
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re-use, the box might contain a couple of keys for one identity corresponding to different
states, we require that for a randomly selected state, it works with δ correctness, thus
the δ-correctness in this case is defined as Pr[B(C) = m : C = Enc(ID,mpk,m, i)∧ i←
{1, . . . , stID}] ≥ δ. Note that according to the pigeonhole principle, there exists at least
one state j, Pr[B(C) = m : C = Enc(ID,mpk,m, j)] ≥ δ/stID, and this is important
for the tracing algorithm of S-III.
IND-ID-CPA security. This is similar to the standard semantic security for IBE
schemes. Consider the following game between the adversary A and the challenger C:
• Setup C runs Setup, and sends A the system public key: mpk.
• Phase 1A runs theKeyGen protocol with the challenger for several distinct adap-
tively chosen identities ID1, .., IDq and gets the decryption keys skID1 , .., skIDq .
• Challenge A submits two equal length messages m0,m1 and an identity ID that
is not appearing in the queries of Phase 1. C flips a random coin b and encrypts
mb with ID. The ciphertext C is passed on to A.
• Phase 2 This is identical to Phase 1 and A is not allowed to query for ID.
• Guess The adversary outputs a guess b′ of b.
The advantage of the adversary A is defined as |Pr[b′ = b]− 1/2|; we say an A-IBE is
IND-ID-CPA secure if A’s advantage is negligible.
Note that for A-IBE schemes with public traceability, the adversary also gets the public
tracing key T .
Besides standard semantic security, for an A-IBE scheme, there are two additional
security properties that have to be considered. The first is security against a malicious
PKG. Any A-IBE scheme, should prevent the PKG from learning useful information
which can help her to leak a decryption program B (we will also call it a decryption
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“box”) on behalf of a certain identity and evade the tracing algorithm. The second is
security against malicious users. In this perspective, a group of colluding users should
not be able to make a working box B that frames the PKG. Depending of the form of B,
one may consider various models for the tracing algorithm. Specifically, if the tracing
algorithm only needs oracle access to B, we call it traceable in the black-box model.
Common variants of the black-box model exist depending on whether the PKG is given
access to the decryption oracle that corresponds to the secret key the user gets (called
the “fully black-box model” if yes, and the “weak black-box model” otherwise).
Weak (black-box) dishonest-PKG game. Consider the following game between a
PPT adversary A and a PPT challenger C:
• Setup: The adversary acts as a malicious PKG, generates system public keys and
sends C mpk. Also A specifies an identity ID.
• KeyGen: C and A then engage in the KeyGen protocols of A-IBE acting as a user
and PKG respectively. In each run, they jointly generate a decryption key and a
tracing key TID and state stID for the identity ID. If neither party aborts, then
C gets a decryption key skID for user ID as output.
• Create Decryption Box: The adversary outputs a decryption box B.
The adversary A wins the game if the following conditions hold true:
B has δ-correctness ∧TraceB(ID, skID) 6= “PKG”.
In a full dishonest-PKG game, A is also allowed to ask decryption queries. In other
weaker (non-black-box) models, the tracing algorithm might have non-black-box access
to the pirate box B.
Adaptive dishonest-user game. In this game, a set of malicious users collude to
create a decoder box, trying to frame the PKG.
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• Setup C runs the A-IBE Setup algorithm, and sends A mpk;
• Secret Key Queries The adversary runs the KeyGen protocols with C, playing
the role of different users and PKG respectively, for adaptively chosen iden-
tities ID1, .., IDq for different times. A gets the corresponding secret keys
{skID1}, .., {skIDq} and C outputs the corresponding tracing keys TID1 , . . . , TIDq
and the states stID1 , . . . , stIDq .
• Create Decryption Box The adversary outputs an identity ID together with a
decryption box B for ID.
The adversary wins if the followings hold true:
B has δ-correctness ∧TraceB(ID, skID) = “PKG”.
Weaker model also exists, i.e., in the selective dishonest-user game, the adversary is
required to declare the ID to be attacked at the beginning.
6.3 Generic Construction of A-IBE with Constant Size Ciphertext
In this section, we give a generic construction of A-IBE secure in the weak dishonest-
PKG model from any IBE scheme using 1-out-of-2 OT, and it only has ciphertext size
two times the underlying IBE scheme.
The intuition behind this generic transformation is that for each identity ID, there
are exponentially many secret keys, each of which has a unique “fingerprint”. Each user
will select his key with a random “fingerprint” using an OT protocol. Given only an
oracle access to a decryption box B implemented using one key, part of the fingerprint
can be retrieved. When a decryption box is found, the recovered partial “fingerprint” is
able to reveal the source of the box.
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Specifically, 2` identities (ID||1||0, ID||1||1), . . ., (ID||`||0, ID||`||1) are all consid-
ered as the same user with identity ID. 2 During KeyGen, for each pair of secret keys
corresponding to identities ID||i||0, and ID||i||1, user randomly selects one of them using
a 1-out-of-2 OT. 3 The “fingerprint” of the user selected key corresponds to the bit string
of length ` he uses in the OT protocols. Enc randomly selects an index r, and simply
encrypts the same message under both ID||r||0, ID||r||1, thus sender does not need to
know the fingerprint of the user with ID. Note the user has one key corresponding to the
identity ID||r||0 or ID||r||1 for each r, thus he can decrypt. Also Trace can attempt
to recover each bit of the fingerprint from a decryption box by feeding ciphertexts
containing different messages for the location, i.e., for an index i, c0, c1 are fed, where
cb = Enc(ID||i||b,mpk,mb). The semantic security of the underlying IBE suggests that
the box will not distinguish these tracing ciphertexts from regular ciphertexts, and the
answer mb reveals the i−th bit of the user fingerprint. Whenever λ bits are recovered,
and all of them equal to the corresponding bits in the user “fingerprint”, the user will be
accused, otherwise the PKG will be accused. Essentially, a malicious PKG can evade
the tracing algorithm only if she guesses correctly λ random bits.
One may notice that a malicious user may put as few keys as possible, e.g., only one
key corresponding to ID||t||bt for some t, into a pirate box B and thus for the other
indices, there is no hope to recover the fingerprint bits. However, since B has to provide
some minimum functionality, i.e., answering correctly with some noticeable probability δ,
(formally, Pr[B(Enc(m, ID,mpk)) = m] ≥ δ), if we choose ` large enough (λ/δ through
our probabilistic analysis), there must be at least λ keys contained in the pirate box to
2Doing above may reduce the original identity space, however, this problem can be easily addressed
by extending the identity string O(log `) bits longer.
3Unlike ABE schemes, our generic construction does not have to provide collusion-resistance, as for
each index, a user can obtain only one key.
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maintain the δ-correctness. In particular, we can argue that there exist at least λ indices,
the box decrypts ciphertext generated using those indices, with probability at least δ/λ.
Then as elaborated above, once a key is used, we can recover the corresponding bit.
6.3.1 Detailed construction.
We call this generic construction S-I, for an IBE scheme (Setup, KeyGen, Enc,
Dec), the details of S-I are as follows:
• Setup(λ, δ): This algorithm inputs the security parameter λ and the correctness
parameter δ, it runs the Setup algorithm of the underlying IBE and outputs master
key pair (mpk,msk), and a parameter ` = λ/δ.
• KeyGen This is a protocol between PKG and a user A with identity ID,
1. PKG generates 2` secret keys {ki,b}i=1,...,`,b=0,1, using KeyGen of the underly-
ing IBE, where ki,b = KeyGen(msk, ID||i||b).
2. User A randomly chooses a bit string b¯ = b1, . . . , b` with length `.
3. A executes ` (1,2)-OT protocols with the PKG in parallel. In the i-th
execution, A inputs bi, PKG inputs ki,0, ki,1 and A receives ki,bi .
The protocol ends with A outputting skID = {ski = (bi, ki,bi)}i=1,...,`.
• Enc(ID,mpk,m): To encrypt a message m for user A, the algorithm randomly
chooses an index r ∈ {1, . . . , `} and outputs ciphertext C = (r, cr,0, cr,1), where for
b ∈ {0, 1}, cr,b = Enc(ID||r||b,mpk,m).
• Dec(C, skID): On input ciphertext C and the secret keys of user A, the decryption
algorithm parses the ciphertext and runs the underlying IBE decryption algorithm,
it returns m = Dec(cr,br , skr).
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• TraceB(ID, δ, {bi}) This is a two stage protocol. In the first stage , the judge J
interacts with user A 4 to get his secret string and verify its validity.
1. A sends b¯ and a pirate decryption box B to J .
2. J parses b¯, and then randomly selects 2` messages {ri,0, ri,1}i=1,...,`, and asks
A to decrypt one of the ciphertext {ci,0, ci,1}, where ci,b = Enc(ID||i||b,mpk, ri,b)
for i = 1, . . . , `. A decrypts {ci,bi} and sends back {r′i,bi}, J then checks
ri,bi
?
= r′i,bi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , `}.
If not, J outputs “user”; otherwise, J runs the following algorithm:
1. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , `}, J repeats the following N times (the exact number
of N will be specified in the analysis) to define a bit si. In each run,
J randomly selects m0,m1, and feeds B with (i, ci,0, ci,1), where ci,b =
Enc(ID||i||b,mpk,mb) for b = 0, 1. J records a b for si if B returns mb,
otherwise, J records a ⊥.
2. After the repetitions for each i, J takes the majority of the non-⊥ records as
the value for si; if all records are ⊥, then si is undefined.
3. Suppose si1 , . . . , sit are the defined bits. If sij = bij for all j ∈ {1, . . . , t} and
t ≥ λ, J returns “user”; otherwise, J returns “PKG”.
Remark. our tracing algorithm is conditioned on the fact that the box has a noticeable
correctness δ for random messages, and the box is resettable.
A note about fully black-box traceability. We can see from the tracing algorithm
of S-I that given access to a decryption oracle, the PKG learns the bit string that the
user chose to select the secret keys, thus further learns the chosen secret keys of the
4It can be easily made non-interactive if the user proves that he has the right keys.
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user. One possible remedy is to introduce a mechanism that only the judge can create
a valid tracing ciphertext, i.e., regular ciphertext pair is augmented with a ZK proofs
of the statement that “either they contain equal plaintexts or I am the judge”. This
prevents the PKG from learning information about the user fingerprint via access to a
decryption oracle, but also at the same time enables the judge to trace. One downside
of this mechanism is that the judge needs to keep some private state. We omit the
details of achieving fully black-box recoverability in this model and focus on the other
advanced properties, e.g., identity reuse, which is not known whether achievable before
in the standard model of A-IBE in this thesis.
6.3.2 Security analysis.
We will give intuitions about the security properties of S-I and for the proof, we
mainly focused on the most involved part dealing with malicious users.
IND-ID-CPA security. ID||i||0, ID||i||1 are considered two different identities and
thus our generic construction S-I is simply a double encryption of a same message using
two different identities. It follows easily that a double encryption is as secure as the
underlying IBE.
Security in the weak dishonest-PKG game. Note that the Trace algorithm always
outputs “PKG” except when the recovered string is composed of two parts: an all-⊥ part,
and a bitstring which is at least λ bits long and matches the corresponding substring
of the user secret string. All other cases, including an all-⊥ string is recovered, or any
single bit recovered is different with that of the user “fingerprint”, the PKG is accused.
The receiver security of the OT protocol executed in KeyGen guarantees that a
malicious PKG can only guess each bit of the secret string, thus she can fools the Trace
algorithm with probability negligibly close to 2−λ. Specifically, in the execution of the
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i-th OT protocol, the malicious PKG can not distinguish the transcript created by an
user inputting a random bit r from the transcript created using the selected bit bi. We
can do a sequence of game changes and end up with a game that all OT transcripts are
created using independently selected random bits r¯ = r1, . . . , r`. In the last game, since
b¯ = b1, . . . , b` are independent of the transcripts, we can let the malicious PKG output
a box and the judge recovers a substring with length at least λ first, and then select b¯.
It follows easily that the corresponding substring of b¯ matches the recovered substring
of r¯, with probability at most 2−λ.
Security in the adaptive dishonest-user game. Our main observation that if the
box is leaked by a user, the judge will always be able to accuse her, relies on the following
reasons. First, since the user has only one key for each location, due to the semantic
security of the underlying IBE (and the OT sender security), the user has to report to
the judge honestly her secret string. Furthermore, the box B is not able to tell a tracing
ciphertext (the pair of the ciphertext encrypting different messages) from a normal
ciphertext, thus B will have δ-correctness during tracing. We will analyze that the box
has to decrypt using the keys with probability δ/λ for at least λ indices to maintain
such correctness. Again, for each index i, B can never succeed in decrypting m1−b if
only ki,b is inside, thus for the indices it responds, it has to reveal the correct bits after
enough repetitions.
Theorem 37. (1). S-I is IND-ID-CPA secure if the underlying IBE scheme is IND-
ID-CPA secure; (2). S-I is secure in the weak dishonest-PKG game if the underlying
1-out-of-2-OT protocol satisfies the receiver security; (3). S-I is secure in the adaptive
dishonest-user game if the underlying IBE is IND-ID-CPA secure, and the 1-out-of-2-
OT protocol satisfies the (simulatable) sender security.
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Proof. The security properties (1) and (2) follow easily from the explanation above, we
will focus on property (3).
First, we see that in the first phase of the Trace protocol, the user has to submit
the same string she selected. This can be shown via a sequence of game changes. In
the original game, the adversary A runs the OT protocols one by one for ` times (or in
parallel), during the KeyGen protocol, and answers the decryption queries during the first
phase of the Trace algorithm. In the modified ` games, the OT protocols are replaced
with an oracle (one by one) that on inputting a bit, outputting the corresponding secret
key. The indistinguishability of these game changes are ensured by the (simulatable)
sender security of the OT protocol (see the composition lemma of Canetti [29]).
In the last game, during KeyGen, mcA has only oracle access to the OT instances,
which can be “controlled” by a simulator. Now suppose the adversary answers correctly
for the decryption request ci,1−bi at some index i with probability ∆i, there exists a
simulator S playing the role of PKG with A as a user, can break the IND-ID-CPA
security of the underlying IBE. S can answer all the OT queries perfectly with the
corresponding secret keys, (which can be asked to the IND-ID-CPA game challenger
directly). S simply uses ID||i||1 − bi as the challenge identity. S selects m0,m1 as
the challenge message, and forwards the challenge ciphertexts to the adversary. If
A answers mb, S answers b, otherwise, a random bit. It is straightforward that S
breaks the IND-ID-CPA security with advantage ∆i2 (which can be derived as follows:
∆i · 1 + (1−∆i)12 − 12).
Let δi = Pr[B decrypts correctly | i is selected]. We divide the indices i ∈ {1, . . . , `}
in two sets, Bad and Good, we define i ∈ Good if and only if δi ≥ δ0, where δ0 = δ/λ.
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Next, we lower bound n = |Good|. If n < λ, then:
Pr[B works correctly] =
∑`
i=1
Pr[B works correctly|i is selected] Pr[i is selected]

















thus, we can conclude that for at least λ indices, the box will answer correctly with
probability at least δ/λ.
Next, similar to the analysis for the first stage of the protocol, we can show that
the probability that B decrypts to the other message selected in the Trace algorithm
(m1−bi , which is with high entropy) will be a negligible function. Following the standard
Chernoff bound, we can see that if we run the Trace algorithm with the a number of
N = O(δ−20 log
2 λ) repetitions, the correct value of bi would form a majority of the
non-⊥ records for si.
Summarizing the above facts, if a box B implemented using one key from the user
and it has δ-correctness, there will be at least λ indices that the Trace algorithm recovers
the correct bits, (⊥ for all other indices), it returns “user”.
6.4 Generic Construction of A-IBE Allowing Public Traceability and Iden-
tity Reuse
In this section, we consider how to add advanced properties of A-IBE generically,
without influencing the ciphertext efficiency much. And for a general definition and
security models capturing the advanced properties, see section 6.2.
6.4.1 A general framework allowing identity re-use.
As elaborated in the introduction, a user may accidentally lose his secret key, in all
previous works, the user has to change a different identity to request a new key. Allowing
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identity re-use in such cases is highly desirable. The main difficulty for achieving id
reuse lies in the fact that a malicious user can obtain multiple keys (for a same ID) by
claiming to the PKG that she lost her key. Then she will implement a pirate box using
one key and reveal a different key to the judge for the tracing algorithm, trying to frame
the PKG.
Necessity of public traceability and linear size tracing key. To defend against
the above attack, a correct tracing algorithm on inputting two keys requested using the
same identity should not always output “PKG”. It follows that the judge has to be able
to identify a “lost” key using some public information, which in turn “implies” public
traceability.
Note that in S-I, each user chooses a “fingerprint” b1 . . . b` when requesting a key.
If the Trace algorithm is able to recover the whole “fingerprint” from the pirate box,
and there is a public reference, e.g., a value T = f(b1 . . . b`) for a one way function
f , then the judge can publicly check whether the pirate box is from the user or not.
In particular, T is generated by the user during the key generation, and he proved in
zero-knowledge that the bits of the pre-image of T are consistent with those used in the
OT protocols. We will first revise S-I to enable the tracing algorithm to recover the
whole fingerprint, and explain in detail in the next section about the one way function
and the ZK proofs.
Before we go into technical details of constructions, we first argue that the public
tracing key has to grow linear to the number of the identities. To see this, suppose
there are N different identities, di is the binary random variable that denotes the
judge output when seeing a key kIDi for identity IDi, and T is the public tracing
key. It is obvious that without the tracing key, each di is a uniformly random bit
(and they are mutually independent), thus H(d1, . . . , dN ) = N ; while given T , all
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{di} will be determined, thus H(d1, . . . , dN |T ) = 0, from the chain rule, we can see
H(T ) = H(d1, . . . , dN , T ) ≥ H(d1, . . . , dN ) = N . Thus the length of T grows linearly
to the number of identities used in the system.
Recovering all bits of each user fingerprint. As one may notice, the Trace algorithm
of S-I can recover only λ bits, thus for the above public tracing strategy to work, we have
to improve the construction of S-I so that one can publicly recover the user “fingerprint”
perfectly. A simple observation is that if one can recover a larger fraction of bits, e.g.,
a linear fraction of `, one may use an error correcting code to generate the fingerprint
and recover the whole string by decoding a string having a linear fraction of correct
bits. However, the probabilistic analysis of S-I will not hold if we set n = |Good| to be
O(`). We further observe that if we use slightly more indices for encryption, (splitting
the message, and using the S-I encryption algorithm at each index for the shares), the
pirate box has to contain more keys to maintain the δ-correctness. Through a careful
analysis, if we use t = 5 ln 2δ pairs of identities for encryption, B has to include at least
4
5 fraction of the keys to maintain δ-correctness. Interestingly, the secret key length of is
reduced to O(log 1δ ). We present here the modified generic construction, (named S-II)
with only the difference with S-I. We will show how to augment S-II to allow id-reuse
and analyze the security in the next sections.
• Setup(λ, δ): Same as S-I, except ` = O(log 1δ ), and it also generates an error
correcting code ECC : {0, 1}`0 → {0, 1}`, (e.g., [70].) which corrects at least `5 -bit
errors.
• KeyGen: Same as S-I, except that the bitstring of user A is generated by first
selecting a random bitstring r¯ with length `0, then applying the ECC to r¯ and
produces b¯ = b1, . . . , b`.
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• Enc(ID,mpk,m, δ): To encrypt a message m for user A, the algorithm first
randomly chooses a subset S = {s1, . . . , st} ⊂ {1, . . . , `} with size t(δ) = 5 ln 2δ . It
then chooses t− 1 random messages m2, . . . ,mt and computes m1 = m−
∑t
i=2mi
and uses the Enc algorithm of the underlying IBE to encrypt each mi. The
algorithm outputs ciphertext C = {(si, ci,0, ci,1)}i=1,...,t, where for b ∈ {0, 1},
ci,b = Enc(ID||si||b,mpk,mi).
• Dec(C, skID): On input ciphertext C and the secret key of user A, the decryption
algorithm parses the ciphertext and then runs the underlying IBE decryption
algorithm, and it selects the secrect keys corresponding to si and returns m =∑t
i=1mi, where mi = Dec(sksi , ci,bi).
• TraceB(ID, δ, {bi}) The first stage is the same as that of S-I except that the user
submits r¯ and the judge J applies the ECC to get b¯ himself. If J does not output
“user” in the first stage, it runs the following:
1. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , `}, J randomly selects a subset S ⊂ {1, . . . , `} of size t un-
til i ∈ S, and let us denote S = {s1, . . . , st} and i = sk; J randomly samples
m,m′ and other t− 1 messages m1, . . . ,mk−1, mk+1, . . . ,mt uniformly, and
he computes mk,0 = m−
∑
j 6=kmj ,mk,1 = m
′−∑j 6=kmj . For j = 1, . . . , t, J
feeds the box B with {(sj , cj,0, c1j )}, where for j 6= k, cj,b = Enc(ID||sj ||b,mj),
and ck,b is encryption ofmk,b, i.e., ck,b = Enc(ID||sk||b,mk,b) for both b = 0, 1.
J records a 0 for bi if the box returns m, 1 if the box returns m′ and ⊥
otherwise.
2. After repeating the above N times (the exact number of N will be specified
in the analysis), J takes the majority of the non-⊥ symbols in the records as
the value for bi. If bi is not defined, let bi = 0.
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3. J runs the decoding algorithm of ECC on b¯, and gets a bitstring r¯′ or ⊥. If
r¯ = r¯′, J returns “user”, otherwise, it returns “PKG”.
Allowing identity re-use. Now with the above briefly explained intuition of public
traceability, a user can use different secret string {bk1, . . . , bk` } to choose the k−th secret
key. The PKG keeps different public tracing key for each string, and the judge can
indeed differentiate among the keys of the same identity and the PKG as long as he can
extract the “fingerprints" correctly. (For detailed construction, see section 6.4.3). To
provide some collision resilience to the generic construction S-II, we extend it further to
keep a state stID for each identity, so that each secret key request for a same identity can
actually correspond to different extended identities. In more detail, in S-II, an identity
ID is represented using a group of identities {ID||i||bi}i=1,...,`,bi=0,1. With a state stID
denoting the number of key requested for ID, the modified extended identities would be
{ID||stID||i||bki }i=1,...,`;bki =0,1;k=stID .
For the k-th time the user requests a key using bk1, . . . , bk` , the PKG adds a new
public tracing key Tk = fk(bk1, . . . , bk` ) to the public directory, and also updates stID
to be k + 1.5 The sender first figures out the state, then he can simply run Enc of
S-II using ID||stID as identity. The Trace algorithm runs the S-II tracing algorithm
on all ID||1, . . . , ID||stID, with a smaller correctness parameter δ/stID, and extracts
fingerprints (potentially more than one). If all of the fingerprints match the corresponding
public tracing keys (except the stID−th one), they are considered as lost keys then no
5A malicious PKG may put different public tracing keys, however this is trivially detectable by the
user and proves to the judge.
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one will be accused; If the one that the user is using (the stID-th key) matches TstID ,
the user would be accused, otherwise the PKG will be accused. 6
We can see that we use the underlying IBE as a black-box, thus this improved
construction (named S-III) is still a general transformation from IBE to A-IBE.
6.4.2 Building blocks for public traceability.
OT instantiation. We choose the Bellare-Micali OT [8] as an example, and construct
efficent zero-knowledge proofs for the consistency. (In principle any OT is applicable if
we do not insist on efficient ZK proofs). The sender S (the PKG in our setting) sets up
the system parameters (including a prime q, group Gq with a random generator g, and
a random value C ∈ Zq). The receiver R(with input b) randomly chooses PKb = gx
and computes PK1−b = C/PKb, then R sends PK0 to S; the sender computes PK1 =
C/PK0 and encrypts the messages m0,m1 to be transmitted, using ElGamal encryption
[54] with PK0, PK1 as public keys respectively, i.e., {(grb , H(PKrbb ) ⊕mb)}b=0,1 are
returned to R, where H is modeled as a random oracle. It is well-known that this OT
protocol satisfies information theoretic receiver security, and simulatable sender security
under the CDH assumption [106].
Public tracing key generation. We first describe the one way function tailored for our
A-IBE scheme. Suppose g¯ = (g1,0, g1,1), . . . , (g`,0, g`,1) ∈ G2`, for each i, gi,0 ·gi,1 = C for
a random group element C, and b¯ = b1 . . . b` ∈ {0, 1}`, we define fg¯(b1 . . . b`) =
∏`
i=1 gi,bi .
We will show that fg¯(·) is one way. Let us first look at a related one way function, suppose




i . It is
6Note that if the recovered fingerprint corresponds to one of the lost keys, it is impossible to decide
whether it is from the user or from someone else who gets the lost key, not erroneously accusing the
PKG is the best possible security in this case.
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implicit that f˜g˜(·) is one way in a couple of papers, e.g., in [?], b1 . . . b` is the secret key
and g˜, h = f˜g˜(b1 . . . b`) are the public keys for their circular secure encryption scheme.
We will omit the proof of one-wayness for f˜ , and we prove the one-wayness of our
function f in the following lemma.
Lemma 38. If there exists a ppt adversary A breaks the one way security of f with
advantage δ, then there exists another PPT adversary B breaks the one way security of
f˜ with advantage δ/`.
Proof. When B receives the public keys g˜ = g1, . . . , g` from the f˜ challenger C, B
selects a random C and prepares g1,0, . . . , g`,0 such that for each i, gi,0 = gi, he
also prepares g1,1, . . . , g`,1 in a way that gi,1 = C/gi,0 for all i. B sends A C, g¯ =
(g1,0, g1,1), . . . , (g`,0, g`,1) as public keys.
Once B receives the challenge X = f˜g˜(b1 . . . b`) for some b1 . . . b`, B selects a random
t ∈ {1, . . . , `}, computes Y = C`−t ·∏`i=1 gi ·X−2 and sends Y to A. B forwards the bit
string b′1 . . . b′` returned by A as her answer to the challenger C.
Note that if the bitstring b1 . . . b` has Hamming weight ` − t, i.e., t of them are
0, then Y =
∏`
i=1 gi,bi . To see this, suppose S = {i|bi = 0}, and |S| = t, Y =
C`−t ·∏`i=1 gi/∏`i=1 g2bii = ∏i∈S gi ·∏i 6∈S(C/gi). Thus with probability 1/`, B guesses
t correctly, and in turn, B produces a valid value of fg¯(b1 . . . b`). In this case under our
assumption, A will invert correctly with probability δ. We can conclude that B breaks
the one way security of f˜ with probability δ/`.
The public tracing key T will be h = fPK(b1 . . . b`), together with PK which are
{(PK1,0, PK1,1) . . . , (PK`,0, PK`,1)} used in the OT protocols.
Efficient zero-knowledge proof for consistency. Next, we provide an efficient zero-
knowledge proof protocol for the consistency between the public tracing key and the bit
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string selected by the user in the OT protocol. Essentially, we need to prove that each
bit of the pre-image of the public tracing key is used for selecting one secret key in each
call of the OT protocol. For the public tracing key h, the user first commits {PKi,bi} to




gi ∧`i=1 [ci opens to gi ∧ (gi = PKi,0 ∨ gi = PKi,1)] ∧ PoK for logg h.
Before we describe the detailed ZK proofs, we first explain how we can prove a
commitment opens to a value. We will use a homomorphic commitment scheme from the
BBS encryption [18]. It has the public keys in the form of (g, u, v, w), where ux = vy = w,
and x, y are private keys. The ciphertext (which is a commitment as well) for m is
C¯ = (C1, C2, C3) where C1 = ur1 , C2 = vr2 , C3 = wr1+r2m. One can easily prove
a BBS commitment C¯ opens to a message m in zero-knowledge using the following
Σ−protocol: the proof is in the form of (a1, a2, c, z1, z2), where a1 = Ct11 , a2 = Ct22
are the first round messages sent by the prover, a random value c is returned by the
verifier and z1 = t1 + cx, z2 = t2 + cy are calculated by the prover, The verifier checks
Cz11 · Cz22 = a1 · a2 · (C3/m)c.
Now we are ready to construct the efficient ZK proofs. (1). Prove the first clause,
which is equivalent to prove
∏`
i=1 ci opens to h. (2). Prove ci opens to either PKi,0
or PKi,1. This can be done easily using the OR proof [41] of the two Σ−protocol.
More specifically, suppose bi = 1, the proof is in the form of (a1,0, a2,0, a1,1, a2,1, c, z1,0,
z2,0, z1,1, z2,1), where (a1,0, a2,0, c0, z1,0, z2,0) is simulated and using c1 = c − c0, and
generates the proof of (a1,1, a2,1, c1, z1,1, z2,1). The verifier checks C
z1,0+z1,1
1 ·Cz2,0+z2,12 =
a1,0 · a1,1 · a2,0 · a2,1 · (C3/m)c. (3) Repeat step (2) for each commitment ci to do an
“And” proof. (4) Do a regular proof of knowledge about the exponent of h using e.g.,
Schnorr proof [121].
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All these Σ−protocols can be made zero-knowledge following the standard technique,
e.g., let the verifier commits to the challenge value c first, and they can be made
non-interactive by applying the FS heuristic [53].
Finally, let us check whether the soundness is enough for ensuring h to be generated
honestly, i.e. h =
∏`
i=1 PKi,bi . Suppose there is an adversary A convinces the verifier
and uses one PKi,1−bi when generating h. We can see that A can be separated into
two independent parts (A1,A2). A1 prepares {PKi,0, PKi,1} and the corresponding
exponents, and A2 finishes the ZK proofs. It follows that if we replace A1 with another
algorithm A′1 which simply receives {PKi,0, PKi,1} and the corresponding exponents
from an oracle, the modified adversary A′ = (A′1,A2) behaves identically as A.
According to the special soundness of the proof of knowledge part, a simulator can
run A′ (A2 part) to extract logg h =
∑
j 6=i αj,bj + αi,1−bi , where αj,b = logg PKj,b for
j ∈ {1, . . . , `} and b = 0, 1. As the simulator can “control” the oracle of A′1, and prepare
{PKj}j 6=i accordingly for A′1, thus he knows the exponents {αj,bj} and recovers αi,1−bi
and further logg C = αi,bi + αi,1−bi thus breaks the discrete log assumption, where C is
the system parameter in the OT protocol. (for the case that more than one PKi,bi are
used in generating h, a similar argument can be made to recover logg C).
6.4.3 Concrete construction and security analysis.
With the building blocks we developed above, we now describe the concrete algorithms
of our generic A-IBE construction allowing public traceability and identity reuse (named
S-III). We only describe the difference with S-II here.
• Setup(λ, δ): Same as S-II.
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• KeyGen: For the k-th key requests from user A for an identity ID, the KeyGen
protocol of S-II is run for identity ID||k, and user returns skID,k. During the
KeyGen, the OT described above [8] is utilized to transmit secret keys. Suppose
PKk = {(PKki,0, PKki,1)} are the first round messages of the user. After the OT





and proves in zero-knowledge (we call this proof pik) for the consistency using
protocol described in section 6.4.2. The PKG outputs a new public tracing key
Tk = (hk, PKk), adds them to the list of public tracing keys TID for ID and
updates the stID to be k. The PKG outputs (TID, stID) and the user outputs
secret key skID,k.
• Enc(ID,mpk,m, stID, δ): It runs the Enc of S-II with identity ID||stID.
• Dec(C, skID,stID): It runs the Dec of S-II with identity ID||stID.
• TraceB(ID, δ/stID, TID): The first stage is the same as S-II using ID||stID. If the
judge does not output “user”, the following is run. The second stage of the Trace
algorithm of S-II is repeated for all identities from ID||1 to ID||stID. For ID||k,
the algorithm recovers a bitstring bk1, . . . , bk` or ⊥, and it records a flag tk for this
run. For k = 1, . . . , stID − 1, if the recovered string is ⊥ or fPKk(bk1, . . . , bk` )=hk,
where hk, PKk are from Tk, then tk = 0; otherwise tk = 2. For k = stID, if no
string is extracted, tstID = 0; if fPKstID (b
stID
1 , . . . , b
stID
` )=hstID , then tstID = 1;
otherwise, tstID = 2.
The algorithm returns ⊥ if for all k = 1, . . . , stID, tk = 0; it returns “user” if
tstID = 1; it returns “PKG”, otherwise.
Remark that using δ/stID for tracing is necessary, as from our definition of δ−correctness
in this case is only for a random state (see section 6.2).
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Security analysis of S-III. Due to lack of space, we provide here only some high-level
intuition for S-III, and mainly on the difference with S-I.
IND-ID-CPA security. This is very similar to that of S-I, except that there are extra
public tracing keys TID, while they are only related with the bit strings for selecting the
keys, thus independent with the real secret keys. Also S-III uses multiple extended form
of identities, but all of them can be seen as different identities of the underlying IBE
scheme. The semantic security is not influenced.
Security in the weak dishonest-PKG game. Note that a malicious PKG can evade
the Trace algorithm only when the recovered string matches one of the fingerprints
contained in the public tracing key. The difference with S-I is that the malicious PKG
receives extra public tracing keys {Ti = (hi, PKi)}, and ZK proof transcripts {pii}. If
an adversary A (malicious PKG) is able to produce a pirate box which fools the Trace
algorithm, it can be easily turned to an algorithm that breaks the OT receiver security
or the one-wayness of f .
In more detail, we can argue the security via a sequence of game changes by
first replacing each OT transcript with one generated using a random bit r. The
indistinguishability can be guaranteed by the information theoretic receiver security
of the Bellare-Micali OT. In the next game changes, the ZK proofs will be replaced
with simulated transcripts, and the indistinguishability can be guaranteed by the zero-
knowledge property of the proofs. Now in the last game, what the adversary sees are
only simulated transcripts (OT and ZK proofs) which are independent with the actual
fingerprints, there exists a simulator S who can use A to break the one-way security
of f . In particular, S randomly picks an one way function instance, i.e., S embeds the
public keys and a value h received from the one way security challenger and sets it to
be the i-th public tracing key, and sends them (together with a simulated proof) to A.
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Then from the pirate box outputted by A, with probability 1/stID, the recovered string
is the pre-image of h, thus S breaks the one way security.
Security in the adaptive dishonest user game. A malicious user may try to frame
the PKG by outputting a box with recovered fingerprint not matching any of the public
tracing keys for the target identity, and it is possible unless one of the following events
happens:for at least one index i, the adversary A, (1). learns the secret key of ID||i||1−bi
during the OT protocol; (2). is able to decrypt ciphertext under ID||i||1− bi for which
she does not have the secret key; (3). cheats in the ZK proof of consistency during
KeyGen. We can similarly do a sequence of game changes that first replace the OT
instance to be oracle, the indistinguishability is guaranteed by the simulatable sender
security of OT. We then argue from a box, the tracing algorithm must extract one of
the whole fingerprints of the keys. This is similar to the proof of theorem 37, we will
focused on the main difference about the probabilistic argument. We can see that if the
sender splits the message into t(δ) = 5 ln 2δ pieces, the user has to put at least
4
5 fraction
of keys for each state into the box B to ensure δ-correctness, and this fraction is enough
for the ECC decoding to recover the whole original fingerprint.
The probabilistic argument. Let δi = Pr[B decrypts correctly | i ∈ S]. We divide the
indices i ∈ {1, . . . , `} in two sets, Bad and Good, we define i ∈ Good if and only if
δi ≥ δ0, where δ0 = δ/`2. In order to upper bound the size of Bad consider the following.
Let D be the event of correct decryption,
Pr[D] = Pr[D | S ∩ Bad = ∅] · Pr[S ∩ Bad = ∅] + Pr[D | S ∩ Bad 6= ∅] · Pr[S ∩ Bad 6= ∅],
Regarding Pr[S ∩ Bad = ∅] observe that if k = |Bad|, this probability is bounded




i=0(1 − k`−i) ≤ (1 − k` )t. From inequality ex ≥ 1 + x, we
can get p(k, t) ≤ e−kt`. Regarding Pr[D | S ∩ Bad 6= ∅], note that it is bounded by
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∑
i∈Bad δi ≤ `δ0 = δ/` (This follows from the fact that Pr[F | ∪ni=1 Ai] ≤
∑n
i=1 Pr[F |Ai],
for any event F,Ai). We can now derive the following, δ ≤ Pr[D] ≤ e−tk/` + δ/`, from
which we obtain the upper bound k ≤ `t · ln(δ − δ/`)−1, since δ − δ/` ≥ δ/2, when we
set t = 5 ln(2δ−1) into the above bound for k, and in this case k ≤ `/5.
Now in the last game, the adversary has only oracle access to OT which can be
controlled by the simulator if from the outputted box, the simulator recovers a different
fingerprint, the simulator can break the one way security using the extractor as explained
at the end of section 6.4.2.
Public traceability is obvious, and identity reuse follows also straightforwardly as for
each state, the identities are considered as independent “user”, the above argument
implicitly captures this property. We summarize the security properties of S-III in the
following theorem:
Theorem 39. (1). S-III is secure in the IND-ID-CPA model if the underlying IBE is
IND-ID-CPA secure. (2). S-III is secure in the weak dishonest PKG game if the proof
pi is zero-knowledge, f is one way and the OT has receiver security. (3). S-III is secure
in the adaptive dishonest user game, if the underlying IBE is IND-ID-CPA secure,
the proof pi is sound, and the CDH assumption holds.
Proof. IND-ID-CPA security is the same as that in S-I, with only difference that in
S-II, the adversary also receives the public tracing key. The simulator simply choose a
random bitstring b¯ ∈ {0, 1}`, and generates the public tracing key according to b¯. As
the real fingerprint is uniformly random to adversary A, thus this simulation is perfect.
Suppose game G0 is the original IND-ID-CPA game in the public traceability case, game
G1 is the same as G0 except the public tracing key is generated as above. G2 is the
same as G1 except the adversary does the above to generate the public tracing key for
target ID. G3 is the same as in G2 except that there is no public tracing key available
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to A. It is easy to see that the advantage of adversary in all those games are equivalent.
The rest follows the proof of Theorem 37.
Regarding security against malicious PKG, the difference with S-I is that the malicious
PKG receives the extra public tracing key T = (h, PK), and a zero-knowledge proof
transcript pi. The simulator S who plays the role of user in the KeyGen with adversary
A and also the role of inverter with a challenger C of the one way function f . After
receiving public keys from C, S randomly picks one of (PKi,0, PKi,1) for each pair and
sends them to A as the first round message in the OT protocol. As the OT protocol
satisfies information theoretic receiver security, this simulation is as good as in a real
execution. After receiving the challenge value h from C, S rewinds the adversary A and
simulates the zero-knowledge proof pi. Once A outputs a pirate box B, S runs the Trace
algorithm and recovers a bit string b¯ = b1 . . . b`, then returns b¯ to C. It is clear that if
A can produce a pirate box which will be traced to the user, this means applying the
one way function on the bit string recovered from the box will yield the value equal
to h, thus b¯ is a pre-image of h. We can conclude that at this moment, S breaks the
one-wayness of f which contradicts Lemma 38.
For security against malicious user, as we see in the analysis of Theorem 37, the judge
is able to recover the “fingerprint” of the keys contained in any pirate box. Besides the
same factors as in S-I that for at least one index i, the adversary A might (1). learn the
secret key of ID||i||1− bi during the OT protocol; (2). be able to decrypt ciphertext
under ID||i||1− bi for which she does not have the secret key. There in only one extra
possibilities for adversary to frame the honest PKG in S-II that (3). A cheats in the
zero-knowledge proof of consistency during KeyGen. We will provide the game sequence
here to show the security. Suppose game G0 is the same of the original weak malicious
user game, G1 is the same as G0 except that the public tracing key sent by the adversary
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is not consistent with the bits used in the OT protocols. The advantage gap between
G0, G1 is the same as the soundness error of the proof pi, thus it is a negligible amount.
The rest follows from the proof of Theorem 37.
6.5 Conclusions and Open Problems
We presented a generic transformation from IBE to A-IBE, with ciphertext size to
be only twice large as the underlying IBE. We further refine the generic construction,
and for the first time achieve identity reuse. We believe that the efficient generic
transformations with preferable advanced properties can be an important step towards a
wider deployment of A-IBE thus may potentially stimulate the adoption of IBE schemes
in practice.
There are still several interesting open problems relating to the authority account-
ability in IBE schemes. One is to consider efficient generic construction of A-IBE with
fully blackbox traceability directly, the other is to do a systematic study about proactive
deterring mechanisms for IBE schemes. For the latter, our ongoing work suggests to
follow the leakage-deterring framework so that a master secret is embedded to each user,




Conclusions and Future Directions
Since we already summarized our results and described some open problems in
each chapter, here we would like the end the dissertation with a conceptual overview.
Research in computer security in general is to reach a good balance between usability
and security. The more information revealed, the easier for users to operations on the
data. Accountability is no exception.
One notable example is as follows: delegation and outsourcing are prominent func-
tionalities provided by the emerging new technology of cloud computing. While by
definition, our concept of leakage deterrence restricts the user from sharing his privileges
of using secret keys in any form. They are at two opposite ends. How to find a meeting
point, i.e., enable a fine-grained control of delegation, so that we can have the best of
both would be one of the most natural directions to explore.
This philosophy is the same in the setting of cliptography. Of course, we will have
to revisit cryptography in the new complete-subversion model; but eventually, we would
like to build a framework that enables an accountable surveillance.
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